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SECTION A

Some Thoughts for Bankruptcy Practitioners on Sarbanes-Oxley,
Related Regulatory Developments and the New Listing Standards
by Professor Robert M. Lawless
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
William S. Boyd School of Law
May 2003

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 1 has become a CLE staple. It is dangerous to
assume that Sarbanes-Oxley is relevant only to those who practice federal securities law.
Sarbanes-Oxley and accompanying regulatory changes will alter the legal landscape in
which publicly held corporations operate. A background on the provisions of SarbanesOxley is thus part of being a well-informed lawyer.
Beyond the goal of staying informed, bankruptcy practitioners have particular
reasons to become familiar with the changes that Sarbanes-Oxley has brought. SarbanesOxley and related regulatory developments will affect bankruptcy practice directly,
especially in the corporate reorganization area. Indeed, the new lawyer reporting
requirements could have spillover effects for many business lawyers, even those who
practice far away from the nation's financial centers. The same could be said for other
provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley.
These materials review five aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley and related regulatory
developments:

1 Pub.

L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
Generally, these materials will cite to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself. Some provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley are codified in chapter 98 of title 15 of the United States Code. Some provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley amend the Securities Act of 1933 ("the Securities Act"), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77 et seq.,
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("the Exchange Act"), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. Where
appropriate, these materials will cite to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act as well as the
implementing regulations of the Securities Exchange Commission contained in parts 239 (Securities Act)
and 240 (Exchange Act) of the Code ofFederal Regulations.
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1. New nondischargeability provisions for debts relating to securities fraud;
2. Sarbanes-Oxley's new lawyer reporting requirements for lawyers who
discover fraud or breach of fiduciary duty (including a breach of the fiduciary
duty to creditors);
3. Certification of financial statements by officers of reorganizing companies;
4. New causes of action created by Sarbanes-Oxley and what they mean for the
bankruptcy estate; and
5. The effects of new listing standards at the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") and the Nasdaq on reorganizing companies.

1. New Nondischargeability Provision
The provision of Sarbanes-Oxley that has the most obvious relevance to
bankruptcy practitioners is section 803, adding a new nondischargeability provision to
Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(19). A debt is now nondischargeable if it:
(A) is for(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities laws ... any of the State
securities laws, or any regulation or order issued under such Federal or State securities
laws; or
(ii) common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security; and
(B) results from(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered in any Federal or State
judicial or administrative proceeding;

(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor; or
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(iii) any court or administrative order for any damages, fine, penalty, citation,
restitutionary payment, disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment owed
by the debtor.

The terms of the nondischargeability provision is fairly straightforward. Debts resulting
from securities law liability are nondischargeable, but it should be noted that the debt
must be reduced to a judgment, embodied in a settlement, or contained in a court or
administrative order. Of course, as a nondischargeability provision, it applies only to
individual debtors.
Problems in application will come from the requirement that the debt be in a
judgment, settlement, or court or administrative order. Securities law debts will be
dischargeable unless they have reached this stage. Thus, a debtor perhaps can avoid a
finding of nondischargeability by filing bankruptcy before the debt is in a judgment,
settlement, or court or administrative order. The qualification "perhaps" is necessary
because new section 523(a)(19) bears a resemblance to the pre-1990 version of 523(a)(9)
which excepts drunk-driving debts. Before 1990, drunk driving debts were
nondischargeable only if they were embodied in a court judgment or consent decree. To
avoid unfair results, the bankruptcy courts developed a variety of doctrines that allowed a
finding of nondischargeability even in the absence of a court judgment or consent decree.
For example, some courts would find nondischargeability so long as the creditor had
initiated a court proceeding related to the drunk-driving debt. 2 It is possible, even likely,
that the experience under the pre-1990 version of section 523(a)(9) will repeat itself for

A summary of the pre-1990 case law under section 523(a)(9) appears at Lawrence Kalevitch, Cheers?
The Drunk-Driving Exception to Discharge, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213 (1989). It is likely this pre-1990 case
law may become influential in the intetpretation of new section 523(a)(19).
2
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the new nondischargeability provision of section 523(a)(19) and that courts will develop
similar doctrines.
Also, nondischargeability will become another bargaining point in settlement
negotiations for securities suits. Savvy defense lawyers will seek to have settlements
characterize a debt for conversion or some other non-securities wrong. Savvy plaintiffs'
lawyers will want to ensure the settlement agreement characterizes the debt as arising out
of a securities law violation to preserve nondischargeability. Indeed, a well-drafted
settlement agreement that aims to protect a plaintiff might even stipulate to
nondischargeability.

2. Lawyer Reporting
Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley directs the SEC to issue regulations regarding the
minimum standards of professional conduct attorneys appearing and practicing before the
commission. Specifically, Congress directed the SEC to include a requirement that
attorneys report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary
duty or a similar violation. The statute contemphlted that attorneys would first report to
general counselor an officer of the corporation. If the officer did not appropriately
respond, then the attorney was to report to the board of directors.
On November 21, 2002, the SEC issued proposed rules. 3 The proposed rules
went beyond the statutory directive and in some circumstances would have required a
lawyer who did not receive an appropriate response from the board of directors to
"withdraw noisily." Upon withdrawal, the lawyer would have been required to notify the
SEC. Because of the proposed rule's alteration of the fundamental attorney-client
3

Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (Dec. 2,2002).
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relationship, the proposal was very controversial. By the SEC's own characterization, the
proposal received "significant comment and extensive debate." The SEC received 167
comment letters on the proposal.
On January 29, 2003, the SEC issued its final rule. 4 This rule will go into effect
on August 5, 2003. Importantly, the final rule omitted the noisy withdrawal requirement.
The SEC, however, proposed an alternative and extended the comment period for the
noisy withdrawal requirement. The alternative would require the reporting company, not
the attorney, to report the attorney's withdrawal. Thus, the attorney would not be the
party directly reporting his or her withdrawal. There is little functional difference with
the proposed alternative. Whether the attorney or the company reported the withdrawal,
the information would still come out. Because the attorney's withdrawal would mean the
attorney believed company insiders refused to remedy a material breach of the securities
laws or their own fiduciary duties, the notice of such a withdrawal ordinarily would have
a significant negative effect on the company's stock price.
Because the SEC's rule works in ways that are not necessarily intuitive, it is
useful to review them in some detail. As a regulation of attorneys, the rule applies only
to attorneys appearing before the commission. s The rule's scope, however, reaches far
more individuals than that phrase might suggest. The phrase "appearing and practicing
before the Commission" means:
(i) Transacting any business with the Commission, including communications in any

fonn;

Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6,2003).
17 C.F.R. § 205 .1 (the attorney reporting requirements will appear at part 205 of title 17 of the Code of
Federal Regulations and all citations will refer to this codification of the rules).
4

5
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(ii) Representing an issuer in a Commission administrative proceeding or in connection
with any Commission investigation, inquiry, information request, or subpoena;
(iii) Providing advice in respect of the United States securities laws or the Commission's
rules or regulations thereunder regarding any document that the attorney has notice
will be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any document that will be filed
with or submitted to, the Commission, including the provision of such advice in the
context of preparing, or participating in the preparation of, any such document; or
(iv) Advising an issuer as to whether information or a statement, opinion, or other writing
is required under the United States securities laws or the Commission's rules or
regulations thereunder to be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any
document that will be filed with or submitted to, the Commission. 6

As can be seen by the scope of this rule, it is quite broad. It applies not only to those
representing clients to the SEC directly, but it also can apply to anyone working on
documents that at some point may become part of an SEC filing. The rule has two safe
harbors (1) for entities to whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship
or (2) non-appearing foreign attorneys.7 Violations of the rule not only subject an
attorney to discipline before the SEC but also subject the attorney to the full range of civil
penalties and remedies for a violation of the federal securities laws. 8
The reporting process is triggered by the attorney becoming "aware of evidence of
a material violation by the issuer" or its officers. 9 A "material violation" is:

See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(I).
See ide § 205.2(a)(2) (the phrase "non-appearing foreign attorney" is itself a defined term, see 17 C.F.R. §
205.20»
8 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.6.
9 See ide § 205.3
6

7
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a material violation of an applicable United States federal or state securities law, a
material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States federal or state law, or a
similar material violation of any United States federal or state law. lo

Once the attorney becomes aware of such a "material violation," the attorney must report
to the chief legal officer or to both the chief legal officer and the chief executive officer. 11
The chief legal officer, in turn, is obligated to begin an inquiry unless he or she
determines no material violation has occurred.
If the attorney reasonably believes that the chief legal officer or chief executive
officer has "provided an appropriate response within a reasonable time," the reporting
process ends. If not, the attorney must then report the violation to the board of
directors. 12 An alternative process can occur if the company has established a "Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee," which is basically a committee of independent directors
acting in a manner somewhat akin to an audit committee except to oversee the company's
legal services. 13 Regardless of the process, an attorney who does not receive an
appropriate response within a reasonable time must explain his or reasons to the chief
legal officer, the chief executive officer, and the board of directors.
The final rule gives the attorney an additional option. The attorney may reveal,
without the company's consent, confidential information to the extent the attorney
reasonably believes necessary to prevent the company from committing a material
violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest of the company
or investors. 14 In addition, the rule allows disclosure to rectify the consequences of a

Id. § 205.2(i).
llId. § 205.3.

10

See id
See id § 205.2(k).
14 See id § 205.3(d)(2).
12

13
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material violation that already has occurred if it has or will lead to substantial injury to
the fmancial interest of the company or investors. Note in either circumstance, the
material violation must lead to a "substantial injury" to financial interests. Thus, the rule
does not permit disclosure of client confidences to address small or trivial matters. The
attorney also may reveal confidential information to prevent perjury or a fraud on the
SEC.
The proposed rule was substantially different in that it required, as opposed to
merely permitting, the disclosure of client confidences. In addition, as noted above, the
proposed rule would have required the attorney to withdraw at this point and report the
withdrawal to the SEC. Neither the required disclosure nor the withdrawal requirement
are part of the final rule. The SEC is currently studying a proposal that would require
withdrawal and the report of the withdrawal to come from the company.
At this point, it is worth reminding ourselves not only that these rules apply to
attorneys appearing and practicing before the SEC but also that definition reaches many
attorneys. Advising clients about the scope of the securities law exemption in
Bankruptcy Code section 1145 arguably makes one an attorney appearing and practicing
before the SEC. Remember also that the concept of a "material violation" includes a
breach of fiduciary duty. This could include a breach of fiduciary duty to creditors.
Therefore, an attorney preparing documents for an insolvent company could run afoul of
the SEC reporting rules.
Another issue with the rules is that they could potentially create a standard of
conduct for professional liability. The final rule expressly disclaims that it creates a
private cause of action. There is a difference, however, between creating a cause of
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action and serving as the basis for an existing cause of action for professional
malpractice. An attorney who fails to report risky financial behavior that puts the
recovery of creditors in jeopardy may run afoul of the new reporting requirements, not
for their own sake but as a standard of conduct in a professional malpractice action.

3. Certification of Financial Statements
Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley imposes new certification requirements on both
the principal executive and principal financial officers of companies filing annual and
quarterly reports with the SEC. These officers must sign the quarterly and annual reports
filed with the SEC (typically the Forms 10-Q and 10-K). Signing these quarterly or
annual reports constitutes certifications that can be summarized as follows: 15

1. The signing officer has reviewed the report;
2. Based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact (or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make other statements not materially misleading);
3. Based on the officer's knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in the report fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer;
4. The signing officers have reviewed and assumed enumerated
responsibilities for the "disclosure controls" of the company;16

15These text contains only a summary of the actual provisions. The actual text of the statute and
implementing rule contain more detailed language and should be consulted to determine the precise
o~eration of these provisions.
1 Although the statutory text uses the term "internal controls," the SEC rule interpreted this to mean
"disclosure controls" as explained in the next paragraph.
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5. The signing officers have disclosed to the audit committee all·significant
deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls and a~y fraud,
whether or not material, that involves management or any employee who
has a significant role in the issuer's internal controls; and
6. The signing officers have indicated in the report significant changes in
internal controls or other factors that could affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of evaluation.
These rules apply to any companies required to file reports under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 17
In its rules to implement section 302, the SEC provided some detail to these
requirements. First, the SEC clarified that the certification in the fourth item about
control designed to ensure adequate disclosure. The SEC termed these controls
"disclosure controls" and defined that tenn as:
controls and procedures of an issuer that are designed to ensure that information required
to be disclosed by the issuer in the reports that it files or submits under the [Securities
Exchange] Act is recorded, processed, summarized and reported within the time periods
specified in the Commission's rules and forms. Disclosure controls and procedures
include, without limitation, controls and procedures designed to ensure that information
required to be disclosed by an issuer in the reports that it files or submits under the
[Securities Exchange] Act is accumulated and communicated to the issuer's management,
including its principal executive officer or officers and principal financial officer or
17 Generally speaking, companies traded on a national securities exchange or companies with publicly held
equity and that have more than 500 shareholders of record and more than $10 million in total assets must
register with the SEC, see Exchange Act § 12(g)(l); SEC Rule 12g-1, and are thereby subject to reporting
requirements, see Securities Exchange Act § 13(a). In addition, section 15(d) of the Exchange Act requires
registration and reporting by persons who issue securities pursuant to a registration statement under the
Securities Act. The main effect of section 15(d) is to require reporting by companies that issue only
publicly held debt that trades off the national exchanges.
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officers, or persons perfonning similar functions, as appropriate to allow timely decisions
regarding required disclosure.

Thus, the SEC distinguished the concept of "disclosure controls" from the more common
tenn "internal controls." As the SEC uses the tenn, disclosure controls help to ensure a
company adequately meets its public reporting obligations, while financial controls
concern a company's financial accounting. The signing corporate officers certify not
only that they have designed the disclosure controls to be effective but also that they have
evaluated the effectiveness of these controls within ninety days of making the
certification. 18
The other important feature of the SEC rules is that they require the corporate
officers' certification to be in the exact form mandated by the rule. The wording of the
required certification may not be changed in any respect even if the change would appear
.
. I·tn nature. 19
to b e tnconsequentta

Turnaround professionals and other newcomers to a financially distressed
company may find these certification requirements troubling. A new executive stepping
into a company will be required to make these certifications the same as one who had
been there for years. The requirement of a review of the company's disclosure controls
within ninety days before the certification also is the same for new as well as long-time
executives. Although the rule's language would seem to allow reliance on a review
conducted by a predecessor officer, that result is not clear. In the event, the new officer
would be making a certification based on someone else's work, and in the context of a
financially distressed or reorganizing company there are often reasons not to rely on the
See SEC Rules 13a-14(b)(4), 13a-15, 15d-14(b)(4), 15d-15
See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg.57,276 (Sept.
9, 2002). The forms for the required certification also contain a similar statement. See id.
18

19

A-II

predecessor officer. The certifications will be required any time distressed or
reorganizing companies file quarterly or annual reports with the SEC.
The consequences for filing a false certification are potentially severe. All of the
Exchange Act's liability provisions come into play, including liability under general
antifraud provisions like Rule 10b-5. This includes potential criminal liability under the
Exchange Act as well as civil enforcement actions by the SEC and private lawsuits by
individual investors.
In addition to liability under the Exchange Act, section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350) added a new crime to the federal criminal code. A
knowingly false certification carries a potential $1,000,000 fine and up to 10 years in
prison, and a willfully false certification carries a potential $5,000,000 fine and up to 20
years in prison. Moreover, this new crime might have a potentially broader reach than
the reporting requirements of section 302. Under the new crime, the chief executive and
chief financial officers must certify that the information contained in a "periodic report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the issuer." Although the certification requirements in the section 302 reporting
provisions contain similar language, the new provision in the criminal code is not tied to
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). Thus, a plausible but extreme
interpretation would criminalize a certification when financial statements complied with
GAAP but off-balance sheet items meant the financial statements did not "fairly present"
the financial condition of the company.
Given these substantial consequences, the Sarbanes-Oxley certification rules
definitely raise the stakes for turnaround and reorganization professionals stepping into a
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financially distressed company. Certainly, new executives might simply refuse to sign
the required certification. Such a decision, however, would place the·company in breach
of its reporting obligations under the Exchange Act. Both the company and executive
would face enforcement proceedings from the SEC. With the stakes raised, the
certification requirements will add another burden to turnaround and reorganization
professionals. It is likely to lead to demands for higher compensation and possibly
broader indemnification. There also exists the possibility that it will simply become more
difficult to find turnaround professionals willing to take a job at a company unless
assurances can be provided that the new executive will be able to make the certifications
required by Sarbanes-Oxley.

4. New Causes of Action for the Bankruptcy Estate
Sarbanes-Oxley added a number of new causes of action to the federal securities
laws. For the bankruptcy professional, an important question will be whether these
causes of action will become part of the bankruptcy estate, and, if not, how these causes
of action will affect the reorganization process.

1. Section 304: Return ofBonus and Incentive Compensation after an
Accounting Restatement
Section 304 adds a new cause of action when an issuer must prepare an
accounting restatement because of material noncompliance. If the restatement results
from misconduct, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer must reimburse
the issuer for:
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(1) Any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation
received by the CEO or CFO for the twelve-month period following the first
public issuance or filing with the SEC of the document with the incorrect
financial information and
(2) Any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that
twelve-month period.
This section's operation is prophylactic. There is no requirement that the chief executive
officer or chief financial officer have participated in the misconduct leading to the
financial restatement. Because section 304 creates a cause of action in favor of the
"issuer," it would clearly become property of the bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy
Code section 541. In chapter 11 s that have been preceded by an accounting restatement,
this new cause of action will be further grounds for appointment of a chapter 11 trustee if
management has remained in place.

2. Section 306: Trading Bars on Corporate Directors and Executive Officers
During Pension Fund Blackout Periods
Section 306 bars trading by corporate directors and executive officers in the
company's stock during any pension fund blackout period. This section was adopted on
the heels of reports that Enron insiders avoided huge losses by selling their company
stock at a time when low-level employees were prohibited from selling their holdings
because of temporary restrictions in the company's stock plans. To enforce the trading
bar, section 306 states that any profit earned by a director or executive officer in violation
of the trading bar will inure to the benefit of the company. In provisions that parallel
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section 16(b) of the Exchange Act,20 the issuer may bring a suit to recover these profits,
but any "individual security holder may sue after the issuer fails or refuses to bring a suit
within sixty days after the security holder requests. As with section 16(b), winning
plaintiffs are likely to get their attorneys' fees under the common fund doctrine. The
statute of limitations is two years.
Again, section 306 clearly states that the recovery inures to the issuer. Therefore,
it certainly becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Like the section 304 recovery of
bonuses and trading profits, corporate insiders will have little interest to bring suits
enforcing the trading ban during pension fund blackouts. Still, the right of an individual
security holder to sue means it is less likely that the existence of "section 306 pensionfund trading ban" actions will be grounds for appointment of a trustee. There will be no
need to appoint a chapter 11 trustee to prosecute the action because individual security
holders may do so.

3. Section 308: Fair Funds for Investors
Known as the "Fair Funds for Investors" provision, section 308 of SarbanesOxley does not add a new cause of action but instead changes how the SEC may
distribute civil penalties. Previously, the SEC was required to return the amount of any
civil penalty to the United States Treasury. Under section 308, if the SEC obtains a
disgorgement order that returns funds to victims of a securities violation, the amount of
any additional civil penalty the SEC also obtains may be added to the fund. The SEC

20 Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act authorizes recover of short-swing insider trading profits, that is
trading profits earned by a section 16 insider (a director, officer, or more than 10% shareholder) based on a
matched purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) during a six-month period.
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must request and receive court approval to add the civil penalty to the disgorgement fund
for the benefit of the victims of the securities violation.
Of course, the rights under section 308 belong to the SEC and could not accrue to
the bankruptcy estate. Nevertheless, section 308 could affect financially distressed or
reorganizing companies. First, by creating a potentially larger recovery for victims of a
securities violation, the "fair funds" provision could reduce the amount of claims victims
assert against the issuer. Of course, this only matters if the civil penalty and
disgorgement that create the fund come from sources other than the company itself,
which might be the case if the corporation's individual officers or directors paid. Second,
one wonders whether the company could subrogate to the rights of victims of a securities
violation or otherwise recover from the fund. The statute directs that the fund be paid
"for the benefit of the victims" of the securities violation. If a company has paid victims
of a securities violation perpetrated by one of its officers and the officer then pays a civil
penalty, the company might assert a claim against the fund by standing in the shoes of the
victim. There might be two problems with such an assertion. Unless the company had
paid the victims in full, it would be competing against out-of-pocket victims and trying to
assert rights under an equitable doctrine of subrogation. In addition, the discretion to
create the fund rests with the SEC, which may not feel moved to do so if the principal
beneficiary of the fund will be the company from whence the fraud came.

4. Sections 201 & 206,17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (c) (4)
Pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley sections 201 and 206 and the implementing SEC
regulations adopted under section 208, the list of non-audit services that a public

A - 16

accountant may provide to its audit clients has been drastically shrunk. To be considered
"independent," an auditor may not provide the following non-audit services to a client:
1. Bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or
financial statements of the audit client;
2. Financial information systems design and implementation;
3. Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-inkind reports;
4. Actuarial services;
5. Internal audit outsourcing services;
6. Management functions;
7. Human resources;
8. Broker-dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services;
9. Legal services; and
10. Expert services unrelated to the audit.
Section 10A(h) of the Exchange Act now provides that audit committees have to
preapprove the provision of any nonaudit services, including tax services, that are not on
this list and thereby still permissible.
Nothing in the statute or implementing regulations expressly creates a cause of
action to enforce the ban on nonaudit services. Nevertheless, it would now be against
public policy for an accountant to engage in the services listed above while at the same
time doing the audit for a company filing reports with the SEC. Although the regulations
provide some detail to the list of provided services, the list still has room for substantial
ambiguity. It is conceivable some insolvent companies could seek to recharacterize some
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past services provided by an auditor as falling within a prohibited category and seek
refund of the fees. Solvent companies would be less likely to seek a recharacterization
because it would jeopardize their ongoing relationship with their auditors. In either case,
the audit committee's approval of the nonaudit services might estop the issuer from
pressing for the recharacterization.
For nonpublic companies, these rules also will have relevance as they reflect the
legislative and regulatory expectations of professional conduct by accountants. In other
words, these laws now represent the public policy regarding nonaudit services. Much
like the attorney reporting rules discussed supra Part 2, the ban on nonaudit services
could come to reflect a standard of professional conduct for even nonpublic companies.
Insolvent smaller businesses might find it worthwhile to bring suit, arguing an auditor's
nonaudit services were against public policy and demand a return of the auditor's fee.
Certainly, smaller businesses have constraints not faced by large public companies, and it
is unrealistic to expect smaller business to incur the financial costs of hiring a second
accountant to perform all of the functions listed in the statute and regulations. These new
rules should not be transported blindly onto small company fact patterns, but there surely
will be cases that will tempt courts and attorneys to do so nonetheless.

5. Listing Standards
In addition to the requirements imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley, the NYSE and
Nasdaq are in the process of adopting new corporate governance standards. Companies
that wish to be listed on these exchanges will need to follow these corporate governance
guidelines. As a practical matter, these rules will not affect many companies operating in
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chapter 11 as the stock is delisted either before or shortly after the filing of the chapter 11
petition. Indeed, the NYSE corporate governance rules specifically give some
exemptions for companies operating in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, some of these rules
will raise difficult issues for companies wishing to come out of bankruptcy with publicly
traded securities or for companies operating near bankruptcy. As listing standards, these
new rules are not "law" as traditionally conceived. Nevertheless, the listing standards are
a type of private law that companies will have to follow if they want to publicly traded in
the United States.
An overview of these corporate governance changes is attached as an appendix.
As of this writing, these proposed rules are pending before the SEC for that agency's
approval. It is this author's understanding that the SEC is working with the NYSE and
Nasdaq to harmonize, to the extent possible, the requirements of the two exchanges.
Once these negotiations conclude, it is expected the SEC will approve these changes.
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The full text of the NYSE and Nasdaq corporate governance listing requirements can be found at the following URLs:
NYSE original proposal: http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp--..gov_pro_b.pdf
NYSE amendment: http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/amendl-04-09-03.pdf
Nasdaq original proposal and amendment: http://www.nasdaq.com/about/ProposedRuleChanges.stm#Recent

Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(primarily codified in
various provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and other federal
securities laws)

~ No comparable provision

>

A majority of the board
must consist of
independent directors,
except for companies with
a controlling shareholder.

(primarily codified in a
new section 303A of the
NYSE listed Company
Manual)

Special rules for audit
committee members

A director lacks
independence unless the
board affirmatively finds
the director has no
material relationship with
the company.

(Effective 24 months after
SEC approval)

No comparable provision

I

No comparable provision

Nonmanagement directors
must meet "regularly"
outside the presence of
management directors.
There may be a "presiding
director" for these sessions.

Subject to a FIVE-year
"cooling off' period:

•

receipt of nondirector
compensation in excess
of $100,000
former employees
affiliated w/ or
employed by auditor
interlocking directors,
compensation cmtes.
family members with
above
Subject to a THREE-year
"cooling off' period

•
•

I

~
~

I

I Committee
See Enhanced Audit
Independence

I

NYSE Listing
Requirements

I

I

(Effective six months after
SEC approval)

•

•
Nasdaq Listing
Requirements
(primarily codified as
amendments to NASD
Rules 4200 & 4350)

A majority of the board
must consist of
independent directors,
except for companies with
a controlling shareholder.
(Effective for first annual
meeting occurring after
January 1, 2004)

A director lacks
independence if (1) the
director is an officer or
employee of the issuer or
(2) the director has a
relationship which, in the
opinion of the board,
would interfere with the
exercise of independent
judgment in carrying out
the responsibilities of
director

•
•
•

same as above plus
receives nondirector
compensation in excess
of $60,000
shareholder or officer
of company that
received $200,000 or
more in payments

Independent directors must
have "regularly scheduled"
meetings at which only
independent directors are
present.

I

(Effective six months after
SEC approval)

Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(primarily codified in various
provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and
other federal securities laws)

I

No comparable rules on
compensation generally,
but:

•
•

NYSE Listing
Requirements

>
~
~

(primarily codified in a new
section 303A of the NYSE
listed Company Manual)

No comparable provision

No exchange may allow
trading of company which
does not meet audit
committee rules, § 301.

Bar on officer &
director loans, § 402
Disgorgement of
performance-based
compensation after
material
misstatements, § 304

Must be a compensation
committee, with a written
charter, composed entirely
of independent directors.
The compensation
committee must approve
the CEO's compensation.

•
•
Must be a nominating
committee, with a written
charter, composed
entirely of independent
directors. Contractual
obligations or securities
rights to nominate
directors will be honored.

•
•
•
•

Nasdaq Listing
Requirements
(primarily codified as
amendments to NASD Rules
4200 & 4350)

A majority of
independent directors or
compensation committee
with exclusively
independent directors
must determine CEO
compensation. Other
officer compensation
determined the same way
with possibility of CEO
attendance at meeting.

•

Directors must be
nominated by a majority
of the independent
directors or a nominations
committee consisting
solely of independent
directors.
(NOTE: Neither nomination
nor compensation rules
requirements apply to
"controlled companies.")

•
•
•
•

Must have written
charter
Sole authority to
hire/ fire auditors
Must approve
nonaudit relationships
still allowed by
Sarbanes-Oxley.
Other "laundry list"
of duties
Must have written
charter
Sole authority to
hire/fire auditors
Must approve
nonaudit relationships
still allowed by
Sarbanes-Oxley
Approve all relatedparty transactions.

•

•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Only directors who
do not receive
consulting or other
compensatory fees
from the company
Not an "affiliated
person" with the
company, § 301
Disclose whether
cmte. has a "financial
expert," § 407
No other
compensation from
issuer
All must be
"financially literate."
One must have
"financial
management
expertise"
Can't own 20% or
more of issuer's
voting stock
No other
compensation from
issuer
Must have basic
financial skills
Must be chaired by a
"financial expert."
n/a to small-business
filers

Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(primarily codified in various
provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and
other federal securities laws)

NYSE Listing
Requirements

>
~

(primarily codified in a new
section 303A of the NYSE
Listed Company Manual)

Each issuer must disclose
whether company has a
code of ethics for senior
fmancial officers, § 406.

No comparable provision,
which is causing concerns
for foreign issuers that
must comply with homecountry legal
requirements that conflict
with Sarbanes-Oxley
rules.

All listed companies will
be expected to have a
code of conduct applicable
to all directors, officers,
and employees.

Non-US companies will
need to disclose the
significant ways in which
home-country practices
differ from those
followed by domestic
companies under NYSE
listing standards. This
disclosure will need to be
on the company's web
site and/or annual report.

•

Each issuer must have a
code of conduct
applicable to all directors,
officers, and employees.

Foreign issuers may
continue to receive
exemptions from Nasdaq
corporate-governance
rules that conflict with
home-country law, but
these exemptions will
need to be disclosed
annually in the foreign
issuer's 10-K.

•

01

Nasdaq Listing
Requirements
(primarily codified as
amendments to NASD Rules
4200& 4350)

•
•

•

Also new rules on shareholder approval of equity
compensation plans
Disclose corporate governance practices on
company web site
NYSE may issue a public reprimand for violation'
of corporate governance rules. Suspension of
trading or delisting is a possibility for "flagrant and
repeated" violation of the corporate governance
rules.

Also new rules on shareholder approval of equity
compensation plans
Nasdaq is considering new rules to

o Prohibit loans to officers and directors through
the adoption of a NASDAQ rule that mirrors
section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley
o Require continuing education for directors
o Require accelerated disclosure of insider
transactions that would harmonize with, and
reinforce, the provisions of the Act and the SEC
rules promulgated thereunder
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I. RIDING LESSONS: HOW TO RIDE-THROUGH WITHOUT VIOLATING THE
DEBTOR'S' DISCHARGE
A.

What is Ride-Through?
Debtors who wish to keep collateral after a discharge need not always enter into
reaffinnation agreements with their creditors. Instead, they may be allowed to use "ridethrough," a judicially developed nonstatutory variant of voluntary repayment.
Remember that while a Chapter 7 debtor's personal liability will be discharged, a secured
creditor will retain its lien on the collateral. Suppose a Chapter 7 debtor's car is subject to
a security interest, and the debtor either has never missed a car payment or has cured any
arrearages before filing. If such a debtor wants to keep the car, the creditor might not
insist on reaffinnation. Instead, the creditor might leave the car with the debtor and
continue to accept payments, through and after the bankruptcy. The effect is to transfonn
the claim into a nonrecourse debt. The debtor's personal liability has been discharged but
the lien lives on as a strong incentive to voluntary payment. If the debtor stops mailing
payments, the creditor may repossess the car. The debtor will not, however, be liable for
a deficiency.
Creditors may consent to ride-through. The fighting question, however, is whether ridethrough is available only by creditor consent or is instead a debtor's right. That question
is not clearly answered by the Code, and h(is divided the circuits. As of this writing, four
circuits hold that a debtor current on payments has a right to ride-through, to retain the
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collateral as long as the payments keep coming. 1 Four others hold that there is no right to
ride-through, if the creditor objects. 2 In those circuits, the creditor may require the debtor
to reaffirm to keep the car.
Ride-through is advantageous to debtors in that they need not reassume personal liability.
If later they cannot continue the payments, they may lose the collateral, but will not be
liable for a deficiency. However, to keep the collateral, the debtor will have to make all
the payments required by the original contract, even if the collateral is worth much less.
The fact that the debtor may repay more than the current value of the collateral may
make ride-through attractive to creditors as well. However, creditors have raised
concerns that debtors with no personal liability have little incentive to keep the collateral
in good condition. 3 A further problem is uncertainty over what contacts creditors may
have with ride-through debtors without violating the discharge injunction.Several recent
decisions have addressed the post discharge procedural plight of the creditor whose debtor
has elected ride-through.

B.

Post Discharge Ride-Through Procedure
The court in Ramirez v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., (In re Ramirez), 273 B.R.
620 (Bankr. C.D. Ca. 2002), rejected the debtor's argument that the creditor violated the
discharge injunction when it sent its regular monthly billing statement to the debtor for

For cases holding a debtor may ride-through despite a creditor's objection, see In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668 (9th Cir.
1998); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43 (2nd Cir. 1997); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992); In re Lowry Federal
Credit Union, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989). See generally Michael P. Alley, Redemption, Reaffirmation, Exemption,
and Retention in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy: Extinction Looms Near for the Free Ride, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 683 (1999)
(discussing the current status of ride-through). See also Ned W. Waxman, Redemption or Reaffirmation: The Debtor's
Exclusive Means ofRetaining Possession ofCollateral in Chapter 7, 56 U. PITT. L. REv. 187 (1994); Oliver B. Pollak,
Reaffirmation andRetention in Bankruptcy: Conflict in the Circuits Over Protecting the Secured Creditor, 111 BANKING
L.J. 302 (1994); Thomas J. Cunningham, Postpetition Payments on Secured Debt; Ipso Facto Clauses and Their
Relationship to Reaffirmation Agreements, 20 CAL. BANKR. J. 213 (1992).
2 For cases holding the debtor has no right to ride-through if the creditor objects, see In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843 (1st Cir.
1998); In re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d
1383 (7th Cir. 1990).
3 NBRC Report, supra note 37, at 166.
1
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six months following the discharge and thereafter sent a billing statement that contained a
new heading: "Transaction Summary of Voluntary Payments Made" and a new comment
"Voluntary Payments Must Be Timely Received by GMAC if You Wish to Retain Your
Vehicle." The Ramirez court ruled that these statements amounted to an informational
courtesy and not an effort to collect the debt a sap ersonall iability. Ins 0 holding the
court observed "to hold that a secured creditor is precluded from sending monthly billing
statements to a debtor would not eliminate all contact between debtors and creditors.
Rather, such a ruling would solely force debtors to guess, with little guidance, the due
date and proper amount of their payments." Id. at 258.
A Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel agreed with the Ramierez court that monthly
billing statements sent by the creditor to its ride-through debtor did not violate the
discharge injunction in Garske v. Arcadia Financial Ltd. (In re Garske), 2002 W.L.
31922081 (9th Cir. BAP 2002). The court held that post discharge contacts with the
debtor are necessary and do not violate the discharge injunction as long as the
communications do not indicate that the debtor is personally liable for the debt.
Moreover, post discharge telephone collection efforts directed at a debtor who is
delinquent on ride-through payments do not constitute per se violations of the discharge
injunction. As long as the creditor confines any conversation with the debtor to requests
for payment as a condition to continued possession of the collateral, there is no violation
of the discharge injunction because the injunction protects the debtor only from efforts to
collect the debt as a personal liability.

In so holding, the BAP disagreed with the

bankruptcy court's ruling in Henry v. Associates Equity Home Services, 266 B.R. 457,
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472-73 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2001) that only written communications between creditor and
debtor are permitted is such circumstances.
In Henry the creditor attempted to contact the debtors "some 90 times" "at home and at

work, left telephone messages, threatened action if the debtors did not make payments
and sent delinquency letters." Henry at 470. Half of these calls were made before the
debtors' discharge and half thereafter. In the process of holding that few of the 90
contacts were proper and that most violated the automatic stay or the discharge
injunction, the bankruptcy court laid out in specific and practical terms permissible
creditor conduct both pre and post discharge where a debtor intends to retain the
collateral by ride-through. Here, according to Bankruptcy Judge Sam Bufford, are the
dos and don'ts:
1)

Don't contact the debtor concernIng his or her intentions regarding
collateral if the debtor has timely filed and properly stated his or her
statement of intention concerning the collateral.

2)

Do send monthly statements, payment coupons or other means of
facilitating monthly payments where the debtor states an intention to ridethrough.

3)

Do give the debtor written notice of the creditor's intention to foreclose on
the collateral in the event of a post-discharge default on ride-through
payments.

4)

Do give the debtor all the required notices necessary or appropriate to
foreclose on collateral under applicable state law in the event of postdischarge defaults on ride-through payments.
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In communicating with the debtor, careful word selection can be the deciding factor as to whether or

not the discharge injunction is being violated. Recall that in Ramirez, GMAC sent a regular
monthly billing statement to the debtor for six months following the discharge. Thereafter, GMAC
sent a billing statement that contained a new heading:

"Transaction Summary of Voluntary

Payments Made" and a new comment "Voluntary Payments Must Be Timely Received by GMAC if
You Wish to Retain Your Vehicle." The Ramirez court held that these statements amounted to an
infonnational courtesy and not an effort to collect the debt as a personal liability.

II. POST DISCHARGE REDEMPTION AGREEMENTS
Sears' post-petition redemption agreements received the Circuit Court of Appeals' stamp of
approval in Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2002). The fonner Chapter 7
debtors unsuccessfully argued that Sears violated the discharge injunction and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act when it sent letters after discharge requesting the debtors to contact its
office to arrange for turning over the household goods securing Sears' claims. When the debtors
contacted Sears, they were advised they could either surrender the collateral or redeem it by paying
its fair market value as detennined by Sears. The Sears redemption agreements explicitly stated that
a failure to pay the redemption amount would not impose a personal liability on the debtor.
Therefore, the First Circuit held, the agreements were not disguised reaffinnation agreements and §
524(c) did not affect their enforceability. Nor was the discharge injunction violated because Sears
was merely acting within its in rem rights when it contacted the debtors post discharge concerning
the disposition of the collateral.

Furthennore, said the court, bankruptcy court approval of

redemption agreements is not required under section 722.
With respect to the FDCPA claim, the First Circuit held that the debtors' complaint did not
allege that a debt collector falsely stated they had an obligation to pay money (a claim which would
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be cognizable under the FDCPA). Rather, the complaint alleged only that Sears had contacted them
concerning the terms under which Sears was willing to abandon its right of repossession. As such,
the debtors failed to state a claim because these facts did not amount to the collection (or the
attempted collection) of a "debt" within the meaning of the FDCPA.

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REAFFIRMATION
A.

Reaffirmation Procedure
1.

The Present

Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Chapter 7 debtors often were persuaded to reaffirm so
much debt that the benefit of the discharge was lost. To remedy this problem, the Code of 1978
placed strict limitations on reaffirmation in section 524.

Section 524 makes "[R]eaffirmation

agreements...unenforceable unless they are entered into before...discharge and are approved by the
Court. These measures are necessary to prevent the debtor from being coerced into signing a
reaffirmation agreement and to enable the debtor to be fully aware of its consequences." In re
Smurzynski, 72 B.R. 368, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).

Section 524 requires a valid reaffirmation to:
~

Be enforceable under non-bankruptcy law.

~

Be made before discharge.

~

Contain a clear and conspicuous notice of the debtor's right to rescind and that the
debtor is not required by law to reaffirm any debt.

~

Be filed with the court.

~

Be accompanied by an affidavit from debtor's counsel which states:
~~

that the agreement is an informed and voluntary decision by the debtor;
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~~

that the agreement will not be an undue burden for the debtor or his
dependents; and

~~

that counsel has advised the debtor ofthe legal effect ofthe agreement and of
default under the agreement.

Be approved by the court. If the debtor was not represented by counsel during the
negotiation of the reaffinnation agreement, the court must hold a hearing and
approve the agreement. To approve it, the court must find that it is not an undue
hardship and is in the best interest of the debtor (no court approval is required if the
debt is secured by the consumer's real property); and
Not be rescinded by the debtor before the later of the date of discharge or sixty days
after the agreement is filed with the court.
11 U.S.C. § 524(c).

2.

The Future?

On March 19, 2003, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 975, the "short" title of
which is the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003."

Similar to

prior legislative attempts to amend the Code, the 2003 House bill would alter the Bankruptcy Code
in several ways.

A useful resource on the 2003 legislation is Basic Documents Related to

Bankruptcy Refonn available at www.1aw.unlv.edu/faculty/bam/bkreform2003/bkrefonn.html. A
brief summary of the provisions ofH.R. 975 relating to ride-through, redemption and reaffinnation
follows.

NO RIGHT TO RIDE-THROUGH. Chapter 7 debtors would no longer have the right,
now recognized in four circuits, to retain collateral without reaffirmation or redemption if they are
current on the debt. Under the proposed bills, the debtor must state an intent to surrender, reaffinn
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or redeem (or assume a lease) and then perform the stated intention within forty-five days after the
§ 341 meeting.

If the debtor fails to comply, the stay automatically terminates as to affected

personal property on the forty-sixth day. No motion or hearing is required; the creditor may proceed
to repossess.
Exceptions: The stay does not automatically terminate: 1) as to real estate; 2) if the debtor
intends to reaffirm but the creditor refuses to reaffirm on the original contract terms; or 3) if the
trustee moves to retain because, and the court finds, the collateral is of value to the estate.
A creditor who violates the stay "in the good faith belief' that the stay had terminated will
be liable only for actual, not punitive, damages.

Apparently, a creditor can have this good faith

belief even without asking the court to confirm that the stay has terminated. See §§ 304-05 ofH.R.
975 and amending Code §§ 362 and 521.

POST-DISCHARGE BILLING ON NON-REAFFIRMED MORTGAGES.

While

debtors would have no right to impose ride-through on creditors, creditors could allow it. Home
mortgage creditors have often done so. H.R. 975 would allow mortgagees to send bills and other
communications to non-reaffirming debtors after discharge, if their intent is to seek periodic
payments. There is no similar exception to the discharge injunction for other types of creditors, but
the remedies for discharge violations are not very effective. See § 202 ofH.R. 975 amending Code §
524.

REAFFIRMATION. The reform bill leaves most ofthe current reaffirmation requirements
in place, but adds lots of new paperwork. Debtor's counsel will still be gatekeepers ofreaffirmation,
with the court acting for unrepresented debtors. The "undue burden" and "best interests" standards
are retained, as is the right to rescind until the later of discharge or sixty days after filing with the
court. The changes are:
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The creditor must give the debtor a lengthy disclosure statement, which includes
Truth-in-Lending-type information and legal advice in a "Frequently Asked
Questions" format. If the disclosures are wrong, they are still sufficient, that is, the
reaffirmation is binding, unless the debtor proves the creditor made the false
statements in bad faith.
The debtor must fill out an updated income and expense statement at the time of
reaffirmation. If that statement shows too little money for reaffirmation payments,
the reaffirmation is presumed an undue hardship (unless the creditor is a credit union
-- credit unions are apparently free to impose undue hardships). As Judge Wedoff
noted at this year's ABI annual meeting, nothing requires this statement of income
and expenses to be consistent with the original schedules. If the debtor and creditor
fudge it to make the payments appear affordable, that is unlikely to come to the
court's attention. Of course, if the debtor's attorney approves a reaffirmation based
on a faulty income statement, the attorney could be sanctioned. There is no express
good faith defense for debtor's counsel.
The presumption of undue hardship lasts until sixty days after a reaffirmation
agreement is filed with the court (and the court may extend the time for cause, after
notice and hearing). If the court does not act within sixty days, apparently the
presumption disappears and the reaffirmation becomes fully effective.

The

presumption may be rebutted if the debtor explains in writing where the money to
pay will come from. The court "may" disapprove a reaffirmation if the presumption
is not satisfactorily rebutted, but only upon notice and hearing to the debtor and
creditor, and that hearing must be concluded before discharge.
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Reaffirmations certified by debtor's counsel become effective as soon as they are
filed with the court, unless the undue hardship presumption applies. However, there
is no time limit for filing with the court and there are few real sanctions for failing to
file, except that the debtor's time to rescind does not begin to run until filing.
However, a creditor may accept payments from the debtor 1)

before the

reaffirmation agreement has been filed, and 2) under an otherwise invalid
reaffirmation agreement, if the creditor "believes in good faith" that it is effective.
The debtor may have difficulty proving bad faith here.
H.R. 975 leaves section 524 silent on remedies for discharge violation, and does not
directly address the use of class actions and contempt in that context. However, as
Judge Wedoffhas opined with respect to earlier House and Senate bills, making the
creditor's mental state an element will make class actions difficult.
The bankruptcy court apparently has no power to disapprove a reaffinnation which
debtor's counsel has approved, unless the undue hardship presumption applies.

See § 203 ofH.R. 975.

B.

Recent Developments: Post-Petition Reaffirmation Negotiations
Courts in the First and Ninth Circuits have held that the automatic stay does not forbid

post-petition negotiations pertaining to a reaffirmation agreement as long as the creditor does not
attempt to harass or coerce the debtor. Jamo v. Katahdin Federal Credit Union, 283 F.3d 392
(1st Cir. 2002); Bassett v. American General Finance, Inc., 255 B.R. 747, 758 (BAP 9th Cir.

2000), reversed in part on other grounds, 285 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the fact the
creditor conditions reaffirmation of a debt secured by the debtor's residence on the debtor's
reaffinnation of an unsecured debt is not per se coercive according to the First Circuit in Jamo.
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The Jamo court further held that the creditor did not "threaten" foreclosure when it made a
written reference to its right to foreclose. Furthermore, said the First Circuit, linking the debtor's
reaffirmation of the unsecured debt to reaffirmation of the secured debt was not coercive; the
creditor is not prohibited from exercising its superior bargaining power in the course of
reaffirmation negotiations.

C.

Bankruptcy Courts as "Ethical Watchdogs"
1.

May Bankruptcy Courts Review and Disapprove Reaffirmation Agreements
Approved by Debtor's Counsel?

The 1994 amendments to section 524 make it clear that the court is not required to hold a
hearing on any reaffirmation agreement that is accompanied by an affidavit or declaration from
debtor's counsel approving the agreement. See § 524(d). But the question remains whether the
court has residual power to review sua sponte and disapprove reaffirmation agreements which
debtor's counsel has approved. Robert Hessling in his treatise Reaffirmation and Redemption
(Michie 1994) states that a majority of courts have recognized a lack of power to approve or
disapprove of reaffirmations in these circumstances. Hessling at 204. In re Pendlebury, 94 B.R.
120 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988), is an example of that view:
Congress' intent that the court rely upon the declaration and affidavit filed by
counsel is made manifest under the 1984 amendments by removal of the
requirement of court approval except as to reaffirmation agreements entered into
by pro sed ebtors. I n practice reaffirmation hearings presently serve no useful
purpose except for debtors filing pro see Attorneys are rightly charged with the
responsibility for advising their clients during the reaffirmation process.
Pendlebury, 94 B.R. at 124.

Other cases holding that the bankruptcy court has no power to override counsel's approval
ofa reaffirmation agreement include In re Sweet, 954 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Bauer, 1997
WL 752652 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); In re French, 185 B.R. 910 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); In re
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Grinnell, 170 B.R. 495 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1994); In re Dabbs, 128 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991);
In re Wallace, 102 B.R. 54 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1989). See also Cox v. Zale Delaware, 239 F.3d 910
(7th Cir. 2001) Gudge cannot disallow reaffirmations that debtor's counsel approved) (dicta).
However, revelations of widespread abuse of the reaffirmation process, plus concern that
some attorneys do not adequately protect debtors from ill-advised reaffirmations, have recently led
many bankruptcy courts to review reaffirmation agreements even if they have the blessing of
debtor's counsel. Only two years after the Grinnell decision above, the bankruptcy court in Rhode
Island revisited the issue, saying "The absence of court oversight may be resulting in overreaching
by certain creditors, misrepresentation by certain debtors and/or their attorneys and the perversion of
the reaffirmation provisions of the Code." In re Izzo, 197 B.R. 11, 12 n. 2 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1996).
Among the other courts asserting power to override approval of reaffirmations by debtor's counsel
are BankBoston N.A. v. Nanton, 239 B.R. 419 (D. Mass. 1999) (listing cases on both sides of the
issue); In re Vargas, 257 B.R. 157 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2001); In re Collins, 243 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2000); In re Melendez (Melendez II), 235 B.R. 173 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re Lindley,
216 B.R. 811 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998); In re Melendez (Melendez I), 224 B.R. 252 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1998); In re Turner, 208 B.R. 434 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1997); In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. 382 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1996).
These courts locate the source of their authority to review such reaffirmations and monitor
debtors' attorneys' compliance with section 524(c) in section 105 and Bankruptcy Rule of
Procedure 9011. See, e.g., In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 165-66; Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 188-90;
Melendez I, 224 B.R. at 259-60; In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. at 450; In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. at 386.
Review is authorized under section 105 because it allows the court to make any determination and
take any action to ensure compliance with the Code, including the statutory predicates to a valid
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reaffinnation under section 524(c). Moreover, Bankruptcy Rule 9011 (making Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
applicable to bankruptcy proceedings) authorizes review of such agreements in order to monitor the
conduct of the debtors' attorneys who may file pleadings or other papers with the court without an
adequate factual foundation. Id.
The consequences of a judicial detennination of debtors' attorneys' noncompliance with the
statutory prerequisites to a reaffinnation have included annulling the reaffinnation agreement after
striking the attorney's declaration (In re Bruzzese; Melendez IL· In re Vargas) and ordering a return
of the debtor's attorney's fees to the debtor (In re Vargas; In re Bruzzese) under the authority of
section 329(b). Courts have also considered whether to impose Rule 9011 sanctions on debtors'
attorneys for signing the section 524(c) attorney declaration without adequate factual investigation
and support (Melendez IL· In re Bruzzese; In re Izzo).

2.

Bankruptcy Court Guidance on Debtors' Attorneys' Obligations in the
Reaffirmation Process

The Hovestadt, Bruzzese, Melendez I and IL Nanton and Vargas line of cases have fleshed
out, sometimes in great detail, the obligations of a debtor's attorney under section 524(c).
1.

Counsel Must Decide Whether to Fish or Cut Bait

In In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 163, the court admonished debtors' counsel to make a

conscious, deliberate decision whether to involve themselves in the reaffinnation process.
Debtors' attorneys have a choice to make when presented with their clients'
reaffinnation agreements. They may remain strictly advocates and decline to sign
the requisite declaration attached to the reaffinnation agreement. The court
recognizes that attorneys' execution of these certifications may place some attorneys
in a position of conflict * * * Specifically, attorneys may not wish to undertake the
reaffinnation process because they would be taking on roles akin to in loco parentis.
If this is the case, then attorneys are not obligated to take on the duties of
independently assessing their clients' financial status.
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The Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct make the client the decision maker on substantive matters
and instruct the attorney to "abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation." Model Rules of ProfI Conduct R. 1.2(a). The attorney is further required to "act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." Model Rule 1.3. The decision
to reaffinn is with the client. The attorney must abide by the client's decision and use 'reasonable
diligence' and "competent representation'~ to negotiate the best possible agreement. However, the
attorney may withdraw if "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers...
imprudent." Model Rule 1.16(b)(3).5
The attorney may "limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after
consultation." Model Rule 1.2(c). Limiting the scope of representation can be achieved by limiting
the representation through an agreement with the client or by the tenns under which the attorney
provides the services, commonly in the retainer agreement. Official Comment 4, Model Rule 1.2.
However, if the attorney undertakes to represent the debtor in a reaffinnation process, the certifying
process of §524(c) imposes additional obligations on the attorney.
According to Rule 9011, the presentation of a reaffinnation agreement and the
accompanying §524(c) declaration to the court represents that the contentions have evidentiary
support after conducting a reasonable inquiry. Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b)(3). By certifying the
reaffinnation agreement, the attorney is certifying that, after a reasonable inquiry, the reaffinnation
is voluntary, the debtor has been fully infonned as to the legal consequences, and the agreement will
not impose an undue hardship. The attorney will have only complied with Rule 9011 after "an

Model Rule 1.1 defining competence.
client insistence on reaffrrming a dischargeable debt could be labeled 'imprudent.' Consider In re Jamo 262
B.R. 159 (B.A.P. 1st Cir 2001) where the client insisted on reaffirming over 82% of their prepetition debt. A strong
argument could be made for withdrawal in a situation such as this.
4

S Arguably,
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appropriate investigation" that considers "the totality of the circumstances." In re Melendez(II), 235
B.R. 173, 195 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999).
Given the possibility that the debtor's attorney will be unable to

SIgn

off on the

reaffirmation, counsel might be well advised early on to explain to her client the in loco parentis
role that section 524(c) requires her to play. Model Rule 1.2(e) provides: "When a lawyer knows
that a client expects assistance not permitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the
lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct."
(Emphasis added.) Model Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.2(e). Moreover, Model Rule 1.16(a)(I)
requires counsel to withdraw from representation of a client if the "representation will result in
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law." Model Rules of Profl Conduct R.
1.16(a)(1).
Accordingly, the debtor's attorney may wish to limit the scope of her representation of the
debtor by expressly excluding reaffirmation from the retainer agreement. Model Rule 1.2(c) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:

"A lawyer may limit the objectives of the

representation if the client consents after consultation." If the attorney later decides not to represent
the debtor concerning a reaffinnation, the Model Rules appear6 to allow the attorney to withdraw
from the representation. Model Rule 1.16(b)(3) allows withdrawal if "a client insists upon pursuing
an objective that the lawyer considers ... imprudent." The Model Rules further require the
withdrawing attorney "to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable" to protect the client's
interests. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.16(d).
2.

What Constitutes a Reasonable Inquiry Under Rule 9011?

Undue Hardship
6 This assumes that bankruptcy practitioners generally regard reaffirmations, unless expressly excluded, to be one ofthe
multiple services they provide toe hapter 7 clients. I f r eaffrrmations are not so regarded, withdrawal would be
unnecessary since counsel never undertook to represent the debtor in connection with a reaffirmation.
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One frequently cited description of a reaffinnation which poses an undue hardship is one
that ''would result in a significant, but otherwise avoidable, obstacle to the attainment or retention of
necessaries by the debtor or the debtor's dependents." Melendez I, 224 B.R. at 261 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1998).
The "tests" of undue hardship focus largely on the debtor's and the debtor's dependents'
postpetition ability to pay the reaffinned debt.

Thus, "payment of a reaffinned debt cannot

constitute an undue hardship where funds come from disposable income," Melendez I, 224 B.R. at
270 n. 23.

Reaffinnations by debtors whose postpetition monthly income exceeds monthly

expenses have been approved as not an undue hardship. Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 200.
However, where Schedules I and J reveal that the debtor's postpetition expenses exceed
income and there have been no subsequent improvements in the debtor's financial circumstances,
courts entertain "serious doubts" about the burden posed by the reaffinnation payments. In re

Strong, 232 B.R. at 924 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1999); Melendez 11,235 B.R. at 197; Melendez 1,224
B.R. at 261; In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. at 386 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). Interestingly, the Melendez II
court suggested that a monthly deficit is not necessarily dispositive of the undue hardship issue for
the attorney considering whether to certify the debtor's reaffinnation. In making the undue hardship
assessment, the attorney must
be fully conversant with the financial circumstances of both the debtor and the
debtor's dependents. An attorney should analyze the income and expenses of the
debtor's household, including a review and update of the infonnation contained in
the debtor's Schedules I and J. If it appears that the debtor's expenses will exceed
his or her postpetition income, and if reaffinnation of the debt is not necessary to
retain an item which the debtor or his or her dependents require for their wellbeing-or if the item itself is not necessary-then payment of the reaffinned debt in
addition to the debtor's existing expenses would clearly jeopardize the debtor's
ability to pay for necessary living expenses and impose an undue hardship on the
debtor or his or her dependents.

Melendez 11,235 B.R. at 197.
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Several recent decisions hold that where the reaffinnation is before the court for a
determination whether it poses an undue hardship and is in the best interests of the debtor, the
analysis is not solely a function of a debtor's income and expenses. In BankBoston, N.A. v. Nanton,
239 B.R. 419, 425-26 (D. Mass. 1999), the district court held that the debtor's Schedules I and J
(showing a monthly deficit) raised only a prima facie concern about her ability to pay.
While the standards of "undue hardship" and "best interest" may involve an
evaluation of debtor's ability to pay, they may possibly implicate several other
factors, including 1) what alternatives, other than reaffinnation, are available to a
debtor who wishes to retain an interest in property, 2) whether the underlying debt is
secured or unsecured, 3) if the debt is secured, the threat of repossession of and the
amount of equity in the collateral, and the extent to which the collateral is a necessity
to the Debtor, see Melendez, 224 B.R. at 259 n. 9, 260, and 4) the debtor's payment
history on the collateral.

Nanton, 239 B.R. at 425-26. Accord, In re Claflin, 249 B.R. 840, 847 (BAP 1st Cir. 2000); In re
Strong, 232 B.R. 921,924 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1999).
Fully Infonning the Debtor
In Melendez II, the court summarized the minimum obligations of debtor's counsel before
certifying that the debtor has been fully infonned of the legal effect and consequences of a
reaffinnation agreement and any default thereunder.
At a minimum, debtor's counsel must:
****
(2) review the security agreement, charge slips, payment history and other
documentation constituting the security interest claimed by the creditor in order to
verify the amount of the creditor's claim, the validity, extent and perfection of the
alleged security interest and the non-avoidability of the alleged lien under the
Bankruptcy Code;
(3) question the value placed on the goods by the secured creditor and
independently estimate that value;
(4) evaluate the risk of replevy by the creditor, in light of the age, condition
and value of the goods versus the need of and cost to the debtor to retain the items at
risk; and demand a replevy decision from the secured creditor prior to execution of
the reaffinnation agreement;
(5) discuss relevant financial disclosures with the debtor;
(6) ensure that the agreement was entered into voluntarily and without
creditor misrepresentations or coercion;
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(7) ensure that the debtor ·understands the effect and consequences 0 f the
agreement and the consequences of default;
(8) ensure that the debtor is informed as to his or her options with respect to
the collateral under the Bankruptcy Code; and
(9) advise the debtor as to alternative sources of credit.
Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 203. Accord, see, e.g., In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 165-66; In re Bruzzese,
214 B.R. at 452-55; In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. at 386-87.
Several items on this "to do" list deserve further comment.

The "relevant financial

disclosures" concerning the reaffirmation agreement (item 5 on the Melendez II list) are akin to the
disclosures required by the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, and similar applicable
state law. These include the "annual percentage rate, a statement on when the payments are due, the
applicable grace period, the method for determining finance charges and late payments or over-thelimit charges" as well as "the amount of the prepetition claim; the principal amount of the
reaffirmed debt; the minimum monthly payment on the reaffirmed amount; and the amount, if any,
of an extension or renewal of the debtor's credit line." Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 198-99. See also In
re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. at 451.
Unfortunately for present purposes, Truth-in-Lending's disclosure requirements have been
interpreted not to apply to reaffirmation agreements. Regulation Z exempts changes in credit terms
that are due to "an agreement involving a court proceeding." 12 CFR §§ 226.9(c)(2); 226, 20(a)
(1998).

Federal Reserve Staff Interpretations have extended this exemption to reaffirmation

agreements. Perhaps exemption made sense when bankruptcy courts were required to approve each
reaffirmation. Court's oversight could protect debtors from deceptive and unduly burdensome
reaffirmations. However, the 1984 amendments made debtor's counsel, if any, the reaffirmation
gatekeeper. Under this regime, the great majority ofreaffirmations are never seen by the judge; they
are simply lodged in the debtor's court, file.

Thus, the reasons underlying the reaffirmation

exemption have arguably ceased to prevail.
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Two recent cases addressing the need for standard disclosure of credit terms and the
application of Truth-in-Lending to reaffirmation agreements are In re Kamps, 217 B.R. 836, 848-50
(C.D. Cal. 1998); In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. 444, 458 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
In Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 203, the court observed that such information is not "necessarily

at the disposal of the debtor's attorney. Some of this information is exclusively within the control of
the creditor. However, where a creditor refuses to provide that information, the debtor's attorney
has no option. The attorney must decline to execute the § 524(c)(3) declaration." (Emphasis
added.)
With respect to item 8 on the Court's list, counsel should consider the availability of
"ride-through" in her jurisdiction.

By "ride-through" I refer to the judicially developed

nonstatutory variant of voluntary payment. Some courts allow a debtor who is current on a debt
to retain the collateral without reaffirmation or redemption. The circuits are presently evenly split,
with four circuits on each side of the question whether the debtor has this option. Circuit court
cases allowing the debtor to retain without reaffirming include In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 672-73
(9th Cir. 1998); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 34748 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowery Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1989).
Circuit court cases requiring reaffirmation or redemption in order to retain include In re Burr, 160
F.3d 843 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249, 250-52 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d
1512, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1385-87 (7th Cir. 1990).7
7 An equally unsettled question is what happens after discharge when the debtor has retained collateral without reaffmnation
or redemption. In that case, the creditor retains a valid lien on the collateral but the debtor's personal liability has been
erased. Many creditors may be happy enough to allow a debtor to keep collateral as long as the debtor maintains payments.
However, is a creditor required to do so ifthe loan documents provide that bankruptcy itselfis a default (ipso facto clause)
or include an insecurity clause? May the creditor repossess the property even ifthe debtor is willing and able to repay? The
provisions of section 365 invalidating ipso facto clauses for executory contracts would seem not to apply and some courts
have held the similar provisions of section 541(c) are also inapplicable in the post-discharge context. See, e.g., Judge Leif
Clark's discussion in In re Castillo, 209 B.R. 59 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (creditor may rely on ipsofacto clause) (Castillo
was subsequently reversed by the district court as to the existence ofthe fourth option, but Judge Clark's views on creditors'
rights after discharge absent reaffmnation are still worthy of consideration). In re Lair, 235 B.R.l (Bk. M.D. La. 1999).
See also In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994), suggesting in dicta that absentreaffmnation, a creditor could
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Assuming ride-through is not an available option, counsel must assess whether the liens
in question can be avoided under section 522(f)(I)(B) (authorizing avoidance of non-purchasemoney security interests in exempt household goods). Counsel should also inform debtors of the
possibility of redeeming the collateral at fair market value as well as of the availability of a
judicial valuation determination. Finally, attorneys must again tell clients about the availability
of Chapter 13 as a method of retaining the collateral. Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 199-200. See
also In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 165-66.

use an insecurity clause to justify post-discharge repossession even when the debtor is current on payments. The court noted
that the release of personal liability would justify the creditor's belief that the prospect of payment was impaired.
There is authority to the contrary. Recently, the Second Circuit held, in In re So1010wski, 205 F.3d 532 (2d Cir.
2000), that the decision to allow retention without reaffrrmation in Boodrow required a holding that creditors could not
rely on bankruptcy default clauses to justify foreclosure on collateral. In re Winters, 69 B.R. 145 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986)
holds that section 541 (c)( 1)(B) and the discharge injunction bar use of an ipso facto clause to justify post-discharge
repossession from debtor who is current in payments.
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SECTIONC

1. Socio-Economic Context of Personal Bankruptcy in Canada
The bankruptcy rate in Canada was approximately 3.3 persons per 1000 in 2001 compared
with 5.75 per 1000 in the US. These rates are both much higher than other "Anglo-Saxon"
jurisdictions (Australia, 1.2 and England and Wales, 0.50). There are significant similarities in the
levels of consumer credit in Canada and the US. For example, approximately 75 percent of
individuals have access to credit cards. In the US about 60 percent of consumers borrow on their
cards; a Canadian study concluded that about 50 percent of individuals admitted to carrying a
balance once in the past 12 months. Canadian charge-off and delinquency rates appears to be
lower with net losses on cards about half that in the US from January 1999 to 2002. It is claimed
that Canadian issuers have historically been more selective in those to whom they offer cards and
have not moved as significantly into the sub-prime lending market as US lenders (see Canadian
Credit Card Index, Moody's Investors Service, August 23, 2002). Canadians also have high debtto-disposable income ratios.
There are few legal restrictions on credit granting. There are truth in lending laws, some
regulation of credit contract terms and a Federal criminal interest rate of 60 percent.
There is a public national health care system in Canada which has the effect of reducing
the numbers of bankruptcies related to medical debt, which seem to form a significant portion of
US bankruptcies (see e.g. Bermant and Flynn, 'The Class of2000' (2001) American Bankruptcy
Institute Journal 20 noting that 56 percent ofjoint bankruptcy filers had some medical debt and
of those 11 percent reported US$ 5,000 or over; Sullivan, Warren and Jacoby, 'Rethinking the
Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts'(200 1) 76 New York
University Law Review 375 note that 33 percent of filers incurred medical bills not covered by
insurance in excess of$I,OOO during the two years preceding bankruptcy).

1.1 Outline of Canadian system
Extract: Personal Insolvency Task Force, Final Report at 1-6, August 2002.

. How the Canadian System Works at Present
At present, the BIA provides two major alternatives to individuals trying to deal with their
insolvency:
•
•

filing for personal bankruptcy;
filing a proposal, which is an arrangement with creditors to repay all or part of the debtor's
liabilities over a specified period of time.

While other alternatives exist, both within the BIA and in other legislation, bankruptcies and
proposals are the most common statutory alternatives chosen by insolvent debtors. The following
subsections briefly summarize how bankruptcies and proposals work in the current Canadian
insolvency system.

Bankruptcy
Debtors who file for bankruptcy under the BIA give control of their property to a trustee, an act
which is called an "assignment in bankruptcy." Bankruptcy trustees work in the private sector but
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are licensed by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. The role of the Superintendent and his staff is
to supervise the trustees' work and to ensure that all parties comply with the BIA.
Trustees perform several roles advising the debtor, maximizing the returns to creditors from the
bankrupt's estate and carrying out their duty to administer the bankruptcy while maintaining the
integrity of the BIA. Along the way, they must deal with the potential conflicts of interest that their
multiple roles sometimes create. Trustees often advertise widely and generally aim at being
easily accessible to the low-income debtor. Unlike the practice in the United States, Canadian
lawyers are rarely involved in consumer bankruptcies.
It is relatively easy procedurally, if not psychologically, for individual debtors to go bankrupt in
Canada. Debtors must first demonstrate that they are insolvent. Roughly speaking, an "insolvent
person" is a person who resides in Canada, whose liabilities to creditors amount to at least
$1,000, and who is unable to meet repayment obligations as they become due. Documentation is
simple: a one-page form assigning the debtor's property to the trustee, accompanied by a
"statement of affairs" and a monthly budget. A trustee must be nominated and the assignment
accepted by an "official receiver", an administrative official of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.
In the statement of affairs, debtors must provide the trustee with accurate information about
assets, liabilities, current income and expenses. At the debtors' first interview with the trustee, the
trustee must assess their financial position and explain all of the available options, including the
making of a proposal and various province-specific alternatives.
If debtors choose bankruptcy, the trustee will sell their non-exempt assets, if any, and distribute
the proceeds to creditors according to the provisions of the BIA. Part or all of the trustee's fee is
also taken from the money generated by the sale of the assets. In practice, most consumer
bankrupts have few non-exempt assets. Exempt assets are determined by provincial law and
vary from province to province both as to types of assets that are exempt and the maximum value
that is exempt.
The trustee may require that debtors contribute some of the income that is earned after the date
of bankruptcy, but prior to the discharge of their debts, to the estate. The 1997 amendments to
the BIA required that the trustee collect a prescribed portion of the debtor's "surplus" income, as
defined by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. Approximately 15% of bankrupts have surplus
income.
The 1992 BIA amendments recognized that many debtors had minimal exempt unsecured assets
and needed a simple, inexpensive bankruptcy process. Prior to 1992, only debtors with assets
less than $500 in value could use the then-existing simple process, called the summary
administration process; the 1992 amendments raised this threshold to $5,000, thus widening
access to summary administration. The asset threshold is now $10,000 and the summary
administration process is used in over 90% of personal bankruptcies.
First-time bankrupts are automatically discharged nine months after the assignment in bankruptcy
unless the discharge is opposed by a creditor, the trustee, or the Superintendent. Prior to
discharge, a report summarizing the material aspects of the bankruptcy, including the debtor's
conduct during the bankruptcy and the factors leading to the assignment, must be filed with the
Superintendent by the trustee. In addition, the trustee must also report on whether the debtor has
made the required surplus income payments, where applicable, and whether the debtor could
have made a viable proposal.
Creditors rarely oppose discharge. Trustees sometimes oppose discharge because of
misconduct or because the bankrupt has not contributed sufficient funds to pay administrative
costs or trustees' fees. Where discharge is opposed, a judge or Bankruptcy Registrar holds a
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hearing. The judge or Registrar may delay or refuse the discharge or make a conditional order
requiring future payments by the debtor.
If the unsecured non-exempt assets of the debtor are greater than $10,000, the ordinary
administration process applies. The creditors meet and have an opportunity to confirm the
appointment of the trustee chosen by the debtor or to substitute a trustee of their own choice. The
creditors can vote for the appointment of inspectors to represent them and may give directions to
the trustee about the administration of the bankrupt's estate. In practice, it may not be worthwhile
for the unsecured creditors to play such an active role in the administration of the bankruptcy.
When bankrupts are discharged, they are relieved from liability for most debts. There are some
exceptions, however. Section 178(1) of the BIA lists non-dischargeable debts; most of these
exclusions have an identifiable public policy rationale that outweighs any interest in providing a
"clean slate" for the debtor. The non-dischargeable debts include fines imposed in respect of an
offence, and debt for alimony or child support. In addition, since 1998, debtors cannot be
discharged from student loan debt unless the bankruptcy has been filed more than ten years after
the debtor left school.

Proposals
Bankruptcy should be a solution of last resort for insolvent debtors. It is not, however, the only
solution. There are a number of ways in which financially strapped individuals can deal with their
financial troubles. For example, they can obtain a debt consolidation loan from a financial
institution. They can seek credit counselling from provincial or other agencies to learn how to
handle budgets or make non-statutory voluntary arrangements to pay creditors over an extended
period of time.
In Quebec, individuals can make arrangements through the Association cooperative d'economie
familiale (ACEF). The Lacombe Law, also known as Voluntary Deposits, also provides a process
for Quebec wage earners to pay creditors what would be the seizable portion of their salaries
under garnishment provisions. Such payments prevent creditors from enforcing payment of the
debts. In some other provinces Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and
Prince Edward Island debtors may choose to use the Orderly Payment of Debts (OPD)
provisions of the BIA. These provisions set out the amounts and schedule of payments to the
court, which in turn distributes the payments to creditors. While the timing of payments is altered
by both the Lacombe Law and by OPD, full payment is expected.
There are two types of proposals that can be made under the BIA. This first is known as a
"consumer proposal". The second is known as a "commercial" or "Division I" pro~osal.
Consumer Proposals: Beginning in 1992, the BIA has offered a new statutory alternative for
eligible individuals the consumer proposal. The consumer proposal process allows debtors to
make arrangements with their creditors to extend the time for payment or to reduce the amounts
owed, or both, while potentially retaining more of their assets than in a bankruptcy.
To be eligible to make a consumer proposal, the insolvent individual's debts cannot exceed
$75,000 (excluding the mortgage on a principal residence). The debtor must also have sufficient
resources to permit the development of a fair and realistic proposal. Consumer proposals are
attractive to debtors who wish to avoid bankruptcy while maintaining control of assets that are
important to them. They are also attractive to people who, for personal reasons, want to pay their
creditors as much as they possibly can. Proposals are not binding on secured creditors, who
retain their right to realize on their security if payments are not up-to-date. In many cases,
however, the debtor continues to make payments on secured assets, such as a house or car, in
order to avoid losing them to foreclosure or repossession. The secured creditor is inclined to
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cooperate with this approach since the creditor is spared the costs of realizing on the security in
order to obtain repayment.
To make a consumer proposal, the insolvent debtor seeks the aid of a private-sector
administrator, who is usually a bankruptcy trustee. There are a number of incentives, created by
amendments to the BIA in 1997, to encourage debtors to choose proposals rather than
bankruptcies. First, the fees paid to proposal administrators were increased. Second, as
discussed above, some debtors considering bankruptcy will be required to make surplus income
payments; filing a proposal may allow a debtor more flexibility with payments to creditors than the
surplus income provisions. Finally, the trustee is now under an obligation to report, when a
discharge from bankruptcy is being considered, whether the debtor was in a position to have
made a feasible proposal. If so, the court is likely to impose conditions on a discharge that may
be similar to the payment arrangements in a proposal. When faced with the potential of such a
situation, debtors may feel that they maintain more control by presenting a proposal designed in
cooperation with an administrator.
Where a debtor elects to make a proposal, the administrator files the proposal with the Official
Receiver and sends a copy to all the creditors. The creditors have 45 days to consider the
proposal and may accept or reject it. The unsecured creditors cannot seize property or garnishee
wages while the proposal is pending. If creditors representing a majority of the debt accept the
proposal, its terms bind all the creditors and the debtor. If the proposal is rejected, the rights of
the unsecured creditors are revived and they regain the right to take legal steps to recover their
debts. If and when debtors have fulfilled the terms of their proposal, they are relieved of the debts
covered by the proposal. Even a successful proposal, however, will not relieve debtors from nondischargeable debts, such as student loans or support payments. The proposal is automatically
annulled if the debtor defaults by not paying for over three months.
As noted below, debtors are taking advantage of the consumer proposal provisions, with about
14% of filings now taking that form. There was a clear increase in the number of proposals in
1998, an increase almost certainly due to the 1997 amendments. Among proposals filed between
May 1, 1998 and December 31 , 2000, 31.50/0 had failed by June of 2002, but almost half had not
yet been successfully completed. The ultimate failure rate will thus be higher by an unknown
amount. It is too early to be sure what the failure rate is for proposals filed in any given period
since 1998.
Commercial proposals: The BIA, under Division I of Part III, allows proposals to be filed by
businesses or individuals regardless of the amount of their indebtedness. "Commercial" may be a
misnomer in some cases since debtors filing such proposals need not be engaged in any
commercial activities. A major difference between commercial and consumer proposals is that, if
a commercial proposal fails, what is known as a "deemed bankruptcy" occurs and the trustee
liquidates the assets of the debtors. Apart from that, commercial proposals differ from consumer
proposals primarily in the complexity of the required procedures.

IV. Who Files for Bankruptcy?
There is no stereotypical bankrupt debtor. All are "insolvent", in the sense that they are not
meeting their debt payments as they come due, but they work in all kinds of occupations, vary
widely in educational attainment and come from all ages, both genders and all geographic
regions. A series of U.S. studies by Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook has established that
bankrupts are broadly representative of the American middle class. Similar Canadian studiesi
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suggest that Canadian bankrupts, while also representative of Canadian society, are somewhat
more likely to have jobs with relatively low occupational prestige.
There is no consensus on the underlying causes of personal bankruptcy except for the
deceptively simple explanation of "too much debt." Since debt is a common characteristic of
modern life, the question is why some individuals come to have "too much" debt at a particular
point in time. When asked, many bankrupts identify economic misfortune job loss or small
business failure as the triggering cause of their bankruptcy. In other cases, bankrupts believe
that personal crises such as ill health or marital disruption led to their insolvency. Finally, financial
mismanagement is sometimes identified more often by trustees than by bankrupts as the cause
of bankruptcy. While there is no agreement on which of the many potential causes is the most
important, there is agreement that the causes are diverse and that, while financial
mismanagement may playa role in some bankruptcies, the majority do not result only from
financial mismanagement.

2. Central Institutional Characteristics of Canadian Personal Bankruptcy Administration

2.1 Role of Office of Superintendent of Bankruptcy
This is a Federal agency which oversees the administration of bankruptcy in Canada and is
involved in the development of legislation. The powers of the superintendent of bankruptcy
include: licensing trustees and conducting audits of trustees; receiving complaints from creditors
and others; the power to intervene in any matter or proceeding where it considers it expedient to
do; the issuance of directives to trustees and administrators in relation to the administration of the
BIA (since 1992 these directives have the force of law); conducting investigations to determine if
a bankruptcy offence has occurred; maintaining public records on the operation of the bankruptcy
system (see ss5-12 BIA). All assignments in bankruptcy [voluntary petitions] must be filed with
the Official Receiver (s49(3», which is in substance part of the Office of the Superintendent of
Bankruptcy.
The Office is a "Special Operating Agency" and intends to achieve self-financing status
by recovering its costs from fees and the statutory levy on all bankruptcy estates. Special
Operating Agencies are intended to have greater autonomy from government rules, operate more
like a business and be answerable to their clients. They are viewed as being most appropriate
where there is a relatively stable policy framework and their operation does not require ongoing
Ministerial intervention. Ideally they generate revenues that make them self-financing.
The OSB describes its philosophy as "working together with the insolvency community"
and working in partnership with its stakeholders and clients. Clients are identified as creditors,
insolvent businesses and individuals, and potential lenders and investors. Stakeholders include
trustees, courts, and insolvency counsellors. The Office is more likely to hear from its client
creditors and bankruptcy professionals on a continuing basis than from consumer bankrupts or the
general public. Employees of the OSB now have little contact with individual debtors, since
Official Examinations of debtors are very rare in consumer bankruptcies. Its powers to receive
complaints refer only to "creditors and others" without specifically referring to debtors and it is
only recently that the Office has attempted to monitor complaints by bankrupts.
The relationship of the OSB to trustees is that ofa regulator and policing agency. The
OSB is in continuing interaction with trustees, since the OSB must approve all accounts in
individual estates and individual officers are assigned several trustees to monitor on a continuing
basis. Creditors take little interest in individual bankruptcies and the OSB may be regarded as
their representative in monitoring the conduct of trustees to ensure that trustees are realising
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assets and income. A continuing grumble of creditors is that some trustees realise only sufficient
assets to secure their fees but show little interest in searching for further assets.

2.2 The Trustee in Bankruptcy

Extract: lain Ramsay, Market Imperatives, Professional Discretion and the Role of
Intermediaries in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study of the Canadian Trustee in
Bankruptcy (2000) 74 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 399.
A unique aspect of Canadian consumer bankruptcy practice is the extent to which several
potentially incompatible roles are bundled together in the person of the bankruptcy trustee. She is
administrator of the bankruptcy estate, representative of creditors, and advisor and counselor to a
debtor. In contrast to the United States, lawyers play little role in advising and counseling the
majority of individual debtors who declare bankruptcy in Canada and there is no identifiable
consumer bankruptcy bar. The trustee in bankruptcy, who is generally an accountant, is the
person to whom an individual contemplating bankruptcy will turn for information and advice. It
is also the trustee who will subsequently process the bankruptcy. The trustee has become
therefore the central intermediary in the implementation of public policy in consumer
bankruptcy...
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CANADIAN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
ADMINISTRATION

A. TRUSTEE QUALIFICATIONS AND CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW IN GENERAL

The legal model of the individual bankruptcy process in Canada is that of a process of creditor
control subject to administrative and judicial regulation. Administrative supervision is exercised
by a public agency, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB). The OSB is a federal
agency staffed by civil servants, with fourteen regional offices in addition to the headquarters
office in Ottawa. The OSB has a general supervisory role over the administration of all bankrupt
estates, proposals and receiverships. It maintains public records on these topics, investigates
complaints, licenses trustees, and through legal directives, establishes standards for the
administration of bankruptcies. In addition to its licensing power, the OSB examines trustees'
statements of receipts and disbursements in relation to bankrupt estates, conducts audits of
trustees, and may initiate and intervene in court proceedings. A key power in summary consumer
bankruptcies is the ability of the superintendent to require the accounts of a trustee to be taxed by
the court with the possibility of a consequent reduction in the trustee's fee. All relevant
documents in every bankruptcy file of a trustee are filed with a regional office of the OSB and
individual bankruptcy officers in these offices have responsibility for a designated number of
trustees. The agency plays a central policy role in implementing the statutory framework of
bankruptcy administration through formal means such as the issuance of directives and through
informal methods such as speeches to trustees encouraging particular policies. The agency
receives a levy of five percent on any dividend paid to creditors in a bankruptcy estate but this

C-6

does not fully finance its operation and under current government policy it is moving to a user
pay model of service delivery.
There are no specialized banlcruptcy courts in Canada and the superior courts of general
jurisdiction have general jurisdiction in banlcruptcy. There are also banlcruptcy registrars with
specific powers to hear a variety of matters including discharge applications. It is common
knowledge that registrars in different banlcruptcy districts have different practices in relation to
issues such as the recovery of trustees' fees through the discharge process.
The minimum qualifications for obtaining a trustee licence include successful completion of a
written examination as well as appearance before an examination board where the applicant must
demonstrate knowledge of relevant legislation and jurisprudence, good understanding of business
and consumer matters, good judgment in the administration of professional engagements and a
high standard of business ethics and professionalism. It is therefore a hybrid profession requiring
knowledge of both law and accountancy. However, lawyers may not be licensed as trustees unless
they restrict their practice to acting as a trustee in banlcruptcy. The Superintendent must also be
satisfied that an individual has adequate financial resources and facilities to properly administer
banlcruptcies. Trustees do not constitute therefore a self- regulating profession although
achieving this status is a major goal of the Canadian Insolvency Practitioners Association that
represents the vast majority of the approximately 850 insolvency practitioners in Canada. Most
trustees have a professional accounting qualification and are also members of the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) with which the Association is affiliated.
... C. LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TRUSTEE AND CONTROVERSY OVER
HER ROLE
There is some disagreement as to the precise legal characterization of the trustee in banlcruptcy.
A standard Canadian text, Houlden and Morawetz, describes her as an officer of the court who is
the impartial representative of the interests of creditors. Bohemier however stresses the role also
of the trustee in assisting the debtor to rehabilitation and views the trustee as more of a neutral
administrator acting in the interests of all parties. The Banlcruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA)
envisages that when an individual makes an assignment in banlcruptcy the Official Receiver (in
reality the Office of the Superintendent of Banlcruptcy) will appoint a trustee with reference to the
wishes of "the most interested creditors." In practice, the debtor will almost always initiate the
relationship with the trustee, perhaps after reading a trustee's advertisement in the yellow pages,
and the trustee will file the assignment on her behalf. The trustee or her employees are the
primary source of advice on banlcruptcy options. She will shepherd the debtor through the
insolvency process and may provide the mandatory counseling services to the banlcrupt. Given
this close involvement with a debtor, creditors often claim that trustees are too close to the debtor
and are uninterested in pursuing debtors' assets once they have recovered sufficient funds to cover
their fee.
The potentially conflicting roles of the trustee were highlighted during Parliamentary
consideration of amendments to the Banlcruptcy and Insolvency Act in 1996. At the Committee
stage of the legislation several witnesses were asked their views on the potential conflicts of
interest inherent in the current role of trustees in consumer banlcruptcies. The President of the
Canadian Insolvency Practitioners Association responded that:
We are squarely in the middle. We really are officers of the court. Our duty is to be impartial.
We're not on the creditor's side and we're not on the debtor's side. Quite frankly, creditors often
think that we work for the debtor and debtors often think we work for the people they owe money
to. It would be nice to have everybody like us, but maybe having no one like us is good evidence
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that we're doing the job we should and we're impartial. It's a difficult situation. It's a part of our
professional ethics.
Another trustee commented:
We administer the Bankruptcy Act. Our first allegiance is to the administration of the act. We
can carry out the proper administration of the act and at the same time take care of the concerns
of both debtors and the creditors, but we have to be aware of the concerns and needs of both.
There is a balancing act, but of paramount importance is maintaining the integrity of the Act.
A representative of the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) responded:
Certainly from a creditor's perspective the sense is that the trustee is very much aligned with
the debtor. In the consumer setting the trustee meets with the debtor, gives counseling to the
debtor, and assists the debtor in coming to terms with credit difficulties, ushering the debtor
through the bankruptcy process. There are a number of functions the trustee must perform purely
from the debtor's perspective. By the same token, there are other functions in which the trustee is
a fiduciary for creditors. By the same token, the trustee is licensed federally and has to abide by a
code of conduct that is independent of both debtor and creditor.
So there are a variety of roles here. I think the trustees very much feel themselves in the middle
of the process.
And later, in response to a question concerning how trustees avoid conflict of interest, the CBA
representative commented:
Through professionalism; through a complaints procedure any participant in the system can
pursue; through the superintendent of bankruptcy, through a licensing process that is quite
rigorous ... our trustees are considered to be quite professional, and one of the hallmarks of
professionalism is the ability to balance these various duties. But clearly it is a conflict.
A Quebec consumer group, which provides budget counseling, thought that a trustee's
obligations under the 1992 Act to make an initial assessment of the needs of the debtor placed her
in a conflict of interest since the trustee's income depends on the individual going bankrupt.
By assigning to the trustee the role of analyzing the budgetary and financial situation of the
debtors consulting him, for the purpose not just of assessing the appropriateness of bankruptcy as
an answer to the problem, but also of proposing a solution that reflects the debtor's overall
position, we are putting him in an impossible situation. How can he, in all objectivity, propose the
solution best tailored to the situation of the debtors consulting him when he mows that his
income depends on their opting for bankruptcy? He thus places himself in a conflict of interest.
The image in this quotation of a trustee driven by financial self-interest contrasts with the earlier
picture of the disinterested and neutral professional pursuing a public calling. This is a common
contrast in studies of professionals such as lawyers. Several empirical studies of lawyers depict
them as neglecting their clients' interests in favor of their own interests. Moreover, it is argued
that where clients are individuals or unlikely to generate repeat business, the lawyer-client
relationship is one of professional dominance. Studies of the consumer bankruptcy bar in the
United States seem to confirm this thesis, with a picture of practice where lawyers' advice is a
reflection of financial and ideological factors, constrained by the pressure of local legal culture.
A central question is therefore the extent to which the trustee also may neglect the interests of her
various "constituencies"--creditors, debtors and the mandates of bankruptcy policy--because of
the factors identified in the United States studies. Specific areas where interests may conflict
include advice on the choice between a bankruptcy and a proposal, a failure to realize all assets or
review transactions for fraudulent preferences, and an unwillingness to fully inform debtors at the
outset of the costs of bankruptcy or a debtor's rights.
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The controversy over the role of the trustee has developed at the same time as trustees have been
attempting to achieve a greater self-governing role for the profession. In Canada, as in the United
States and United Kingdom, there has been a transformation in insolvency practice over the past
twenty-five years as it has moved out of the shadows and into the mainstream. Elite law firms and
the big five accountancy firms now have substantial "corporate recovery" departments and it is a
lucrative area of practice. There is probably a divide between those very large firms oriented
towards corporate receiverships and substantial corporate work and smaller firms that deal with
consumers and small business. There appears to be some concern within the profession about
their status, particularly those of the high volume "consumer shops." A senior member of the
Canadian Insolvency Practitioners Association (CIPA) indicated to me that trustees were worried
about their negative image as undertakers or professionals who helped individuals to "beat the
system." There is also increasing professional competition with debt counselors and others who
wish to construct the field of bankruptcy and overindebtedness in terms of individual pathologies
requiring treatment, rather than the processing of a financial problem. The late 1990s were
therefore an interesting period in the development of bankruptcy and the role of different
professional groups in processing bankruptcies...
A. ORGANIZATION OF TRUSTEE PRACTICE IN INDIVIDUAL BANKRUPTCIES
Most consumer bankruptcy work in the Toronto bankruptcy district is undertaken by small or
medium sized firms. The "big five" accounting firms have a limited presence in this market,
although they may process larger numbers in some rural areas. Within the sample interviewed
there were nine single trustee firms, eleven firms with two or more trustees and two firms which
are international in scope...
Tables 1 and 2 indicate the extent to which trustees specialized in consumer bankruptcy
and the number of consumer files processed per firm per annum. There are two caveats to these
tables. First, trustees were providing estimates so that the numbers must be treated as a rough
guide. Second, since the interviews took place over more than one year, the estimates do not
relate to exactly the same time period.

Table 1

Percentage of business devoted to consumer filings Number of Trustees

Over 90

13

50-90

8

Under 50

1

Table 2

e-g

Consumer Files per annum Number of Firms

100-300

5

300-500

9

500-1000

4

1000+

4

The great majority of the firms, whether or not they were sole practitioners, operated more than
one office with only three firms operating from one location. A common form of organization
was to have one main office and a number of "satellite" offices in outlying catchment areas which
would be staffed either by estate administrators or other support staff and which might not always
be open. Estate administrators are individuals who do not hold a trustee licence. Some may be
training to become trustees. They will generally have taken certain courses and indeed it is
necessary for them to have taken a counseling course in order to undertake counseling of
bankrupts. I gained the impression in several interviews that bankrupts will spend more time with
estate administrators than with the trustee and this was a basis for criticism by some of the sole
practitioners who claimed that they spent more time with each bankrupt than did those firms
which relied heavily on estate administrators.
It would appear from these data that much consumer bankruptcy work has been routinized.
Some accounts of the time spent by trustees on individual files have suggested a minimum of
eight hours per trustee on the simplest of files, but this seems difficult to reconcile with the
volumes noted above. One trustee in a high volume practice with significant support staff
suggested an average time of two and one-half to three hours trustee time per file, while another,
who had limited support staff, suggested five to six hours per file ...
C. COMPETITION, MARKETING AND ADVERTISING
Many trustees indicated that consumer bankruptcy work had become very competitive in recent
years. "Fierce" and "aggressive" were terms used by several trustees. I was interested in exploring
how competition worked in a business where trustees would appear to be providing a similar,
apparently highly structured, service where the price is fixed for the overwhelming majority of
cases.
I raised the issue of how trustees marketed their practice. Almost all stressed the importance of
yellow pages advertising and carried some form of yellow pages display advertising. Many
commented on the substantial growth in these ads in recent years, with several (generally older
practitioners) indicating that this form of advertising had become very "aggressive," had"got out
of hand," was very expensive and unprofessional. Notwithstanding these comments there was
also a general feeling that yellow pages advertising was a necessary evil. Advertising could help
to sustain a high volume practice, which was in tum necessary to pay for the relatively high costs
of substantial advertising....Analysis of the Toronto area yellow pages advertising during the
1990s does indicate a large growth in the amount of advertising space taken by trustees in
bankruptcy including many of those interviewed in this study. The number of pages devoted to

C - 10

bankruptcy trustees has increased from two in 1991 to eleven in 1999-2000. Almost all the
yellow page ads promise a free initial consultation but none of the advertisements provided much
information on bankruptcy or the merits of the choices available. The one exception was a large
accounting firm, which focused on the value of making a proposal without the necessity of
declaring bankruptcy. Trustees mentioned various other forms of ads including local media
(primarily the Toronto Sun which has a large blue collar and lower middle class readership),
employment news, ethnic newspapers, radio and community television, buses and even apartment
elevators in residential areas which had been identified as having a large number of potential
bankrupts.
A second source of business was through referrals from previous bankrupts or personal
networks ...Ofless importance were referrals from lawyers (e.g., in relation to clients with
significant judgments against them), credit counseling agencies, paralegals, or other accountants.
There is some additional evidence which seems to support the importance of personal networks.
In a 1997 study of Canadian bankrupts almost sixty-two percent learned about bankruptcy
through their personal network of family and friends with sixteen percent identifying "less
personal sources" such as credit counselors, twelve percent identifying the yellow pages, twelve
percent identifying the media, and twelve percent identifying lawyers.
Location is also an important aspect of competition with some trustees having offices in the
same building as credit counseling agencies and one located in the same building as a trade union
legal advice agency...
D. PRICE COMPETITION, PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND RECOVERY OF "FEES"
I was interested in the extent of price competition among trustees. At first sight this may seem
an odd question given the existence of a fixed tariff, and a brief detour on the Byzantine nature of
trustees' "fees" is necessary. According to the BIA a consumer does not pay a direct fee to a
trustee since she is not the client of the trustee and the trustee's payment is based on a percentage
of the distribution of the bankruptcy estate. In addition, there is no concept of a minimum fee
since a trustee's fee is simply based on the receipts in the estate. The current tariff for summary
administration bankruptcies permits recovery of the first $975 of estate assets realized, thirty-five
percent on the balance to $2000 and fifty percent on the portion above that amount. There is also
a filing fee of $75 and the trustee may charge the estate $85 for each counseling session. The
median trustee remuneration for individual bankruptcy cases filed in 1994 in the Toronto district
was $1491. The concept ofa "bankruptcy estate" is also somewhat ofa misnomer since bankrupt
individuals rarely have any substantial unsecured assets. In my statistical file analysis I found that
there were three main sources of receipts in an individual bankruptcy estate: payments by a
debtor, various forms of tax rebates (income tax and GST (VAT)) and sales of motor vehicles.
This last category might not necessarily involve an actual sale since the trustee might accept the
bankrupt paying a sum into the estate equivalent to the appraised value of the vehicle.
During the period when most interviews were conducted, a trustee could make a court
application to require payments by a debtor where an individual had income beyond what was
reasonably necessary for maintaining herself and her family (the superintendent of bankruptcy
had issued guidelines indicating "surplus income" payments). According to trustees, these orders
were almost never sought because of the cost and inconvenience of making a court application.
Instead it is a common practice for trustees to require a debtor to sign a "voluntary" agreement
that they will contribute a certain amount of income monthly to the estate for the period of nine
months from filing until discharge. These payments might be based on surplus income guidelines
but, as indicated earlier, many debtors without surplus income agree to make some form of

C - 11

i.

income payment into the estate to pay the trustee's fees. This "voluntary" agreement might also be
phrased in terms of an agreement by the debtor to make up any shortfall in "fees" with a term
which stated that a failure to make the payment would entitle the trustee to seek a conditional
discharge order against a debtor.
Whatever the legal description of payments being made to the estate, several trustees indicated
that they would quote a fee to a potential bankrupt over the phone and indicate the terms on
which the fee should be paid. For example one stated, "We tell them that the fee is $1200 for an
individual, $300 deposit when they sign up and $150 for the next six months." An other was more
circumspect: "We tell them, 'Look, there is a fixed fee but that doesn't mean that you have to pay
that fixed fee. What you are more concerned with is how much has to come out of your pocket.
That, I cannot tell you until I've discussed your financial affairs.'" The majority of trustees would
permit the debtor to spread the fees over time and a significant source of competition related to
how much was required as an initial payment. Some trustees would spread the payments over
nine months or longer with one trustee being willing to accept $50 a month over twenty-five
months in the case of low income debtors or those on social security.
[A]t least two trustees indicated that they would compete by pricecutting. One of these stated:
If I was going into a new area, I would take anything if it was justified that the person go
bankrupt in terms of his financial affairs, I would put him through the process and I would bank
on getting my fee out of his tax refunds ... That's the key to starting up in a new area. You'll take
anything regardless of the fee just to get your position known in that area. People who have had
difficulties, poor people or whatever, they have friends, they talk around. A lot of trustees don't
do that. They try to start up in a new area, they want to maintain that price.
This approach was frowned upon by some trustees who felt that these "pricecutters" were not
applying properly the surplus income guidelines, which at the time suggested income
contributions by bankrupts. Two trustees also felt that some trustees might mislead potential
clients by saying that the fee was $1000 and then adding on counseling fees at the time of the
discharge.
These voluntary payments are supplemented by other forms of income payments such as
pre-and postbankruptcy income tax rebates. Postbankruptcy rebates are not automatically part of
the estate since they are conceptualized as income and the Supreme Court of Canada also decided
in 1994 that trustees could not take assignments of a postbankruptcy income tax refund.
Notwithstanding this decision, it appears to be a common practice for trustees to require the
bankrupt to assign his postbankruptcy income tax rebate to the estate. Although the actual
wording of the standard agreement between trustee and bankrupt does not now use the term
assignment, this is the substance of the transaction. The upshot of this practice is that the price
which a debtor may pay in terms of foregone income is often more than the $1200 quoted as the
"fee" by a bankruptcy trustee. In the file analysis, I found that of debtors who made both
voluntary payments and had a postbankruptcy income tax return, the median total payment into
the estate from these sources in 1994 was $1733.
The issue of pricing and competition is related closely to the question of access to bankruptcy
for those on low income. Several trustees indicated that they would finance bankruptcies for
individuals on social assistance though a combination of monthly payments perhaps spread over
as long as two years, and through tax refunds and GST credits. Some would simply accept a
lower fee or "work something out." ... A number of trustees thought that it was rare in the
Toronto Bankruptcy District for the Superintendent of Bankruptcy to appoint a trustee under the
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Bankruptcy Assistance Program, given the strong competition among trustees for a limited pool
of potential clients.

One further issue concerns the mechanisms used by trustees to ensure that their fees are
paid. Some trustees use the discharge procedure to recover their fees. In the file study I found that
there was an opposition to discharge in fourteen percent of cases with the majority of oppositions
(8.6%) being brought by trustees. The opposition to discharge would often state that the "debtor
has failed to make a payment ... as per the voluntary agreement." This procedure provided
leverage to obtain payment since there was generally a significant period between the filing of the
opposition and the discharge hearing and if the debtor paid the balance the opposition was
withdrawn. Some trustees were quite frank about this practice with one trustee stating, "I tell the
bankrupt I am opposing because you haven't paid my fee ... once we file the opposition the
discharge does not happen, but there is often a six-month period or more before that gets to court.
That gives the bankrupt time to give me what I want and then Ijust take it back."
There is controversy within the trustee community as to the propriety of this practice and there
are also differing practices by registrars in the various bankruptcy districts concerning their
willingness to permit trustees to use the discharge process as a means of recovering their fees ...
E. THE CHOICE BETWEEN A BANKRUPTCY AND A CONSUMER PROPOSAL
A continuing theme in modem bankruptcy reform in Canada has been that individuals should be
encouraged to come to a repayment arrangement with their creditors as an alternative to declaring
bankruptcy and it is a major policy goal of the superintendent of bankruptcy to encourage the use
of consumer proposals. In 1992, reforms to the BIA introduced the concept of a consumer
proposal which would permit an individual debtor with debts of $75,000 or less (excluding
residential mortgage debt) to make a proposal to pay his creditors all or a portion of his debts over
a period of no longer than five years. Secured creditors are not included within the proposal. In
some respects these provisions resemble Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the
wage earner provisions) before the 1978 revisions to the Code. Just as that alternative was not
attractive to United States debtors so few Canadian debtors initially chose a proposal as an
alternative to bankruptcy. From 1993 to 1997 consumer proposals increased from about two to a
modest five percent of personal bankruptcy filings, notwithstanding the assessment procedure
which required trustees to discuss the possibility of a proposal with a debtor. Reforms to the BIA
which took effect in early 1998 made proposals more financially attractive to trustees as well as
creating pressures on debtors with surplus income to file a proposal. These changes have been
followed by significant increases in proposal filings in most bankruptcy districts so that proposals
are now 13.6% of consumer bankruptcy filings nationally.
F~w trustees were enthusiastic about proposals. A minority of trustees were not interested in
doing proposals and I am confident that this would be communicated to individual debtors. One
indicated that he did not do proposals and referred individuals who wished to go this route to
another trustee. Another stated, "the people who come to me are not candidates for proposals,"
and a third stated, "usually they come to see me about bankruptcy." This latter trustee would
mention proposals but not spend a lot of time on it in the initial meeting with the debtor. Of those
who were more positive, at least two trustees indicated that they mew that the superintendent of
bankruptcy would like to see more proposals and so they had been pushing more debtors into
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undertaking proposals. Some trustees suggested that proposals might be appropriate for
individuals whose livelihood might be affected by a bankruptcy such as those holding
professional licenses.
Others felt that they often had to dissuade individuals from undertaking proposals. In their view
many individuals want to repay their debts when they initially consult the trustee and thought that
a proposal was a good way of doing so. However, in those trustees' opinion, it was often not a
realistic alternative and the trustee would have to point out that the debtor's income was not
adequate to support a proposal ...
I. THE CONFLICTING ROLES OF THE TRUSTEE
I asked all trustees directly about the potential conflicts in their role as representative of
creditors but also de facto advisor of debtors. For a number of high volume processors this was
not perceived to be a problem since their clients did not raise the issue with them and they had no
assets for bankruptcy planning. The following replies are representative of this group.
"Not normally [an issue]. Usually people are willing to accept the fact that you say I'm going
to be court appointed here. As soon as you give me your money and we get the documents ready,
we're going to be court appointed and we're going to get you up and running as a good citizen
again. But we do represent the creditors to get as much money out of your assets as possible.
They look at you and say good luck because I haven't got any assets. Household furniture,
personal effects, maybe a car worth $300."
"We don't deal with it as a general rule but if the discussion comes up and it sometimes does, we
will point out to them that we are there to advise them about bankruptcy ... and once they've gone
bankrupt, then we're working for the creditors to realize on the assets for them. We don't as a
practice advise them of that initially."
There was an exception to this approach where trustees dealt with higher income
professionals such as doctors, dentists and lawyers (under one percent of total personal
bankrupts). These individuals would be advised to retain a lawyer. Most trustees indicated that at
the initial interview before an individual declared bankruptcy they would inform the debtor of
their role and state that although they were providing the debtor with advice at this stage, they
were not acting on her behalf should she go bankrupt. Several saw no conflict in acting as the
"honest broker," protecting the interests of both creditor and debtor. Most downplayed the
significance of potential conflicts since in their opinion the great majority of debtors were honest,
and had few assets to attempt to shield from bankruptcy, although it is not quite clear how a
debtor would feel in response to the following advice delivered by one trustee:
I say to the debtor that, if what you're telling me is the truth, then I have absolutely no conflict
between representing you or acting for you and acting for the creditors. If you're not telling me
the truth, then I'm going to come down on you like a ton of bricks.

ill. DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON

The professional dominance of the trustee over a debtor who generally lacks lmowledge of the
bankruptcy process and is in a vulnerable position permits the trustee to control the terms of the
relationship and increases her power to define and propose solutions to a debtor. The asymmetry
in information between trustee and debtor and the reliance by a debtor on the trustee suggest a
classic problem of consumer vulnerability. Few debtors will initially view the trustee as a
potential adversary particularly given the marketing by many trustees which emphasizes a
sympathetic concern for individuals who are overindebted. Although we lmow little of debtor
experiences of bankruptcy, anecdotal evidence suggests that debtors may be confused by the role
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of the trustee. There are several problems which I identify as flowing from these findings. Some
debtors may be paying too much for bankruptcy protection and lack representation in conflicts
with individual creditors. In addition, those debtors who have a genuine choice between declaring
bankruptcy and making a consumer proposal may be influenced by advice that reflects a trustee's
financial incentives and perception of the value of a proposal.
The financial interest of the trustee in maximizing revenue may clash with the interests of a
debtor. This occurs in such areas as the unwillingness to process joint bankruptcies, the choice of
a bankruptcy over a proposal, and "fee" payments by bankrupts. The issue of payment of
postbankruptcy income tax refunds by bankrupts illustrates the potential clash of interest.
Postbankruptcy income tax refunds are not automatically part of the bankruptcy estate and may
not be assigned. A low income debtor, if independently advised, might be counseled that it was
unlikely that a trustee could require a debtor to pay the rebate into the estate and that he should
not sign an agreement in relation to his income tax refund. However, most debtors who wish to
repay their debts will be eager to pay over this money as a gesture of good faith commitment to
debt repayment. In addition the characterization of the refund as a foregone expectation rather
than the loss of an existing asset will also reduce any unwillingness by the debtor to give up this
asset.
Trustees are constrained also by law in the extent to which they actively can represent
consumers in relation to debt collectors or finance companies and they do not appear for the
debtor at a discharge hearing. Trustees may inform the debtor at the outset that they do not
represent them and that a debtor cannot provide them with confidential information since they
will be acting as the representative of the creditors. At the same time the trustee will later counsel
the debtor and it is usually assumed that a counseling relationship is confidential. But if debtors
reveal information about personal problems during the counseling process trustees must refer the
debtor to a specialist counselor. In addition, if any information concerning assets is disclosed,
then the trustee would be under a duty to ensure that this asset is taken into the estate. What is of
interest is the general lack of concern until recently concerning these problematic practices. If
trustees were a government agency there would undoubtedly be withering criticism of the
conflicting roles and power exercised by "bureaucrats" over the lives of their clients. Indeed the
potential conflicts inherent in the role of an administrative bankruptcy agency formed a major
criticism of the proposed introduction of such an agency in the United States. It is only perhaps
because bankruptcy has such a low visibility in Canada that the present practices continue.
This "consumer rights" critique of the trustee/debtor relationship might lead to the conclusion
that debtors should have greater representation in the bankruptcy process. Certaiply my findings
on collection practices and repossession practices suggest that there is a significant failure in the
implementation of consumer rights. We could look therefore to the United States model where
the great majority of bankrupts have legal representation. However, studies of United States
practice suggest that legal representation does not change dramatically the nature of the consumer
bankruptcy process. Studies of legal professionals involved in consumer bankruptcy in the United
States reveal interesting similarities in the lawyer/client relationship and the trustee/debtor
relationship. They are both relationships of professional dominance, albeit a dominance where
they may be "principals paternalistically operating in accordance with their sense of the clients'
best interests." Routinization is a characteristic of both Canadian and United States consumer
bankruptcy, with much consumer bankruptcy being handled by relatively small firms. Forms of
marketing, competition and payment mechanisms appear to be remarkably similar as do
questionable practices in relation to the collection of fees. The pressures of cost control mean
that in practice there is unlikely to be much opportunity for adversarial confrontations or complex
assertions of individual rights. There will rarely be extensive investigation of an average debtor's
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assets and liabilities. Both trustees and lawyers believe that debtors have little knowledge of
bankruptcy choices and adopt an approach to consumer rights which involves coaching
consumers to protect themselves and negotiate on their own behalf, avoiding actual
representation. This may be justified in Canada by the fact that trustees are not lawyers and are
constrained by their role in actively representing a debtor's interest, although my interviews
suggest that trustees differ in their willingness to assist debtors. Studies in the United States also
note the clash between the financial self-interest of the lawyer and the best interests of a debtor.
Braucher argues that this occurs in relation to the choice of bankruptcy chapter with many
overoptimistic debtors being channeled into Chapter 13 since this "is often the best way for a
lawyer to make both a sale of services quickly and get the highest fee." Thus although there are
fundamental problems in the trustee-debtor relationship it is not clear that introducing legal
representation would make a substantial difference to the processing of consumer bankruptcy. It
must also be added that neither the private bar in Canada nor publicly subsidized lawyers have
shown interest in consumer credit problems of lower income consumers.
A characteristic of both the Canadian and the United States systems is that in practice the expert
intermediaries who provide the service also diagnose the need for the service and the particular
level of service (e.g., bankruptcy or proposal). This bundling together of diagnosis and treatment
is particularly problematic with professional services which are purchased infrequently and where
there are significant information gaps between consumer and producer. Consumer bankruptcy
seems a particularly strong example of this phenomenon. A consumer may have difficulty in
judging the quality of the diagnosis, the quality of the treatment, and whether the services are of
the appropriate level. Individuals may often be unable to evaluate accurately the quality of
services provided except through superficial signals such as inattention by the service provider.
The problems associated with bundling are one reason for the fiduciary duty of lawyers to their
clients but the evidence on consumer bankruptcy lawyers and Canadian trustees suggests that
rational self-interested behavior may at times override this duty. One reform which has been
proposed is therefore to unbundle diagnosis from treatment by requiring an overindebted debtor
to obtain a "second opinion" or some form of independent advice. Thus it has been suggested in
Canada that debtors should obtain advice from independent, publicly funded debt advice agencies
before declaring bankruptcy. The problem is that the professional delivering the "second opinion"
is unlikely to be neutral intermediary. Studies of intermediaries in the legal process, such as
mediators, suggest that all intermediaries bring with them a baggage of interests and values. None
are neutral and so the concept of independent debt counseling advice is probably a chimera.
Although bundling of services has disadvantages, it may have the advantage of reducing
consumer costs where there is little choice facing a debtor. There is probably a large percentage
of consumers with no assets and little income for whom a proposal is not a serious alternative to
declaring bankruptcy. Since there is only one service provider in Canada, it might be
hypothesized that this could provide a less expensive service than the United States approach for
this group. It does not appear however that consumers in Canada pay less for a straight
bankruptcy than consumers in the United States. In the United States a debtor will pay filing fees
of $200 and in a straight Chapter 7 bankruptcy attorney's fees which may range at the median
from $500 to $700. In Ontario debtors will currently be asked to pay approximately $1350 to
$1400(Can) to a trustee which will go towards payment of the filing fee of$50, counseling fees
of $170 and the trustee's fee. In addition, they may be asked to sign over an income tax refund of
approximately $500 to $1000 and also certain other tax credits. As I indicated earlier, the median
trustee remuneration in 1994 in the Toronto bankruptcy district was $1491. In return for these
payments a debtor will obtain advice on bankruptcy options, discharge of debts, counseling and
an income tax filing service. The ability of a Canadian trustee to access postbankruptcy income
streams from a debtor results both in higher payments by debtors and significantly fewer no-asset
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cases in Canada. However, there remains little for distribution to unsecured creditors after
payment of the trustee's fee with a median of only $558 in my file study.
If it is difficult to find neutral intermediaries for the delivery of bankruptcy services then one
possible solution is greater simplification and routinization and the use of bright line rules which
reduces the need for intermediaries. The need for bright line rules and the reduction in the use of
costly intermediaries is one of the major lessons of the experience of consumer protection over
the past thirty years. The great majority of consumer bankruptcies in Canada and the United
States are effectively no-asset cases which require administrative processing. The United States
National Bankruptcy Review Commission argued for a basic bankruptcy where bankruptcy
would become a form of routinized processing with a certain percentage of claims subject to
audit. Australia appears to have a low cost form of processing for no-asset cases. The thrust of
Canadian reform proposals during the 70s and early 80s was towards this model-- a relatively
swift discharge for the great majority ofbankrupts--and the provision of a repayment alternative
for a small minority of higher income debtors who could repay. The benefits ofroutinization
inclu'de a swifter process than individualized scrutiny, an entitlement not subject to the discretion
of a professional intermediary, and the reduction of stigma. The Canadian model is currently
moving away from this approach with greater emphasis on scrutinizing the individual situation of
debtors. Accompanying this there has also been an increase in forms and papers which must be
filed in relation to consumer bankrupts, which in different regulatory contexts would be described
as "red tape." Ifroutinization might seem the rational approach to addressing the great majority of
casualties of the credit system, the potential for its adoption must be set within the political
economy of bankruptcy reform and the relative power of interest groups. Creditors are unlikely to
support routinized processing since they may fear that it will increase the number of bankruptcies,
and trustees, who have often been a voice for debtors in reform debates, also have a vested
interest in the existing system. Government, in an era of privatization, will be unwilling to take
greater responsibility for processing no-asset cases so that routinization may face significant
opposition.
Potential bankrupts are often in a vulnerable position, appear to have little lmowledge about the
nature and effects of bankruptcy, and consequently may face difficulties in making rational
choices. There now exists a large literature in behavioral law and economics which has drawn
attention to the many deviations from rationality in individual decisionmaking and this literature
may be of particular relevance to consumer bankruptcy decision-making. Thus Braucher indicates
that many debtors suffer from an optimistic bias, where they wish to use Chapter 13 even though
there is little hope of repayment and although it will have a marginal effect on their credit rating.
While a full exploration of the application of behavioral law and economics to individual
bankruptcy decision making is not possible here, it does suggest that, taken together with the
findings of this and other studies, the ideal of informed debtor choice is one which is difficult to
achieve.

2. 3 No specialized bankruptcy courts
There are no specialized bankruptcy courts in Canada. All superior provincial courts are
vested with original, auxiliary and ancillary jurisdiction in bankruptcy. These judges are federally
appointed judges. There are also bankruptcy registrars who are appointed by the Chief Justice of
the Superior Court and who have specific powers which include hearing oppositions to discharge,
taxing and passing accounts, hearing unopposed or ex parte applications and unopposed
bankruptcy petitions (see s192(1) BIA).
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3. Substantive Differences in Canadian and US personal bankruptcy rules
1. The ability to access post bankruptcy income if an individual has "surplus income". This
will be payable for the nine months during which the debtor is an undischarged bankrupt but
may be extended by the trustee to 21 months. [See below Directive on surplus income].
2.The possibility of creditors opposing discharge on relatively broad grounds (see s173) and
obtaining a conditional discharge order. The court has broad discretion as to the terms of this
order. [Examples where it may be used include "abuse" of credit cards, failure to pay income
tax arrears (income tax authorities are unsecured creditors in bankruptcy), bankruptcy to
avoid payment of a judgment in relation to wrongful or tortious conduct).
3. The requirement of mandatory counseling as part of the bankruptcy process and as
condition for first-time bankrupt obtaining automatic discharge.
4. Absence of statutory control on reaffirmation agreements by consumers
5. The consumer proposal option does not provided the "carrots" associated with Chapter 13
such as the ability to address secured debt or the "superdischarge".
6. There is no statutory provision preventing discrimination against bankrupts based on
bankruptcy status.

3.1 BIA provisions relating to discharge

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act R.S.C, 1985, c. B-3.

Discharge of
Bankrupts

First-time individual
bankrupt

168.1 (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), the following provisions apply in respect of an
individual bankrupt who has never before been bankrupt under the laws of Canada or of any prescribed
jurisdiction:
(a.1) the trustee shall, not less than fifteen days before the date of automatic discharge provided for
in paragraph (f), give notice of the impending discharge, in the prescribed form, to the
Superintendent, the bankrupt and every creditor who has proved a claim, at the creditor's latest
known address;
(b) where the Superintendent intends to oppose the discharge of the bankrupt, the Superintendent
shall give notice of the intended opposition, stating the grounds therefor, to the trustee and to the
bankrupt at any time prior to the expiration of the nine month period immediately following the
bankruptcy;
(c) where a creditor intends to oppose the discharge of the bankrupt, the creditor shall give notice of
the intended opposition, stating the grounds therefor, to the Superintendent, to the trustee and to the
bankrupt at any time prior to the expiration of the nine month period immediately following the
bankruptcy;
(r!\ whArA thA trustAA intAnds tn nnnnSA thA discharoA nf thA banknJnt. thA tnJstAA shall OiVA nntir.A nf

C - 18

the intended opposition in prescribed form and manner, stating the grounds therefor, to the bankrupt
and the Superintendent at any time prior to the expiration of the nine month period immediately
following the bankruptcy;
(e) where the Superintendent, the trustee or a creditor opposes the discharge of the bankrupt, the
trustee shalJ, unless the matter is to be dealt with by mediation under section 170.1, forthwith apply to
the court for an appointment for the hearing of the opposition in the manner referred to in sections
169 to 176, which hearing shall be held
(i) within thirty days after the day the appointment is made, or
(ii) at such later time as may be fixed by the court at the request of the bankrupt or the trustee;
and
(f) where the Superintendent, the trustee or a creditor has not opposed the discharge of the bankrupt
in the nine month period immediately following the bankruptcy, then, subject to subsection 157.1(3),
(i) on the expiration of that nine month period, the bankrupt is automatically discharged, and
(ii) forthwith after the expiration of that nine month period, the trustee shall issue a certificate to
the discharged bankrupt, in the prescribed form, declaring that the bankrupt is discharged and is
released from all debts except those matters referred to in subsection 178(1), and shall send a
copy of the certificate to the Superintendent.
Application not
precluded

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) precludes an individual bankrupt from applying to the court for discharge
before the expiration of the nine month period immediately following the bankruptcy, and subsection (1)
ceases to apply to an individual bankrupt who makes such an application before the expiration of that
period.

Application of other
provisions

(3) The provisions of this Act concerning the discharge of bankrupts apply in respect of an individual
bankrupt who has never before been bankrupt under the laws of Canada or of any prescribed jurisdiction,
to the extent that those provisions are not inconsistent with this section, whether or not the bankrupt
applies to the court for a discharge referred to in subsection (2).

Effect of automatic
discharge

(4) An automatic discharge by virtue of paragraph (1)(f) is deemed, for all purposes, to be an
absolute and immediate order of discharge.
1992,c.27,s.61; 1997,c. 12,s.98.

Trustee to prepare
report

170. (1) The trustee shall prepare a report in the prescribed form with respect to
(a) the affairs of the bankrupt,

(b) the causes of his bankruptcy,
(e) the manner in which the bankrupt has performed the duties imposed on him under this Act or
obeyed the orders of the court,
(d) the conduct of the bankrupt both before and after the date of the initial bankruptcy event,
(e) whether the bankrupt has been convicted of any offence under this Act, and
(f) any other fact, matter or circumstance that would justify the court in refusing an unconditional
order of discharge,
and the report shall be accompanied by a resolution of the inspectors declaring whether or not they
approve or disapprove of the report, and in the latter case the reasons of the disapproval shall be given.

(2) Where an application of a bankrupt for a discharge is pending, the trustee shall file the report
Filing and service of
prepared under subsection (1) in the court not less than two days, and forward a copy thereof to the
report
Superintendent, to the bankrupt and to each creditor who requested a copy not less than ten days, before
the day appointed for hearing the application, and in all other cases the trustee, before proceeding to the
discharge, shall file the report in the court and forward a copy to the Superintendent.
(3) The Superintendent may make such further or other report to the court as he deems expedient or
Superintendent may
as in his opinion ought to be before the court on the application referred to in subsection (2).
file report
Representation by
counsel

(4) The trustee or any creditor may attend the court and be heard in person or by counsel.

Evidence at hearing

(5) For the purposes of the application referred to in subs"ection (2), the report of the trustee is
evidence of the statements therein contained.

Right of bankrupt to
oppose statements
in report

(6) Where a bankrupt intends to dispute any statement contained in the trustee's report prepared
under subsection (1), the bankrupt shall at or before the time appointed for hearing the application for
discharge give notice in writing to the trustee specifying the statements in the report that he proposes at
the hearing to dispute.

Right of creditors to
oppose

(7) A creditor who intends to oppose the discharge of a bankrupt on grounds other than those
mentioned in the trustee's report shall give notice of the intended opposition, stating the grounds thereof to
the trustee and to the bankrupt at or before the time appointed for the hearing of the application for
discharge.
R.S., 1985,c. 8-3,s. 170; 1997,c. 12,s. 100.
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Recommendation

Factors to be
considered

170.1 (1) The report prepared under subsection 170(1) shall include a recommendation as to
whether or not the bankrupt should be discharged subject to conditions, having regard to the bankrupt's
conduct and ability to make payments.
(2) The trustee shall consider the following matters in making a recommendation under subsection
(1 ):
(a) whether the bankrupt has complied with a requirement imposed on the bankrupt under section 68;
(b) the total amount paid to the estate by the bankrupt, having regard to the bankrupt's indebtedness
and financial resources; and
(c) whether the bankrupt, if the bankrupt could have made a viable proposal, chose to proceed to
bankruptcy rather than to make a proposal as the means to resolve the indebtedness.

Presumption

(3) A recommendation that the bankrupt be discharged subject to conditions is deemed to be an
opposition to the discharge of the bankrupt.

Request for
mediation

(4) Where the bankrupt does not agree with the recommendation of the trustee, the bankrupt may,
before the expiration of the ninth month after the date of the bankruptcy, send the trustee a request in
writing to have the matter determined by mediation.

(5) Where a request for mediation has been made under subsection (4) or the discharge of the
Mediation request to
bankrupt is opposed by a creditor or the trustee in whole or in part on a ground referred to in paragraph
be sent to official
173(1)(m) or (n), the trustee shall send an application for mediation in prescribed form to the official
receiver
receiver within five days after the expiration of the nine month period referred to in subsection (4) or within
such further time as the official receiver may allow.
Mediation procedure

(6) A mediation shall be in accordance with prescribed procedures.

Court hearing

(7) Where the issues submitted to mediation are not thereby resolved or the bankrupt has failed to
comply with conditions that were established by the trustee or as a result of the mediation, the trustee
shall forthwith apply to the court for an appointment for the hearing of the matter, which hearing shall be
held
(a) within thirty days after the day the appointment is made, or
(b) at such later time as may be fixed by the court,
and the provisions of this Part relating to applications to the court in relation to the discharge of a bankrupt
apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, in respect of an application to the court under
this subsection.

Certificate of
discharge

(8) Where the bankrupt complies with the conditions imposed on the bankrupt by the trustee in
relation to the discharge of the bankrupt or as a result of mediation referred to in this section, the trustee
shall
(a) issue to the bankrupt a certificate of discharge in the prescribed form releasing the bankrupt from
all debts other than a debt referred to in subsection 178(1); and
(b) send a copy of the certificate of discharge to the Superintendent.

File

(9) Documents contained in a file on the mediation of a matter under this section form part of the
records referred to in subsection 11.1 (2).
1997, c. 12, s. 101.

Trustee's report

171. (1) On a request therefor by the Superintendent the trustee shall, within two months after the
trustee's appointment or within such longer period as the Superintendent may allow, prepare in the
prescribed form and file with the Superintendent a report setting out the following information:
(a) the name of the debtor and, where the debtor is a corporation, the names and addresses of the
directors and officers of the corporation and, when applicable, the names of the persons who in the
opinion of the trustee actively controlled the day-to-day operations of the corporation or the business
of the debtor or who in the opinion of the trustee were responsible for the greater proportion of the
debtor's liabilities or under whose directions in the opinion of the trustee the greater proportion of the
debtor's liabilities were incurred;
(b) whether in the opinion of the trustee the deficiency between the assets and the liabilities of the
debtor has been satisfactorily accounted for or, if not, whether there is evidence of a substantial
disappearance of property that is not accounted for;
(c) a statement of opinion by the trustee with respect to the probable causes of the bankruptcy,
arrived at after consultation with the inspectors and other persons, which shall be expressed as
resulting from one or more of the probable causes in the following enumeration:
(i) misfortune,
(ii) inexperience,
(iii) incompetence,
(iv) carelessness,
(v) over-expansion,
(vi) unwarranted speculation,
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(vii) gross negligence,
(viii) fraud, and
(ix) other probable cause (to be specified); and
(d) a statement of the facts and information on which the trustee relied in arriving at the opinion
expressed pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c).
Report to persons
concerned

(2) A separate report containing only the information to be given to the Superintendent pursuant to
paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) shall be immediately prepared in the prescribed form by the trustee and a copy
thereof shall be sent, by prepaid registered or certified mail in an envelope marked "private and
confidential", to each of the persons named pursuant to paragraphs (1 )(a) and (b) in the report to the
Superintendent.

Report to official
receiver

(3) After the expiration of two months from the date of filing the report with the Superintendent and
not later than three months after that date, the trustee shall file with the official receiver the report
prepared pursuant to subsection (2).

Application to court
regarding report

(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), where before he has filed his report with the official receiver
pursuant to that subsection, the trustee is served with a copy of an application to the court, by any of the
persons named pursuant to paragraphs (1 )(a) and (b) in the report prepared pursuant to subsection (2), to
have that report altered in any manner or to dispense with the requirements of subsection (3), the trustee
shall not file the report under subsection (3) except as may be directed by the court.

Altering report to
Superintendent

(5) Where the report to be filed under subsection (3) has been altered in any respect on the direction
of the court, the trustee shall inform the Superintendent of any alteration so made, and the Superintendent
shall alter the report made to him by the trustee accordingly.

Exoneration
(6) The trustee is not liable for any statements made or opinions expressed by him in good faith and made or
from liability purporting to be made by him pursuant to this section, nor is any person liable for publishing, or referring to any
matters contained in, the report of the trustee to the official receiver if the publication or reference is made after the
filing of the report with the official receiver.
R.S., 1985,c. 8-3,s. 171; 1992,c. 1,s.20,c.27,s.63; 1997,c. 12,s. 102.
Court may grant or
refuse discharge

Powers of court to
refuse or suspend
discharge or grant
conditional
discharge

172. (1) On the hearing of an application of a bankrupt for a discharge, the court may either grant or
refuse an absolute order of discharge or suspend the operation of the order for a specified time, or grant
an order of discharge subject to any terms or conditions with respect to any earnings or income that may
afterwards become due to the bankrupt or with respect to his after-acquired property.
(2) The court shall on proof of any of the facts mentioned in section 173
(a) refuse the discharge of a bankrupt;
(b) suspend the discharge for such period as the court thinks proper; or
(c) require the bankrupt, as a condition of his discharge, to perform such acts, pay such moneys,
consent to such judgments or comply with such other terms as the court may direct.

Court may modify
after year

(3) Where at any time after the expiration of one year after the date of any order made under this
section the bankrupt satisfies the court that there is no reasonable probability of his being in a position to
comply with the terms of the order, the court may modify the terms of the order or of any substituted order,
in such manner and on such conditions as it may think fit.

Power to suspend

(4) The powers of suspending and of attaching conditions to the discharge of a bankrupt may be
"
exercised concurrently.
R.S., c. 8-3, s. 142.

Facts for which
discharge may be
refused. suspended
or granted
conditionally

173. (1) The facts referred to in section 172 are:
(a) the assets of the bankrupt are not of a value equal to fifty cents on the dollar on the amount of the
bankrupt's unsecured liabilities, unless the bankrupt satisfies the court that the fact that the assets
are not of a value equal to fifty cents on the dollar on the amount of the bankrupt's unsecured
liabilities has arisen from circumstances for which the bankrupt cannot justly be held responsible;
(b) the bankrupt has omitted to keep such books of account as are usual and proper in the business
carried on by the bankrupt and as sufficiently disclose the business transactions and financial
position of the bankrupt within the period beginning on the day that is three years before the date of
the initial bankruptcy event and ending on the date of the bankruptcy, both dates included;
(c) the bankrupt has continued to trade after becoming aware of being insolvent;
(d) the bankrupt has failed to account satisfactorily for any loss of assets or for any deficiency of
assets to meet the bankrupt's liabilities;
(e) the bankrupt has brought on, or contributed to, the bankruptcy by rash and hazardous
speculations, by unjustifiable extravagance in living, by gambling or by culpable neglect of the
bankrupt's business affairs;
(f) the bankrupt has put any of the bankrupt's creditors to unnecessary expense by a frivolous or
vexatious defence to any action properly brought against the bankrupt;
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(g) the bankrupt has, within the period beginning on the day that is three months before the date of
the initial bankruptcy event and ending on the date of the bankruptcy, both dates included, incurred
unjustifiable expense by bringing a frivolous or vexatious action;
(h) the bankrupt has, within the period beginning on the day that is three months before the date of
the initial bankruptcy event and ending on the date of the bankruptcy, both dates included, when
unable to pay debts as they became due, given an undue preference to any of the bankrupt's
creditors;
(I) the bankrupt has, within the period beginning on the day that is three months before the date of
the initial bankruptcy event and ending on the date of the bankruptcy, both dates included, incurred
liabilities in order to make the bankrupt's assets equal to fifty cents on the dollar on the amount of the
bankrupt's unsecured liabilities;
(j) the bankrupt has on any previous occasion been bankrupt or made a proposal to creditors;
(k) the bankrupt has been guilty of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust;
(I) the bankrupt has committed any offence under this Act or any other statute in connection with the
bankrupt's property, the bankruptcy or the proceedings thereunder;
(m) the bankrupt has failed to comply with a requirement to pay imposed under section 68;
(n) the bankrupt, if the bankrupt could have made a viable proposal, chose bankruptcy rather than a
proposal to creditors as the means to resolve the indebtedness; and
(0) the bankrupt has failed to perform the duties imposed on the bankrupt under this Act or to comply
with any order of the court.

Application to
farmers

(2) Paragraphs (1)(b) and (c) do not apply in the case of an application for discharge by a bankrupt
whose principal occupation and means of livelihood on the date of the initial bankruptcy event was farming
or the tillage of the soil.
R.S., 1985,c. B-3,s. 173; 1997,c. 12,s. 103.

174. For the purposes of section 173, the assets of a bankrupt shall be deemed of a value equal to
Assets of bankrupt
when deemed equal fifty cents on the dollar on the amount of his unsecured liabilities when the court is satisfied that the
to fifty cents in dollar property of the bankrupt has realized, is likely to realize or, with due care in realization, might have
realized an amount equal to fifty cents on the dollar on his unsecured liabilities.
R.S., c. B-3, s. 144.
Modification of
order

(12) On the application of any interested person, the court may, at any time, amend an order
made under this section to take into account material changes that have occurred in the personal or
family situation of the bankrupt.

Default by other
person

(13) An order of the court made under this section may be served on a person from whom the
bankrupt is entitled to receive money and, in such case,
(a) the order binds the person to pay to the estate of the bankrupt the amount fixed by the
order; and
(b) if the person fails to comply with the terms of the order, the court may, on the application of
the trustee, order the person to pay the trustee the amount of money that the estate of the
bankrupt would have received had the person complied with the terms of the order.

Application is a
proceeding

(14) For the purposes of section 38, an application referred to in subsection (10) is deemed to
be a proceeding for the benefit of the estate.
R.S., 1985,c. B-3,s.68; 1992,c.27,s.34; 1997,c. 12,s.60.

3.2 The Concept of Surplus Income
Historically there was some confusion as to whether post-bankruptcy income fell within
the definition of estate property in section 67 of the BIA. In the 1950s a Supreme Court of
Canada decision indicated that post-bankruptcy income did fall within the estate, subject to
provincial exemptions. In 1966 the Bankruptcy Act was amended by the addition of section 68
which permitted a trustee to make an application to court for an income payment order. The court
had a broad discretion in addressing the application "having regard to the family responsibilities
and personal situation of the bankrupt". A later decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
(Marzetti v. Marzetti [1994] 2 S.C.R. 765 held that section 68 was a complete code in relation to a
debtor's salary, wages or other remuneration and that, absent an application to court, these do not
automatically vest in the trustee. In practice trustees rarely used this time-consuming procedure
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in consumer banlauptcies and it was common to make an agreement with the banlaupt to
"voluntarily" make monthly payments, which would in many cases cover the trustee's fees. The
superintendent of banlauptcy issued guidelines, which were intended to provide guidance on the
issue of surplus income.
In 1992 Canada introduced an automatic discharge after nine months for a first time
debtor. It was no longer necessary to apply to court for a discharge. During the 1990s creditors
argued that it was becoming too easy to declare banlauptcy and the OSB probably received this
sentiment sympathetically. In 1997 amendments were made to section 68 of the BIA to encourage
'consumer debtors to act more responsibly'.
The central aspects of these amendments are:
1. Section 68 was amended to require the trustee at the outset of the banlauptcy to fix
the amount of income to be paid to the estate by the banlaupt by reference to the
surplus income standards established by the OSB and to "the personal and family
situation of the banlaupt". This determination must be filed with the OSB (Official
Receiver).
2. If the official receiver determines that the amount determined by the trustee is
substantially not in accordance with the standards then the OR may make a
recommendation for a surplus income payment to the trustee and if this is not
followed by the trustee, apply to court for a judicial hearing of the issue.
3. There is provision for mediation if the debtor disagrees with the trustees'
determination of surplus income. Creditors and the OSB may also request mediation.
If mediation does not resolve the issue then a court hearing may be requested where
the court has discretion under s68 (10) to establish the surplus income on the basis of
the OSB standards and "having regard to the personal and financial situation of the
banlaupt".
In addition the trustee when s/he makes her report on the debtor shortly before discharge
may recommend that the debtor be discharged subject to a repayment condition if the debtor has
not complied with section 68 or "having regard to the "total amount paid to the estate by the
banlaupt, having regard to the banlaupt's indebtedness and financial resources" or "if the debtor
could have made a viable proposal" (sI70.1(1». This condition will automatically take effect if
the debtor does not object. The Superintendent of Banlauptcy has issued a directive, which limits
the maximum period of this conditional discharge to 21 months.

Finally, the grounds for objection to discharge (by trustee, creditor or OSB) have been
extended to include the fact that the banlaupt has failed to comply with a requirement to pay
imposed under s68 or that the banlaupt could have made a viable proposal but chose banlauptcy
rather than a proposal to creditors as a means to resolve the indebtedness.

3.2.1 Empirical Impact of the Amendments

Data provided by the OSB indicate that from August 1998 to August 2000 there were
169,680 total personal banlauptcies and in 29, 058 of these cases there was surplus income. Of
these 2,775 were paying below the OSB standards and 1, 277 were paying more than $100 below
the standard. There were 116 mediations requested in relation to surplus income during this
period with the majority being requested by the trustee in banlauptcy.
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In 2001 and 2002 8.28 percent and 6.45 percent of debtors with surplus income were
paying below the standard established in the guidelines.

3.2.2 The basis of the surplus income assessment
Surplus income is based on Statistics Canada "low income cut-offs" which are sometimes
used in Canada as an unofficial poverty line. They are established by identifying in the family
expenditure survey those situations where individuals are paying 20 percent of their income more
than the Canadian average on food, shelter and clothing. These data are then analysed to identify
income levels where families spend this percentage on the basics. These income levels,
differentiated by area of residence and family size are the low income cut offs. [See Statistics
Canada. Low income cut offs from 1992-2001 and low income measures 1991-2000 available at
http://www.statcan.ca/cgibinJdownpub/listpub.cgi?catno=75F0002MIE2002005 and see Low
Income Cut-Offs, http://www.statcan.ca/english/census200 l/dict/fam021.htm There are different
levels for urban and rural areas, and for the population of an urban area [less than 30,000,
30,0000-99,999,100,000-499,999, 500,000 and over]. The Superintendent of Bankruptcy's
guidelines are based on the licos for urban areas of 500,000 and over.

3.2.3. Comparison of Canadian surplus income provisions and recent US proposals.
1. The Canadian provisions provide relatively bright-line, inflexible rules without
addressing individual needs or regional disparities. The costs of administration are
not high for trustees.
2. They are initially based on income at the time of declaring bankruptcy not average
income based on the previous six months income of the debtor.
3. In Canada the surplus income guidelines are determined in secondary legislation by
an administrative agency.
4. No deduction of secured debt payments under Canadian system
5. Surplus income payments are only for nine months or possibly 21 months. US
approach seems based on potential of five-year repayment alternative.

The courts have recognized some limited flexibility in the phrase having regard to "the personal
and family situation of the bankrupt" to permit some deviation from the statutory guidelines.

3.3 Statutory provisions on surplus income: section 68 BIA and Directive No IIR.

Directives re standard of living
factors
68. (1) The Superintendent shall, by directive, establish in respect of the provinces or one or more
bankruptcy districts or parts of bankruptcy districts, the standards for determining the portion of the
total income of an individual bankrupt that exceeds that which is necessary to enable the bankrupt to
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maintain a reasonable standard of living.
Interpretation
(2) For the purposes of this section,

(a) "total income" referred to in subsection (1) includes, notwithstanding paragraphs
67(1 )(b) and (b.1), all revenues of a bankrupt of whatever nature or source; and

(b) a requirement that a bankrupt pay an amount to the estate of the bankrupt is
enforceable against all property of the bankrupt, other than property referred to
in paragraphs 67(1 )(b) and (b.1).
Trustee to fix amount to be paid
(3) The trustee shall

(a) having regard to the applicable standards established under subsection (1), and
to the personal and fa-mily situation of the bankrupt, fix the amount that the
bankrupt is required to pay to the estate of the bankrupt;

(b) inform the official receiver in writing of the amount fixed under paragraph (a);
and

(c) take reasonable measures to ensure that the bankrupt complies with the
requirement to pay.
Modification by trustee
(4) The trustee may, at any time, amend an amount fixed under subsection (3) to take into
account

(a) material changes that have occurred in the personal or family situation of the
bankrupt; or

(b) a recommendation made by the official receiver under subsection (5).

Official receiver recomfnendation
(5) Where the official receiver determines that the amount required to be paid by the bankrupt
under subsection (3) or (4) is substantially not in accordance with the applicable standards
established under subsection (1), the official receiver shall recommend to the trustee and to the
bankrupt an amount required to be paid that the official receiver determines is in accordance with the
applicable standards.
Trustee may request mediation
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(6) Where the trustee and the bankrupt are not in agreement with the amount that the bankrupt is
required to pay under subsection (3) or (4), the trustee shall, forthwith, in the prescribed form, send to
the official receiver a request that the matter be determined by mediation and send a copy of the
request to the bankrupt.
Creditor may request mediation
(7) On the request in writing of a creditor made within thirty days after the date of bankruptcy or an
amendment referred to in subsection (4), the trustee shall, within the five days following the thirty day
period, send to the official receiver a request in the prescribed form that the matter of the amount the
bankrupt is required to pay under subsection (3) or (4) be determined by mediation and send a copy
of the request to the bankrupt and the creditor.
Mediation procedure
(8) A mediation shall be in accordance with prescribed procedures.
File
(9) Documents contained in a file on the mediation of a matter under this section form part of the
records referred to in subsection 11.1 (2).
C'ourl deternlination

(10) Where

(a)

the trustee has not implemented a recommendation made by the official receiver
under subsection (5),

(b)

the issue submitted to mediation requested under subsection (6) or (7) is not
thereby resolved, or

(c)

the bankrupt fails to comply with the requirement to pay as determined under
this section,

the trustee may, or on the request of the inspectors, any of the creditors or the official receiver shall,
apply to the court for the hearing of the matter, and the court may, on the hearing, in accordance with
the standards established under subsection (1) and having regard to the·personal and family
situation of the bankrupt, by order, fix the amount that the bankrupt is required to pay to the estate of
the bankrupt.
Fixing fair and reasonable remuneration
in the case of related persons
(11) The court may fix an amount that is fair and reasonable

(a) as salary, wages or other remuneration for the services being performed by a
bankrupt for a person employing the bankrupt, or

(b) as payment for or commission in respect of any services being performed by a
bankrupt for a person,
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where the person is related to the bankrupt, and the court may, by order, determine the part of the
salary, wages or other remuneration, or the part of the payment or commission, that shall be paid to
the trustee on the basis of the amount so fixed by the court, unless it appears to the court that the
services have been performed for the benefit of the bankrupt and are not of any substantial benefit to
the person for whom they were performed.
Modification of order

(12) On the application of any interested person, the court may, at any time, amend an order
made under this section to take into account material changes that have occurred in the personal or
family situation of the bankrupt.
Default by other person

(13) An order of the court made under this section may be served on a person from whom the
bankrupt is entitled to receive money and, in such case,

(a) the order binds the person to pay to the estate of the bankrupt the amount fixed
by the order; and

(b) if the person fails to comply with the terms of the order, the court may, on the
application of the trustee, order the person to pay the trustee the amount of
money that the estate of the bankrupt would have received had the person
complied with the terms of the order.
Application is a proceeding

(14) For the purposes of section 38, an application referred to in subsection (10) is deemed to be
a proceeding for the benefit of the estate.

Directive N° 11 R on Surplus Income
For your information, you will find attached a revised Appendix "A" which reflects the standards for
the year 2003 and the revised page 5 of the directive. The revision of Appendix "A" has necessitated
an update to the example provided on page 5.

Surplus Income
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Issue : October 3rd 2000
This Directive replaces Directive No. 11, which came into force April 30th, 1998.
This Directive comes into force on November 1st, 2000.
Interpretation
1.

In this Directive,
a.

"Act" means the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act;

b.

"Superintendent's standards" refers to the table set out in Appendix A of this
Directive.

Purpose
2.

The purpose of this Directive, issued pursuant to paragraph 5(4)(c) and section 68 of the Act,
is to assist the trustee in determining equitably and consistently the portion of the bankrupt's
income that should be paid into the bankrupt's estate.

Sections of the Act concerned:
Sections 68 and 170. 1.

Background
3.

Subsection 68(3) of the Act states:
a.

"The trustee shall :
i.

ii.
iii.

having regard to the applicable standards established under subsection (1),
and to the personal and family situation of the bankrupt, fix the amount that
the bankrupt is required to pay to the estate of the bankrupt;
inform the official receiver in writing of the amount fixed under paragraph (a);
and
take reasonable measures to ensure that the bankrupt complies with the
requirement to pay."

Family Unit
4.

In determining the bankrupt's personal and family situation, it is necessary to establish the
earnings and expenses of both the bankrupt and the bankrupt's family unit. The bankrupt
must disclose the earnings and expenses of each member of the family unit. As well, the
trustee may question each member of the family unit as to their earnings and expenses.

5.

For the purposes of this Directive, the bankrupt's family unit includes, in addition to the
bankrupt, any persons who reside in the same household and who benefit from either the
expenses incurred or income earned by the bankrupt, or who contribute to such expenses or
earnings. A person who does not reside in the same household shall be considered as a
member of the family unit if the person benefits from, or participates in, the bankrupt's
income or expenses.

Calculation
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6.
1.

In order to apply the Superintendent's standards (Appendix A), the bankrupt shall
first complete the income and expense statement of the family unit, including the
bankrupt, in Form 65 entitled Monthly Income and Expense Statement of the
Bankrupt and the Family Unit and Information (or Amended Information) Concerning
the Financial Situation of the Individual Bankrupt.

2.

The family unit's total monthly income shall be determined by subtracting from the
total of all its members' monthly incomes the following amounts, as applicable:
a.

b.

3.

The family unit's available monthly income is determined by subtracting from the
family unit's total monthly income the monthly non-discretionary expenses applicable
to the personal and family situations of both the bankrupt and the bankrupt's family
unit:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

4.

In the case of a salaried employee, minimum statutory remittances (income
tax, pension and employment insurance deductions) and other mandatory
deductions paid; or
in the case of a person who is self-employed, business expenses and
deductions as permitted by the Income Tax Act or similar provincial
legislation, minimum statutory remittances and instalment tax payments.

child support payments;
spousal support payments;
child care expenses;
expenses associated with a medical condition;
court-imposed fines or penalties that are in process of being paid;
expenses permitted by the Income Tax Act (or similar provincial legislation)
that are a condition of employment; or
any other debt where a stay of proceedings has been lifted by the court, and
a recourse authorized.

The trustee shall verify the accuracy of the income and expense statement submitted
by the bankrupt by requiring that the bankrupt provide:

a.

proof of payments made pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) above;
proof of income.

7.
1.

The trustee determines the bankrupt's total monthly surplus income by subtracting
from the family unit's available monthly income the amount which, according to the
standards, corresponds to the number of persons in the family unit, as set out in
AppendixA.
a.

Where the bankrupt's total monthly surplus income is equal to or greater
than $100 and less than $1,000, 50% of the amount determined in
subsection (1) shall be required from the bankrupt;

b. Where the bankrupt's total monthly surplus income is equal to or greater
than
$1,000, at least 50%, but no more than 75% of the amount determined in subsection
(1), shall be required from the bankrupt.
Family Situation Adjustment
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8.

The amount that the bankrupt is required to pay to the bankrupt's estate shall be adjusted to
the same percentage as the bankrupt's portion of the family unit's available monthly income.

9.

For the purposes of this Directive and subsection 68(3) of the Act, when the trustee has
determined the amount the bankrupt is required to pay to the bankrupt's estate, the trustee
shall inform the Official Receiver of that amount, in Form 65 entitled Monthly Income and
Expense Statement of the Bankrupt and the Family Unit and Information (or Amended
Information) Concerning the Financial Situation of the Individual Bankrupt.

Example (Family unit of 2)
Bankrupt's available monthly income

$1,800

Other family unit member's available monthly income

$1,000

Family unit's available monthly income

$2,800

Minus the Superintendent's standard for a family unit of 2 as per Appendix A

$2,054

Total monthly surplus income

$746

Bankrupt's portion of the family unit's monthly income (1,800 + 2,800

=64.3 %)

Payment required from bankrupt, as per paragraph 7(2)(a) of the Directive
[(746 x 64.3 %) x 50 % 239.84]

=

$240

10. Where a person considered to be a member of the family unit as defined in section 5, who is
not a bankrupt, refuses or neglects to divulge his or her family income and expenses, for the
purposes of subsection 7(1), this person is deemed not to be a member of the family unit.
The trustee shall describe these circumstances in Form 65 entitled Monthly Income and
Expense Statement of the Bankrupt and the Family Unit and Information (or Amended
Information) Concerning the Financial Situation of the Individual Bankrupt and in Form 82
entitled Report of Trustee on Bankrupt's Application for Discharge.

Irregular Income
11. When a bankrupt's income is irregular (e.g., sale commissions or seasonal employment), the
amount that the bankrupt is required to pay to the bankrupt's estate may be deferred until the
time of preparation of Form 82 entitled Report of Trustee on Bankrupt's Application for
Discharge, if necessary. At that time, the average income for the period of bankruptcy would
be considered for the purpose of determining the amount that the bankrupt is required to pay
to the bankrupt's estate and a conditional discharge shall be recommended by the trustee for
the total amount, if this has not already been paid.
12. The trustee shall comment on this situation when dealing with surplus income in Form 82
entitled Report of Trustee on Bankrupt's Application for Discharge.

Example
An individual with no regular income, but an occasional sales commission, files an
assignment in bankruptcy. During the eighth month of bankruptcy, the bankrupt receives
three commissions in the amount of $6,000, $4,000 and $8,000 for a total of $18,000. The
monthly average during the nine month period of bankruptcy would be $2,000, and the total
monthly surplus income determination would be made retroactively with a recommendation
for a conditional discharge being made in the amount of the determined surplus.

Discontinuation of payments
13. The payments which the bankrupt is required to make to the bankrupt's estate shall cease
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upon the discharge of the bankrupt, or as otherwise ordered by the court.

Marc Mayrand
Superintendent of Bankruptcy

Appendix "A"

Superintendent's Standards • 2003 •

Persons
1
2
3
4
5
6
7+

S

Total monthly surplus income
Family unit's available monthly income

1743 1843 1943 2043 ~14312343 2543 ~743 2943 3143 3343 3543 3743

1643 100
20540
25540
30920
~4560
~821 P
~185P

200 300
J
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

400 500 .1700 900
100 ~89 489
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

to

to

1100 1300 1500 1700 1900 2100
689 889 1089· 1289 1489: 1689
189 389 589 789 :1989 1189
10 0 0 ~511451 '551
0
0
0
0
110 'r287
0
0
0
0
ilO
0
0
0
0
0
0
10

The Superintendent's Standards ("S") are derived from the Low Income Cutoffs (LICO) released by
Statistics Canada. The Superintendent uses the before-tax LICO for urban areas 500,000 people and
over. The 2003 standards are updated adding to the 2001 LICO the 2002 Consumer Price Index
(CPI), 2.2%, plus a 2.4% adjustment reflecting the 2003 CPI expectation.
The amounts shown above represent the monthly total surplus income of the bankrupt over the
standards, from which the surplus income payment should be calculated.

4. Mandatory Counseling in Bankruptcy

lain Ramsay 'Mandatory Bankruptcy Counseling: the Canadian Experience' (2002)_
7 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 525

...II. The Introduction of Mandatory Counseling
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Canada introduced mandatory counseling for bankrupts in 1992. The rationale for the
introduction of counseling was to prevent repeat bankruptcies and to further rehabilitative goals
of behavior modification. Creditors had lobbied for the inclusion of mandatory counseling during
legislative debates. The concept of counseling was also supported by the Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy, the independent agency that regulates the bankruptcy process in
Canada...
There are three instances in the Canadian bankruptcy process that could be characterized
as counseling, although only two are formally described as such. At the point when an individual
is considering bankruptcy and has visited a trustee, the trustee is required to make a
pre-bankruptcy assessment of a potential bankrupt. This includes an outline of the debtor's
financial affairs, a discussion of the debtor's options, including the option of a consumer proposal,
and the various rights and responsibilities of the debtor. This directive was introduced in
response to concerns that individuals were being processed through bankruptcy by clerical
personnel in trustee firms without being provided with a full explanation of their options and
without an opportunity to meet a trustee.
The first formal counselling session takes place shortly after the declaration of bankruptcy and is
titled "Consumer and Credit Education." The counselor should provide the debtor at this stage
with consumer advice in "(i) money management; (ii) spending and shopping habits; (iii) warning
signs of financial difficulties; and (iv) obtaining and using credit." The second counseling
session, which takes place shortly before the discharge in a straight bankruptcy is entitled
"Identification of Road Blocks to Solvency and Rehabilitation." The focus here is to follow up
on the principles of money management introduced in the first session and to assure the bankrupt
better understands "his/her strengths and weaknesses with regards to money management and
budgeting skills." It is also to "identify the non-budgetary causes (such as gambling abuse,
compulsive behaviour, substance abuse, employment and marital or family difficulties) that may
have contributed to his/her financial difficulties; to better understand his/her behavior in financial
management and consumption habits" and "to develop recommendations and alternatives for a
financial plan of action." The fee for each session is eighty-five dollars Canadian which is
payable from the bankruptcy estate.} Since the estate usually comprises income payments by the
debtor, one could argue that, in substance, the debtor pays for counseling. Each session is
expected to last approximately one hour...
There are three groups who undertake counseling. These are trustees in bankruptcy,
estate administrators in trustees' offices who have passed the required course, and credit
counseling agencies. Reliance was placed initially on trustees in bankruptcy to carry out the
required counseling as part of their duties in relation to the administration of the estate and most
counseling is undertaken by trustees or individuals (estate managers) within their offices.
A mandatory training course was developed for all individuals who counsel debtors. Also, all
counselors are required to complete successfully an examination based on the course materials.
The course consists of a textbook, a videocassette, a help line and a two-hour true/false multiplechoice examination. It is assumed that the course will take about forty hours to complete. In
addition, counselors must work under the supervision of a qualified counselor for one hundred
hours. These are the only formal credentialing requirements for bankruptcy counseling.
It is not clear whether the introduction of counseling has made a significant difference in
the practice of many trustees. Counseling sessions could be tacked on to other required meetings
with a debtor, so that counseling may not have altered significantly the office routine. Perhaps
reflecting the above comments, the Insolvency Institute, a group composed of trustees and
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lawyers that models itself on the National Banlauptcy Conference in the U.S., has questioned
whether counseling should be mandatory for all debtors.
Trustees may delegate counseling to credit counseling agencies, and there is a variety of credit
counseling agencies in Canada. In English Canada, the most common model for such agencies is
a non- profit agency that receives significant financing from creditors. This funding takes the
form of a percentage of remittances (twenty-five percent) in administering voluntary repayment
plans, and income from banlauptcy counseling augments this income. They may also charge
clients a percentage of remittances (usually ten percent) paid by the client on repayment
programs. In contrast, Quebec's main credit counseling agency, the ACEF, is funded by the
government and charities and does not accept funding from creditors or debtors since the agency
is concerned with retaining its independence. There are, however, privatization pressures on
government funding of counseling agencies, so that one might predict that the first model
outlined above may become increasingly common. A central question therefore concerns the
independence of the agencies from creditors. In a review of credit counseling in Canada, Andrew
Dekany concludes that for "a combination of historical and financial reasons agencies are more
and more assuming a 'dual' role whereby they also represent the interests of creditors."
There is also the influence of the values and interests of intermediaries in administering a
counseling program. For example, a major credit counseling service in Canada indicates in its
annual report that "more and more consumers [are considering] personal banlauptcy as a 'quick
fix' to their financial woes. Fortunately, we have been able to help almost 3,000 individuals ...
to avoid banlauptcy."

N. Assessing the Effectiveness of Counseling
There have been two reviews ofbanlauptcy counseling. An initial review was undertaken
shortly after its implementation. This report was based on interviews with banlaupts who had
undergone counseling, as well as interviews with trustees and private counselors. Trustees were
of the view that counseling would have, at best, a moderate or non-existent influence on
banlaupts' understanding of the causes ofbanlauptcy, knowledge of financial management, and
ability to be productive in the future. Almost two-thirds of trustees thought that counseling made
little or no difference to a banlaupts' understanding of how the banlauptcy affected their creditors
or their willingness to act in a financially responsible manner in the future. Trustees also indicated
that the introduction of counseling had required little increased expenditure in their practices and
that they rarely referred individuals to other counselors for counseling on non-financial problems.
In contrast, banlaupts were much more enthusiastic than trustees about the success of
counseling. Fifty-one percent of banlaupts thought that counseling improved their knowledge
about handling their money and sixty eight percent reported that counseling would have a
considerable or extensive effect on their ability to avoid future banlauptcy. Sixty-seven percent
thought that it would have a considerable or extensive impact on their ability to keep their
financial affairs in order in the future. Finally, seventy-one percent thought that counseling would
have a considerable effect on their willingness to act in a responsible manner in the future.
Overall, sixty percent rated the banlauptcy counseling as very useful.

The researchers also distinguished the effect of the education and occupational status of the
banlaupts on their views of the value of counseling. Those in the semi-skilled and unskilled
categories found counseling to be more valuable than those in higher occupational categories in
relation to its impact on preventing future banlauptcy, knowledge of handling money, and ability
to keep financial affairs in order and act in a financially responsible manner in the future.
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These findings are of interest for several reasons. They indicate that bankrupts seem to find
counseling valuable and that satisfaction with the counseling varies across social class. Studies of
debtor education in the U.S. seem to confirm that individuals appreciate debtor-education
programs. It would be interesting to probe why debtors appreciate counseling. For example, it
may reflect the fact that they have had the opportunity to discuss their problems with a
sympathetic listener. In addition, there is the dissonance between trustees' and debtors' views of
the value of the process. This dissonance does not seem to be as strong in the case of credit
counselors who appear slightly more enthusiastic about the potential impact of counseling on the
future financial stability of a debtor. It is not clear whether trustees are skeptical of the value of
the process because counseling challenges their knowledge and professional status. Since many
trustees are accountants they will rarely have had training in counseling.
A second study of the effectiveness of counseling was completed recently as part of a current
review of personal insolvency. While the draft findings of this study record a similar enthusiasm
among debtors for counseling, they suggest also that those providing counseling are more
optimistic about its overall utility with over forty percent of counselors believing that counseling
is very useful. However, there is a substantial difference between trustees and counselors in their
assessment of counseling, with fifty-five percent of counselors rating counseling to be very useful
versus thirty percent of trustees. This might suggest that those whose primary vocation is
counseling are significantly more optimistic about its impact.

Directive No. 1R2

Counselling in Insolvency Matters
Issued on December 21, 1994
This Directive applies to trustees and administrators of consumer proposals acting for individuals
who make a consumer proposal and trustees acting for individuals who become bankrupt after
December 31, 1994. For the above purposes, this Directive supersedes Directive NO.1 R (issued
June 1,1993).

Short Title
1.

Counselling Directive.

Interpretation
2.

In this Directive,
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"Act"
means the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act;
"counselling"
means to assist and educate bankrupts and/or relatives of bankrupts, or consumer
debtors, on good financial management, including prudent use of consumer credit and
budgeting principles; in developing successful strategies for achieving financial goals and
overcoming financial setbacks; and at any time, where appropriate, making referrals to
deal with non-budgetary causes of insolvency (e.g.: gambling, addiction, marital and
family problems, etc.);
"effective date of bankruptcy"
means the date on which the bankrupt filed an assignment with the official receiver or the
date on which the bankrupt became a bankrupt as a result of a receiving order being
issued, or of a proposal under Division I of Part III of the Act being terminated before
completion;
"qualified counsellor"
means an individual (independent counsellor authorized by the trustee, a trustee, an
administrator of consumer proposals, and an employee of a trustee or administrator of
consumer proposals) who has obtained the qualifications and skills to provide financial
counselling to a debtor, consumer debtor, bankrupt or relative of a bankrupt;
"relative"
means an individual connected by blood relationship, marriage or common-law
relationship, or adoption, to the bankrupt, and includes same sex partners;
"Rules"
means the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Rules made pursuant to subsection 209(1) of the
Act;
"trustee"
means a trustee licensed under section 13.1 of the Act and an administrator of consumer
proposals as defined in section 66.11 of the Act.

Authority
3.
4.

Section 157.1 and paragraph 66.13(2)(b) of the Act state that trustees shall provide, or
provide for, counselling.
This Directive, issued pursuant to the authority of paragraphs 5(4)(b) and (c) of the Act,
establishes that the trustee is responsible for ensuring compliance with this Directive and
that the individual performing the counselling, as described herein, must be a qualified
counsellor.

Purpose and Application
5.
1.

2.

This Directive:
a. describes the minimum content of the counselling stages and associated
tasks;
b. subject to subsection (2), applies to trustees acting for individuals who
make a consumer proposal or become bankrupt after December 31,
1994.
Counselling obligations incurred on or before December 31, 1994, pursuant to
Directive No.1 R (issued June 1, 1993) shall continue to be governed by the
provisions of Directive No. 1R.

Policy
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6.

The counselling referred to in section 157.1 and paragraph 66.13(2)(b) of the Act shall
consist of the following two stages:
a. a first stage to be conducted, in accordance with subsection 7(1) of this Directive,
i.
between 10 and 60 days following the effective date of bankruptcy or the
filing of a consumer proposal, or
ii.
within 10 days following the first meeting of creditors held pursuant to
subparagraph 57(c)(i) of the Act where a Division I proposal was refused
by the creditors.
b. a second stage to be conducted, in accordance with subsection 8(1) of this
Directive not before the end of a 30 day period after the first stage and no later
than 210 days following the effective date of bankruptcy in the case of a bankrupt
or of the filing of a consumer proposal in the case of a consumer debtor.

Standards

First Counselling Stage - Consumer and Credit Education
7.

1.
a.

b.

2.

In the first stage, the qualified counsellor shall present information to
provide the bankrupt and/or relative, or a consumer debtor, with
consumer advice in the areas of:
i.
money management;
ii.
spending and shopping habits;
iii.
warning signs of financial difficulties; and
iv.
obtaining and using credit.
With the agreement of the bankrupt and/or relative, or consumer debtor,
this stage may be conducted in a group presentation. A group shall be
more than two but no more than 20 participants.
On the completion of the first stage, the qualified counsellor shall:
a.complete and sign the Counselling Certificate (Schedule I);
b.request the bankrupt or consumer debtor to sign the
Acknowledgement (Schedule I), indicating that counselling has
been provided; and
c.were applicable, send to the trustee the Counselling Certificate
for retention as part of the estate file of the bankrupt or consumer
debtor.

3.
4.

On request by the Official Receiver, the trustee shall provide the Official Receiver
with a copy of the certificate referred to in paragraph 2(c).
Once the trustee has executed, or received from a qualified counsellor, the
certificate referred to in paragraph 2(c), the trustee may withdraw from the trust
account to his/her benefit, or remit to the qualified counsellor, the prescribed
amount for the payment of the first stage.

Second Counselling Stage - Identification of Road Blocks to
Solvency and Rehabilitation
8.
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1.

The second stage is to determine the budgetary and/or non-budgetary causes of
insolvency or bankruptcy and requires that the qualified counsellor:
a.

follow'!"up on the application by the debtor of the principles presented in
the first stage to assist the bankrupt and/or relative, or the consumer
debtor, to better understand his/her strengths and weaknesses with
regards to money management and budgeting skills;
b. assist, where appropriate, the bankrupt and/or relative, or a consumer
debtor:
i.
to identify the non-budgetary causes (such as gambling abuse,
compulsive behaviour, substance abuse, employment and
marital or family difficulties) that may have contributed to his/her
financial difficulties;
ii.
to better understand his/her behaviour in financial management
and consumption habits; and,
iii.
to make him/her aware of the existence of resources that will
help him/her achieve and maintain economic stability; and
c. cooperatively with the bankrupt and/or relative, or a consumer debtor,
develop recommendations and alternatives for a financial plan of action
which, if appropriate, may include referral for specialised counselling to
deal with non-budgetary causes of insolvency.
2.

When the bankrupt or consumer debtor has satisfied the requirements of this stage, the
qualified counsellor shall:
a.complete and sign the Counselling Certificate (Schedule II);
b.request the bankrupt or consumer debtor to sign the Acknowledgement
(Schedule II), indicating that counselling has been provided; and
c.where applicable, send to the trustee the Counselling Certificate for
retention as part of the estate file of the bankrupt or consumer debtor.

3.
4.

On request by the Official Receiver, the trustee shall provide the Official Receiver with a
copy of the certificate referred to in paragraph 2(c).
Once the trustee has executed, or received from the qualified counsellor, the certificate
referred to in subsection 2(c), the trustee may withdraw from the trust account to his/her
benefit, or remit to the qualified counsellor, the prescribed amount for the payment of the
second stage.

General

Explanatory Note
(This note is not part of the Directive)
1.

It is recognized that counselling services should be provided by skilled and qualified
individuals and that standards be established for the delivery of the service.
In this respect, it is suggested that everyone, including trustees, take a training program if
they wish to provide counselling. A training program should establish a level playing field
as to the skills and qualifications of the individuals who will be providing counselling
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services.
The establishment of standards is meant to reinforce and facilitate the rehabilitation of all
individual debtors. Standards will establish a uniform structure for the delivery of content.
The implementation of the above recommendations will ensure that individual debtors
facing financial difficulties will receive professional advice from qualified people, who will
assist them in adopting more responsible practices with respect to financial matters and
avoiding reoccurrence.

5. Fees in Summary Administration Bankruptcies and Consumer Proposals

TRUSTEE'S FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS IN SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION
128. (1) The fees of the trustee for services performed in a summary administration are
calculated on the total receipts remaining after deducting necessary disbursements relating
directly to the realization of the property of the bankrupt, and the payments to secured creditors,
according to the following percentages:
(a) 100 per cent on the first $975 or less of receipts;
(b) 35 per cent on the portion of the receipts exceeding $975 but not exceeding $2,000; and
(c) 50 per cent on the portion of the receipts exceeding $2,000.
(2) A trustee in a summary administration may claim, in addition to the amount set out in
subsection (1),
(a) the costs of counselling referred to in subsection 131(2); [currently $85 where counselling
provided on an individual basis}
(b) the fee for filing an assignment referred to in paragraph 132(a); [currently $75 for first
time bankrupt}
(c) the fee payable to the registrar under paragraph l(a) of Part II of the schedule;
(d) the amount of applicable federal and provincial taxes for goods and services; and
(e) a lump sum of $100 in respect of administrative disbursements.
(3) A trustee in a summary administration may withdraw from the bank account used in
administering the estate of the bankrupt, as an advance on the amount set out in subsection (1),
(a) $250, at the time of the mailing of the notice of bankruptcy;
(b) an additional $250, thirty days after the date of the bankruptcy; and
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(c) an additional $250, four months after the date of the bankruptcy.
(4) Subsections (1) to (3) apply to bankruptcies in respect of which proceedings are
commenced on or after September 30, 1997 and the accounts are taxed on or after April 30, 1998.
SOR/98-240, s. 1.
ADMINISTRATOR'S FEES AND EXPENSES IN A CONSUMER PROPOSAL
129. (1) For the purposes of paragraph 66. 12(6)(b) of the Act, the fees and expenses of the
administrator of a consumer proposal that must be provided for in a consumer proposal are as
follows:
(a) $750, payable on filing a copy of the consumer proposal with the official receiver;
(b) $750, payable on the approval or deemed approval of the consumer proposal by the court;
(c) 20 per cent of the moneys distributed to creditors under the consumer proposal, payable on
the distribution of the moneys;
(d) the costs of counselling referred to in subsection 131(1);
(e) the fee for filing a consumer proposal referred to in paragraph 132(c);
(f) the fee payable to the registrar under paragraph 3(b) of Part II of the schedule; and
(g) the amount of applicable federal and provincial taxes for goods and services.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to consumer proposals in respect of which proceedings are
commenced on or after April 30, 1998. SOR/98-240, s. 1.
APPLICATION OF SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION PROVISIONS
130. For the purposes of subsections 49(6) and (8) of the Act, the prescribed amount is
$10,000. SOR/98-240, s. 1.
MISCELLANEOUS FEES
131. (1) For the purposes of paragraph 66. 12(6)(b) of the Act, the fees and expenses in respect
of counselling are $85 per session where counselling is provided on an individual basis, and $25
per person per session where counselling is provided on a group basis.
(2) For the purposes of subsection 157.1(1) of the Act, the costs of counselling are $85 per
session where counselling is provided on an individual basis, and $25 per person per session
where counselling is provided on a group basis. SOR/98-240, s. 1.
132. (1) The total fee to file all documents relating to an estate with the official receiver is as
follows:
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(a) $75 for an estate under summary administration in respect of an individual banlcrupt who
has never before been banlcrupt under the laws of Canada or of any jurisdiction prescribed
under section 168.1 of the Act and, in the case of any other banlcruptcy, $150, payable at the
time of filing an assignment pursuant to subsection 49(3) of the Act or at the time of the
making of a receiving order pursuant to subsection 43(6) of the Act;
(b) in the case of a proposal made by an insolvent person, $150, payable at the time of filing a
copy of the proposal pursuant to subsection 62(1) of the Act;
(c) in the case of a consumer proposal made by a consumer debtor, $100, payable at the time
of filing a copy of the consumer proposal pursuant to paragraph 66.13(2)(d) of the Act; and
(d) if the official receiver directs, pursuant to subsection 49(8) of the Act, that subsection
49(6) of the Act ceases to apply in respect ofa banlcrupt, $75, payable at the time of the
official receiver's direction.
(2) The fees set out in paragraphs (1)(a), (c) and (d) apply to all documents filed on or after
the coming into force of those paragraphs. SOR/98-240, s. 1; SOR/2001-155, s. 2.
133. For the purposes of subsection 11.1 (1) of the Act, the fee payable for each request for
information contained in the public record is $8. SOR/98-240, s. 1.
134. (1) For the purposes of subsection 13.2(1) of the Act, the fee payable by an applicant for
a licence to act as a trustee is $300.
(2) For the purposes of subsection 13.2(2) of the Act, the annual fee payable by a trustee is
$850.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph 13.2(4)(a) of the Act, the penalty amount that must be paid
by a trustee is $100. SOR/98-240, s. 1; SOR/2001-155, s. 3.
135. For the purposes of subsection 120(5) of the Act, the fees per meeting that may be paid
to an inspector, to be determined on the net receipts as calculated by subtracting the payments to
secured creditors from the amount of total receipts received by the trustee, are as follows:
(a) $10, where the estate has net receipts of less than $10,000;
(b) $20, where the estate has net receipts of$10,000 or more but less than $50,000;
(c) $30, where the estate has net receipts of $50,000 or more but less than $100,000; or
(d) $40, where the estate has net receipts of $100,000 or more. SOR/98-240, s. 1; SOR/99416, s. 1.
136. For the purposes of subsection 245(1) of the Act, the fee that accompanies the notice
sent to the Superintendent is $70. SOR/98-240, s. 1.
PRESCRIBED DATE
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137. For the purposes of paragraphs 136(1)(h) and (j) of the Act, the prescribed date is
November 30, 1992. SOR/98-240, s. 1.
136.1 (1) The fee payable by a creditor who applies for payment ofa dividend pursuant to
subsection 154(2) of the Act is $30 for each dividend applied for.
(2) The fee set out in subsection (1) applies to all applications for dividends made on or after
the coming into force of that subsection. SOR/2001-155, s. 4.
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I.

How the Durbin-Delahunt bill (Employee Abuse Prevention Act of2002, S. 2798 and
H.R. 5221), would have affected security interests.

II.

How the bill came to include section 103.

III.

Possible assumptions underlying section 103.
A.

B.

c.

Assumption #1: Anything that scales back security interests in bankruptcy is good
for employees.
1.

This is true in cases where the debtor enters bankruptcy. However, these
additional benefits must be offset by the benefits that are lost as a
consequence. These lost benefits include the low cost and wide
availability of secured credit.

2.

If scaling back security interests in bankruptcy is desirable, why did the
bill provide for this result only indirectly?

Assumption #2: A security interest that anyone could avoid under any
circumstances should be avoidable in bankruptcy.
1.

This argument completely overlooks differences in legal outcomes that
tum on relevant facts. A buyer of collateral is treated differently from a
subsequent secured party and a subsequent lien creditor for good reasons.

2.

The failure to respect these differences yields results that could not
possibly have been intended.

Assumption #3: A security interest that is not effective against another secured
party is not "really" perfected and so should be avoidable.
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1.

This, too, reflects a misunderstanding of how Revised Article 9 works.
Revised Article 9 treats subsequent judicial lien creditors differently from
subsequent secured parties for commercially relevant reasons.

2.

An example: A legally sufficient financing statement is filed against the
equipment of a corporate debtor, but it provides the wrong corporate
identification number.

3.

D.

a.

The misinformation is relevant only to someone who is informed
of the contents of the financing statement and gives value in
reasonable reliance on the misinformation. Accordingly, Revised
9-338 provides that the security interest perfected by the filing is
subordinate to the security interest of such a purchaser. The
bankruptcy trustee neither looks at the financing statement, nor
gives value, nor relies (let alone reasonably relies).

b.

One might argue that giving the bankruptcy trustee the equivalent
of Revised 9-338 rights does no more than reflect the
pre-bankruptcy reality: Unsecured creditors, in a pre-bankruptcy
workout, could have taken a security interest and trumped the
"bad" security interest but failed to do so because they conducted a
search, found the filed financing statement, but did not realize that
the debtor named in the properly-indexed financing statement was
in fact their debtor. Is this risk any different from the risk that the
property in question would become encumbered after the workout?

Other examples include the non-temporal priority afforded to a secured
who purchases chattel paper or instruments that previously were
encumbered by a security interest perfected by filing. These rules are
designed to enable the prevailing secured parties to rely on certain facts,
such as the debtor's possession of the chattel paper or instruments, without
having to investigate. The reasons do not apply to the bankruptcy trustee
or unsecured creditors.

Assumption #4: Giving the trustee the rights of a purchaser in Be 544(a)(l) does
nothing more than make personal property subject to the same rules as real estate
in BC 544(a)(3). If Congress's override of state law's "secret lien" policy for real
property is unobjectionable, why shouldn't Congress also override state law's
"secret lien" policy for personal property?
1.

Congress's concern is (and should be) limited to avoiding secret liens
where nothing has been filed/recorded, but leaving state law to determine
exactly what must be put in the public record.
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E.

2.

The powers also could be made parallel by giving the trustee the rights of a
judicial lien creditor with respect to real property. However, in a number
of states, .lien creditors do not prevail over unrecorded mortgages. Giving
the trustee the rights of a purchaser of real property puts the trustee in the
same position with respect to unrecorded mortgages as a lien creditor with
respect to unperfected security interests, not in a better position.

3.

Moreover, Congress has shown appreciation for the fact that differences
between the non-bankruptcy law of real property and of personal property
justify using different "hypothetical" claimants.
a.

Com Exchange National Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943),
and the 1950 amendment of the former Bankruptcy Act.

b.

The 1984 amendment to BC 544(a), which removed "fixtures"
from the real-property avoidance rule in BC 544(a)(3).

Assumption #5: Anyone who puts anything in the record that is or becomes
seriously misleading should lose in bankruptcy, regardless of the state law
outcome.
1.

A rule of this kind arguably would provide proper incentives for secured
parties to keep the record complete and accurate.

2.

This argument misconstrues the purpose of the Article 9 filing system.
a.

The Article 9 public record never has been complete and accurate.
It is not, and does not purport to be, a substitute for warranties of
title, credit investigation (e.g., through Dun & Bradstreet), and
other due diligence.

b.

State law weighs the costs and benefits of making the record more
accurate, as well as the costs and benefits of requiring a searcher to
look beyond the public record. It reaches a principled
accommodation that is not peculiar to bankruptcy or even targeted
at subsequent lien creditors.
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I.

Executive Summary.

Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-IL) and Rep. William D. Delahunt (D-MA) introduced the
Employee Abuse Prevention Act of2002 (S. 2798 and H.R. 5221) (the "Act") on July 25, 2002.
The stated purpose of the Act is to provide additional protections for "employees and retirees
from corporate practices that rob them of their earnings and retirement savings when businesses
collapse into bankruptcy."} That is a laudable goal and we applaud the sponsors' efforts and
concerns. This report does not address the provisions of the Act that deal directly with those
corporate practices. Instead, this report limits its focus to three especially troubling provisions of
the Act that are designed to override important aspects of state law. These provisions are not
directed to the corporate practices that are the principal focus of the Act.
The provisions of the Act addressed here would materially amend the Bankruptcy Code
("BC"). In doing so, they would impose significant constraints on state laws and have a
substantial and adverse effect on the economy. Significantly, these provisions would impede
future transactions and would be applied retroactively to invalidate property rights in existing
transactions in which billions of dollars of credit "have been extended to both business enterprises
and consumers.
First, the Act would confer on a trustee in bankruptcy considerably expanded avoidance
powers with respect to a debtor's pre-bankruptcy transfers of property, including security
interests in personal property. Second, the Act would subordinate secured claims to certain new
administrative expense priority claims and create a "super" priority for the new priority claims.
These two sets of provisions would significantly impair in bankruptcy many
nonpossessory and possessory security interests in personal property. These changes would
effectively repeal, immediately and retroactively, much of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
Article 9, thus relegating secured transactions law in the United States to the genre of legal
regimes that exist in many developing countries, with the corresponding impediments to
financing and capital formation. This repeal would come not long after aliSO states, the District
of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands adopted changes to UCC Article 9 intended to
modernize the statute to facilitate the capital formation that is so crucial to the health of our
national economy. Indeed, the sponsors indicate that the expanded avoidance powers in the Act
are specifically intended to override certain of these changes to UCC Article 9. 2 The proposed
avoidance powers in the Act go far beyond negating the recent changes made to UCC Article 9.
They would render UCC Article 9 largely without effect to support extensions of secured credit
because many secured transactions would not be effective in bankruptcy.

1. See Section-By-Section Summary at 1.
2. See Section-By-Section Summary at 2.
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Third,· the Act would federalize the question whether a pre-bankruptcy sale, lease, or
other transfer of property is to be recharacterized as a secured loan, replacing generally applicable
and settled state law with a vague federal test. For example, an outright (or "true") sale of
property removes the property from a debtor's estate and should be effective and nonavoidable if
made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value. Under most state laws, transactions that
nominally are sales may, in appropriate cases, be recharacterized as transfers of an interest in
property that is less than complete and outright ownership. When state law does not permit such
a recharacterization, federal courts in bankruptcy cases already have the power to adjust state law
when required to advance a significant federal interest. The new federal test for
recharacterization would introduce substantial uncertainty for a variety of commercial
transactions that have been used as a source of capital and liquidity for businesses.
Part II of this report summarizes its conclusions. Parts III through V address the
substantive proposals mentioned above. In each case the discussion explains how the provisions
of the Act probably would be interpreted and applied, the likely transactional and economic
impact of the provisions, and the merits of the proposals in the context of well-accepted
bankruptcy policies and history. Part VI addresses the Act's proposed immediate effectiveness
and retroactive application. Part VII then considers the importance of thorough, well-publicized
legislative hearings on this bankruptcy legislation before adoption of the Act or any of its
provisions. Part VIII concludes the report.
The following analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act seeks to identify the most
plausible interpretation of the Act.

II.

Summary of Conclusions.

•

The trustee's expanded avoidance powers under the Act would:
•

essentially eliminate nonpossessory secured transactions (and probably possessory
secured transactions) in virtually all areas of personal property financing,
including the financing of inventory, intangibles such as receivables, securities,
and other investment property, and equipment;

•

effectively repeal UCC Article 9 (as recently revised and enacted in substantially
the uniform version in all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands) and deprive the United States of a modem law on secured transactions (as
opposed to nullifying recent amendments to UCC Article 9, as claimed by the
sponsors);

•

reduce the availability and increase the cost of credit, thus imposing significant
costs on a wide range of businesses and individual consumers;

•

have a substantial and adverse effect on the economy; and
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•

conflict with well-accepted theoretical and historical bankruptcy policies on the
appropriate role of avoidance powers.

•

Even if the Act were rewritten to address only secured transactions as to which a public
registry actually contains incorrect information, it nonetheless would increase costs, have
adverse economic effects, conflict with well-accepted bankruptcy avoidance policies, and
impair vee Article 9.

•

The Act's provision for subordination of secured claims to new pension-related priority
claims and its new super priority rule:

•

•

are unclear as to their operation and application;

•

would place unacceptable burdens on secured financing and raise the cost of
credit; and

•

do not reflect a sound or balanced bankruptcy policy.

The Act's federal test for recharacterizing pre-bankruptcy transfers of property:
•

provides no guidance on the factors relevant to recharacterization, leaving the
courts with no principled basis to evaluate transfers;

•

provides the courts with unbridled and dangerous discretion to recharacterize
transfers that have been structured and negotiated between parties to legitimate
commercial transactions,

•

is unnecessary because (i) state law, as interpreted by the courts, normally
provides sufficient guidance and has worked well in determining when transfers
should be recharacterized and (ii) federal courts already have the power to adjust
state property law if required to protect a compelling federal interest; and

•

would create substantial and undesirable uncertainty for:
•

securitization transactions (including those involving sales of residential
mortgage loans) and other transactions in which sales of financial assets
take place, thereby reducing the availability and increasing the cost of
credit and funding; and

•

virtually all transfers of real and personal property, including leases,
licenses, consignments, and other bailments.
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•

would have a substantial and adverse effect on the economy.

•

The Act's provision for immediate and retroactive effectiveness is unfair and unnecessary
and would upset fixed and vested rights and interests, including property interests.

•

Neither Congress nor any of its Committees should take action on the Act or any of its
provisions until open hearings have been held, after well-publicized notice, and all
interested parties have been given the opportunity to be heard.

III.

Proposed Avoidance Provisions.
A.

Description, Application, and Interpretation.
1.

BC § 544(a) "Strong Arm" Avoidance Power.

Section 103(a) of the Act would amend Be § 544(a) (the trustee's so-called "strong ann"
power) to add a new paragraph (4). The new provision would give a trustee the rights of a
hypothetical good faith purchaser of property who (i) gave value, (ii) relied on incorrect
infonnation in a public record, and (iii) either (x) took possession of the property (even ifit could
not be possessed) or (y) took steps to make the purchaser's interest invulnerable to a judicial lien
creditor. The trustee would have those rights even though no such purchaser actually existed3
and even if no incorrect infonnation on a public record existed. The hypothetical purchaser
could be either an outright buyer or another secured party receiving a security interest. Under
current BC § 544(a)(l), the trustee only has the rights of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor as to
personal property and fixtures on the date bankruptcy commences. 4
The principal effect of the new avoiding power would be to render most nonpossessory
security interests vulnerable to avoidance by a trustee. This proposal is an enonnous expansion
of rights of a trustee beyond those that exist under current law as to personal property and
fixtures.
Consider an example:

Example 1. Dealer obtains a loan from Lender and grants to Lender a security
interest in its inventory of goods and in its rights to payment for goods that it has
sold or leased, as evidenced by installment sales contracts and leasing agreements

3. We read the reference to "such creditor" in proposed new BC § 544(a)(4)(C)(I) to
mean "such purchaser." This gives effect to the apparent intent and, otherwise, there would be
no antecedent to which "such" could refer.
4. Under current BC § 544(a)(3) the trustee has the rights of a good faith purchaser of
real property, but not of personal property or fixtures. This distinction is considered below.
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with Dealer's customers. Lender perfects its security interest under vee Article
9 by filing a proper financing statement in the appropriate public filing office.
One year later Dealer files a bankruptcy petition.
The perfected status resulting from public notice (Lender's filing of the financing
statement) affords Lender priority over a later-in-time judicial lien creditor of the debtor. 5 It also
protects Lender's security interest from avoidance under current Be § 544(a)(I). Vnder the
Act's new Be § 544(a)(4), however, the trustee could avoid Lender's perfected security interest,
as to which Lender had proceeded correctly in all respects including the filing of a financing
statement in the correct public office containing correct information. As to the inventory on
hand, the trustee's new hypothetical good faith purchaser status would afford it the right of a
"buyer in ordinary course of business," to buy the inventory free of Lender's security interest. 6
As to the installment sales agreements and leasing agreements (denominated "chattel paper"
under vee § 9-102(a)(II)) generated when Dealer sells the inventory, the trustee would have the
rights of an ordinary course purchaser of the rights to payment under the chattel paper who has
taken possession of the chattel paper and given new value in order to achieve priority over the
Lender. 7 Lender's only possible means of protecting itself against a future bankruptcy of Dealer
would be to take physical possession of Dealer's inventory and chattel paper--a step that would
be practically impossible in the case of most inventory financing and that often is not practical in
the case of chattel paper.
Arguably, even Lender's taking possession of the inventory and chattel paper would not
protect it from the trustee's proposed enhanced avoidance powers. Because the Act's new Be §
544(a)(4) hypothesizes that the trustee takes possession of the collateral, it might be read to imply
that Lender no longer holds possession itself. The same reasoning might be applied to secured
party that has "control" of intangible assets such as uncertificated securities or security
entitlements, even if actual possession were impossible. This reading would negate Lender's
actual possession or control in favor of the trustee's subsequent hypothetical possession. On this

5. vee

§ 9-317(a).

vee

§ 9-320(a).

6.

7. vee§ 9-330(a), (b). In like manner, the Act's new Be § 544(a)(4) also would permit
avoidance of security interests perfected by filing in instruments (such as promissory notes),
documents of title, and securities. vee §§ 9-330; 9-331. Note that most of the good faith
purchase rules discussed in this section (Vee §§ 9-320, 9-330, and 9-331) had very similar
antecedents that would have produced identical results under former (i.e., pre-revision) vee
Article 9. See former vee §§ 9-307; 9-308; 9-309.
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reasoning even security interests perfected by possession or control would be vulnerable in
bankruptcy. 8
The Act's expansion of the trustee's strong arm avoidance power is even broader than
indicated above. Consider another example:

Example 2. Manufacturer obtains a working capital loan from Lender and grants
to Lender a security interest in Manufacturer's equipment. Lender perfects its
security interest by filing a proper financing statement in the appropriate filing
office. One year later Manufacturer files a bankruptcy petition.
Once again, Lender has taken all appropriate steps to perfect its security interest by filing,
but under the Act's new BC § 544(a)(4), the trustee is entitled to avoid Lender's security interest.
This is because the trustee is anned with hypothetical reliance on hypothetical incorrect
infonnation in the filing office. The trustee may rely on the rights of a purchaser relying on
incorrect information to take free of a security interest under VCC § 9-338(2).
One possible interpretation of proposed new BC § 544(a)(4) is that it addresses, and is
intended to address, only the rights of a good faith purchaser who has relied on incorrect
information under UCC § 9-338(1) and (2). Even if the language is so limited, the Act
nonetheless would give the trustee the rights of a hypothetical good faith purchaser who
hypothetically relied on hypothetical incorrect information in a filed financing statement. Having
these rights, the trustee would be able to avoid correctly perfected security interests that had been
perfected by filing. In Example 1, the trustee would still be able to avoid the correctly perfected
security interests in inventory and chattel paper.
These examples do not reflect a complete account of the problems and do not exhaust the
circumstances in which the trustee's enhanced avoidance powers could be exercised under the
Act's proposed new BC § 544(a)(4). There are several other circumstances under UCC Article 9
in which, under the proposed expanded strong arm power, a trustee could exercise the rights of a
good faith purchaser to avoid properly perfected security interests.

2.

Be § 547 "Preference" Avoidance Power.

Section 103(b) of the Act would change the rule for determining when a transfer is made
for purposes of avoiding preferential transfers. Under current BC § 547(b) transfers made by an
insolvent debtor to a non-insider within 90 days before a bankruptcy filing and on account of an
antecedent debt generally are avoidable. A somewhat complex statutory system for determining
when a transfer is made is found in BC § 547(e). The timing ofa transfer is important for
determining both whether the transfer was made within the 90-day window and for determining

8. See, e.g., VCC §§ 9-331 (rights of purchasers of instruments, documents, and
securities under UCC Articles 3, 7, and 8); 9-328(1) (control priority).
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whether the transfer was for an antecedent debt. Under Be § 547(e)(2), the timing of a transfer is
a function of whether and when a transfer is "perfected." For personal property and fixtures, a
transfer is perfected when it is invulnerable to a judicial lien obtained by a creditor on a simple
contract. 9 (This is essentially analogous to the judicial lien creditor test for personal property and
fixtures in current BC § 544(a)(I), discussed above.) The Act would change the results in
bankruptcy significantly by substituting a good faith purchaser test for the judicial lien creditor
test. This would mean, for example, that a security interest perfected under UCC Article 9 would
not be perfected for purposes of preference avoidance so long as the security interest were
vulnerable to the claim of a superior good faith purchaser.
Example 3. Vendor sells a consumer appliance to Consumer on credit under an
installment sales agreement in which Vendor obtains a security interest in the
goods to secure the unpaid price. Sixty days later Consumer files a bankruptcy
petition.
Under uce § 9-309(1), Vendor's security interest is perfected automatically, without the
need to file a financing statement or otherwise give public notice, because it is a purchase-money
security interest in consumer goods. Because Vendor's security interest is perfected under UCC
Article 9, Vendor's security interest has priority over a judicial lien creditor of Consumer. The
security interest would not be avoidable under BC § 547(b) because it was perfected under
current BC § 547(e)(I)(B) when it was created and therefore was not on account of an antecedent
debt. 10 But, under the Act's version ofBC § 547(e)(I)(B), even though Vendor complied in
every respect with uec Article 9, the security interest was never perfected for preference
avoidance purposes because it remained at all times vulnerable to a consumer good faith
purchaser under UCC § 9-320(b). Consequently, Vendor's security interest would be avoidable
under the Act because it would be deemed to have been transferred "immediately before the date
of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition" and therefore was on account of an antecedent debt. 11
Under uec Article 9, a secured party with purchase-money security interest in consumer
goods who has concern about a good faith purchaser of those goods acquiring superior rights can
protect its security interest by filing a financing statement covering the goods. 12 The filing would
subject the good faith purchaser of these goods from the consumer buyer to the security interest
in the goods. Vendor in Example 3 could ensure that its rights in the goods would be superior to

9. BC § 547(e)(I)(B).
10. Alternatively, the security interest would be protected from avoidance under BC §
547(c)(I) (contemporaneous exchange for new value) or (3) (purchase-money security interest).
11. BC § 547(e)(2)(C). The security interest also would not be sheltered from avoidance
by BC § 547(c)(I) or (3).
12. UCC § 9-320(b).
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those of a good faith purchaser for value by filing a financing statement. The experience under
former Article 9, which contained the same provision, was that purchase-money secured parties
rarely filed financing statements in these circumstances because of the low risk that the consumer
buyer would wrongfully sell the goods subject to the security interest and the cost savings of not
filing a financing statement. The Act would instantly change the costlbenefit analysis by forcing
the secured party to go the trouble and expense of filing a financing statement in order to have a
security interest that is effective in bankruptcy. These costs would, of course, be passed on to the
consumer.
On the same reasoning applied to Example 3, because Lender's security interests in
inventory and chattel paper in Example 1 remained vulnerable to good faith purchasers, they also
could.be avoided as preferences under the Act's proposed revision ofBC § 547(e)(l)(B).
Unlike the proposed expansion of the strong arm power in proposed new BC § 544(a)(4),
the proposed revision ofBC § 547(e)(l)(B) makes no reference to "incorrect information."
Consequently, the proposed test for perfection is not limited to the rights of a good faith
purchaser relying on hypothetical incorrect information under UCC § 9-338(1) and (2).

B.

Transactional and Economic Impact; Rationale.

The impact of the proposed revised avoidance powers cannot be overemphasized. In
particular, the use of inventory, chattel paper, equipment, and other collateral in business
financing is ubiquitous. Each year an enormous amount of credit is extended in business
financing transactions in reliance on security interests in these types of collateral. The Act would
largely render those security interests ineffective in bankruptcy, thus striking a blow at capital
formation. The impact of this de/acto repeal of much ofUCC Article 9 would be especially
harsh for small businesses that lack access to the capital markets and which must rely on secured
commercial financing for working capital. Contrary to the stated purposes of the Act, its
detrimental effects on the cost and availability of business credit necessarily would seriously
harm employees and their employers alike. It would leave the United States essentially without a
modem secured transactions law.
While we can speak to the impact that the Act would have on transactions with which we
are familiar, we suspect that the businesses that rely on secured credit for their existence will
have even more to say on the subject. The central insight here is that the principal negative
impact of the proposed new avoidance powers would not be confined to debtors in actual
bankruptcies, present and future. Following a period of time (involving disruptions of
expectations arising out of the Act's retroactivity), credit markets would adjust. Thereafter, for
example, no lender would make a secured inventory loan once forewarned that the security
interest would be avoidable in bankruptcy. Thus, the principal impact by far would be on
solvent, healthy debtors that never file a bankruptcy petition. By rendering ineffective in
bankruptcy a wide swath of secured transactions, many borrowers and buyers would be unable to
obtain needed credit or only could obtain less credit at the much higher cost associated with
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unsecured credit. That is precisely the result that every state and the District of Columbia sought
to avoid when, effective just last year, they adopted Revised UCC Article 9 in order to facilitate
secured financing in the United States.
The Act's negative effect on debtors also is not limited to future debtors. The Act would
affect every security interest in existence on the day of enactment. On the day of enactment all
secured parties would reevaluate their extensions of credit. Almost all secured parties would
conclude that, as a practical matter, the credit they had extended on the assumption that their
security interests would be respected in bankruptcy had become unsecured. Virtually all security
agreements allow a secured party that reasonably concludes that its security is impaired to
accelerate the secured loan, making it payable in full at once. Of course, not all debtors would be
able to pay in full instantly. But Lenders most certainly would invoke these provisions to
accelerate loans or renegotiate loans to take account of the much higher credit risk associated
with the fact that the loans had effectively become unsecured. In the end, debtors would be
denied credit or would be obliged to pay the higher interest rates normally charged for unsecured
loans. Indeed, given the proposed retroactivity of Title I of the Act, if any serious support for the
Act surfaced, creditors might begin the renegotiation process even before enactment.

c.

Bankruptcy Policy and History.

In addition to the serious potential transactional and economic impact of the proposed
avoiding power revisions, the proposals also conflict with well-accepted and uncontroversial
understandings about bankruptcy avoiding powers.
Bankruptcy theoreticians and analysts of bankruptcy history have explored the underlying
conceptual bases for the trustee's strong arm (BC § 544(a)) and preference (BC § 547) avoiding
powers. Unsurprisingly, they have not always agreed. For example, there are plausible
arguments that the strong arm power derives from the trustee's role as the representative of
creditors, from the collectivist goals and structure of bankruptcy law, from concerns about
ostensible ownership and secret liens, or from more than one of these possible justifications.
Similarly, as to justifications for preference avoidance, arguments advanced include the
deterrence of eve-of-bankruptcy grabs, the goal of creditor equality, and a combination of both
factors. Quite possibly there are no clear, overriding theoretical justifications.~ However, no
complete theory and historical account of these avoiding powers is needed in order to understand
that the Act's proposed modifications would push the law far from the mainstream and against
the current of conventional wisdom about acceptable bankruptcy policy.
Consider first the trustee's existing BC § 544(a)(I) strong arm power to avoid transfers
that would be ineffective against a hypothetical judicial lien creditor of the debtor in the typical
context of a security interest in personal property that is unperfected (under UCC Article 9).
Outside bankruptcy, the secured party has rights in the property that are superior to those of the
debtor's unsecured creditors, who have no rights at all. On the other hand, outside bankruptcy
and under UCC Article 9, any unsecured creditor has at least the potential to become a judicial
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lien creditor whose lien would defeat (i.e., subordinate) the unperfected security interest. Upon
the bankruptcy filing, however, the automatic stay (and, essentially, the whole structure of the
BC) prevents these creditors from acquiring a judicial lien and thereby priming the unperfected
secured party. Without something like the strong arm power, those creditors would be deprived
of any possibility of realizing anything from the debtor's encumbered property, a possibility that
existed outside bankruptcy.
Under the strong arm power the trustee inherits the power of the hypothetical judicial lien
creditor and can avoid the unperfected security interest for the benefit of all unsecured creditors-a potential power held by creditors outside bankruptcy. After avoidance, the former unperfected
secured party itself becomes an unsecured creditor. This structure recognizes that before
bankruptcy all creditors (except the unperfected secured party) had equal rights. The strong arm
power preserves this equality by freeing the property from the security interest of the unperfected
secured party for the benefit of the unsecured creditors generally. In effect, if not in precise
doctrine, upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition the trustee metaphorically seizes the debtor's
property, obtains rights equivalent to that of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, and preserves
the value for all unsecured creditors.
The strong arm power has been criticized on the basis that it is too favorable to unsecured
creditors because the power fails to recognize the clear priority of the unperfected secured party's
interest outside bankruptcy. However, the power nevertheless strikes a fair balance by
recognizing that some nonbankruptcy entitlements must yield to the benefits of a collective
bankruptcy proceeding.
By conferring the power of a hypothetical good faith purchaser on the trustee, the Act
deviates from this well-understood effect of the strong arm power to avoid transfers that were
vulnerable to judicial lien creditors outside bankruptcy. In general bankruptcy law respects
nonbankruptcy rights and entitlements and does not create new rights. The Act, however,
confers on the unsecured creditors benefits that they could not have enjoyed outside bankruptcy.
Moreover, it ignores the fact that an entire national system of personal property secured financing
and law (one that is the envy of much of the world) has been created and recently revised,
updated, and reenacted based on the expectation that transfers of personal property and fixtures
will be tested in bankruptcy against a hypothetical judicial lien creditor. 13

13. The same can be said of the similar test for testing the time of transfer in the context
of preferences, discussed below. It is interesting that as secured financing practices and law
developed during the mid-twentieth century, especially following the Second World War, the
development of bankruptcy avoidance law proceeded alongside. See the discussion below of
Corn Exchange National Bankv. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), and the 1950 amendment of the
former Bankruptcy Act. This may account for the fact that ~ome prominent bankruptcy law
experts also were widely recognized experts in secured transactions law and were involved in the
development ofUCC Article 9. Legendary figures in the law such as Peter F. Coogan and Grant
Gilmore come to mind.
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There is nothing suspect, sinister, or inconsistent with bankruptcy policy about
nonbankruptcy priority rules that provide good faith purchasers with rights vis-a-vis a perfected
security interest that are greater than the rights ofjudicial lien creditors. Under both fonner uee
Article 9 and Revised uee Article 9, the holder of a security interest is afforded perfected status
and, accordingly, protection against judicial lien creditors, even though the security interest may
be subordinated or cut offby a subsequent good faith purchaser. This is because, unlike
purchasers, judicial lien creditors rarely if ever rely in extending credit on the property subject to
their judicial liens. Accordingly and appropriately, uee Article 9 affords them a weaker status
than good faith purchasers vis-a-vis a perfected security interest.
To be sure, the strong ann power to avoid transfers of real property, unlike personal
property and fixtures, has been based on a bona fide purchaser test in BC § 544(a)(3) since
1978. 14 It has remained unchanged, however, both for strong ann and preference transfer
purposes, as discussed below. IS But the distinction is more apparent than real as a result of
differences between real property law and personal property law. Under the real property law of
many states the rights ofjudicial lien creditors are comparatively weak. For example, in these
states a judicial lien creditor takes subject to even an unrecorded mortgage. The practical effect
of the bona fide purchaser test for real property, then, is similar to the judicial lien creditor test
for personal property under which the lien creditor obtains rights superior to an unperfected
security interest. 16

14. Section 70(c) of the fonner Bankruptcy Act provided for the trustee's strong ann
power until it was superseded by BC § 544(a). Fonner section 70(c) did not contain a bona fide
purchaser test for transfers of real property.
15. We note that proposed new BC § 544(a)(4) would apply to all property and is not
limited to personal property and fixtures. What effect would the expanded strong ann powers,
based on hypothetical reliance on hypothetical incorrect infonnation in a public registry, have on
transfers of real property such as mortgages and deeds of trust? Might the new powers render
these transfers avoidable through the application real property law doctrines? While we have not
considered these questions on the merits, certainly they deserve attention from the real property
bar.
16. A hypothetical bona fide purchaser test also is found in BC § 545(2), dealing with
avoidance of statutory liens. Its origin was a concern about hidden priorities and the belief that if
a state creates a statutory lien so weak that it succumbs to a bona fide purchaser it was a
disguised attempt to fix priorities among creditors. One recommendation of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission was to cut back on the BC § 545(2) bona fide purchaser test as
it has been applied against federal tax liens. National Bankruptcy Review Commission Final
Report, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, Recommendation 4.2.11 at 955 (October 20,
1997).
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Preference avoidance law, including late-perfection, also generally is understood to be
based in substantial part on concerns about creditor equality. Much of the foregoing reasoning
concerning the strong arm power also applies in the preference context. As with the strong arm
power, the judicial lien creditor test for determining when a transfer of personal property takes
place for preference purposes has worked well. Indeed, a bona fide purchaser test for
determining when a transfer of personal property occurs for preference purposes was abandoned
more than 50 years ago because it did not work and substantially impeded the development and
use of secured credit. In 1950, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act 17 so as to override the
(in)famous case of Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder. 18 The then effective Bankruptcy
Act conferred on the trustee, in exercising its power to avoid preferences, the rights of a
hypothetical bona fide purchaser of personal property (assigned accounts receivable, in Klauder).
Klauder, in effect, also gave the trustee the rights of a hypothetical purchaser that was the first
assignee to give notice to the underlying account obligor. 19 From the 1950 amendment forward,
the test for transfers of personal property in the context of preference avoidance has been based
on the priority of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor.
As far as we are aware the Act's proposed changes to the strong arm and preference
avoidance powers do not respond to any widespread dissatisfaction with current law on the part
of the bankruptcy bar, the financing bar, debtors, creditors, or any other identifiable affected
segment. Fewer than five years ago the National Bankruptcy Review Commission issued its
massive Final Report, making numerous recommendations for changes to the Bankruptcy Code.
But the Report's recommendations barely mention the trustee's avoiding powers. Certainly the
Commission did not recommend any fundamental changes in the strong arm and preference
powers. 20 Significantly, the recommendations that do relate to avoidance uniformly propose
restricting, rather than expanding, the trustee's avoidance powers. 21

17. Pub. L. No. 461, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (March 18, 1950) (amending former §§ 60 and
70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act).
18. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
19. Klauder was decided long before the UCC existed as a uniform law, much less as

actual law. At the time states had various conflicting rules on the priority of competing
assignments of intangibles.
20. Moreover, the Commission must have been aware of the status of the planned
revisions to UCC Article 9. By 1997 most of the substantive proposals already were on the table.
For example, a provision substantially similar to UCC § 9-338 was included as § 9-335 in the
1997 drafts of the revised Article presented to The American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
21. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission Final Report, Bankruptcy: The Next
Twenty Years, Recommendations 3.2.1 at 797-98 (transfers of less than $5,000 may not be
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The Act's sponsors have asserted that Section 103 of the Act "restores to trustees in
bankruptcy the ability to review and set aside suspect transactions which they enjoyed as lien
creditors under Article 9 of the Vnifonn Commercial.Code prior to the VCC amendments that
became effective on January 1, 2002."22 That statement is manifestly incorrect.
First, ·as demonstrated above, the striking impact that the new avoidance powers would
have on secured financing goes far beyond overturning the changes made in Revised VCC
Article 9. Second, it would "restore" nothing other than arguments about preference avoidance
powers that were settled more than fifty years ago. Third, Revised VCC Article 9 did not
diminish the powers of a trustee. Fourth, the vast majority of the transactions that would be
rendered ineffective in bankruptcy by the Act are far from "suspect." Instead, they are
mainstream business and consumer finance transactions on which our economy depends. And
these financing transactions are supported by a legal platfonn, VCC Article 9, that is the most
modem and efficient in the world.
Finally, even if modification of the avoidance powers could somehow be limited to the
recent changes in VCC Article 9, why would Congress have any interest in dismissing the clearly
demonstrated public will? Revised VCC Article 9 emerged from almost a decade of work by
The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Vnifonn State
Laws, the co-sponsors of the VCC and two of the most respected law refonn institutions in the
world. Representatives of virtually every interest affected by secured transactions participated in
the drafting process, including the bankruptcy bar and consumer and business debtors. Drafts of
the new statute were extensively discussed and debated in panels and meetings sponsored by
organizations such as the American Bar Association, the American College of Bankruptcy, The
American College of Commercial Finance Lawyers, the American College of Mortgage
Attorneys, and the American Bankruptcy Institute. 23 Following its unanimous approval in 1998,
it was presented to the legislatures for adoption, a process that nonnally takes 8 to 10 years.

sought in action to avoid nonconsumer debt preference); 3.2.2 at 799-800 (preference recovery
action of less than $10,000 must be brought in district in which transferee has principal
business); 3.2.3 at 800-03 (strengthening protection from preference avoidance for ordinary
course payments); 4.2.11 at 955 (October 20, 1997) (cut back on BC § 545(2) bona fide
purchaser test to provide federal tax liens greater protection from avoidance).

22. See also Press Release following the August 1, 2002 Durbin and Delahunt Press
Conference ("[I]t [the Act] restores to bankruptcy trustees the full authority to challenge and set
aside pre-bankruptcy transactions that take assets out of the company.") Of course, in the .
transactions addressed in this report, assets of an equal or greater value (e.g., loaned funds or
purchased property) come in as the debtor's property consisting of new assets, a feature the
sponsors have not mentioned.
23. Note, for example, that Revised VCC Article 9 received the strong approval of the
American College of Bankruptcy.
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Because of the strong national support, the need for immediate adoption, and the lack of any
organized opposition to the changes, Revised UCC Article 9 was adopted by the legislatures in
all 50 states and by the District of Columbia by July I, 200 I, and is now effective in all 50 states,
the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Indeed, Revised UCC Article 9 enjoys the
fastest adoption record in the more than IOO-year history of the National Conference. Article 9
has been considered the "crown jewel" of the UCC for almost 50 years, being the most bold and
innovative of the UCC's articles. Why would the United States Congress wish to flout this
important and successful domain of state law?

D.

Effect of Limiting Expanded Avoidance Powers to Cases of Actual Incorrect
Information in Public Registry.

The Act's expanded avoidance powers could be curbed by revising it to address only (i)
the rights of a good faith purchaser that relies on incorrect information under vce § 9-338 and
(ii) cases in which the public registry actually contains incorrect information in connection with
the particular transfer to be avoided. Under this approach, for example, if a financing statement
on file actually contained incorrect information that did not render a security interest unperfected
under uec Article 9,24 the trustee would have the rights of a hypothetical purchaser that
hypothetically relied on the actually incorrect information. 25 So revised, the expanded avoidance
powers would reach a narrower slice of transactions. However, even this narrower version would
create a material adverse transactional and economic impact, would offend longstanding policies,
and would be unnecessary and unwise.
VCC § 9-338 permits a secured party or other purchaser to obtain priority over or cut off
a security interest perfected by a filed financing statement if the financing statement contains
information specified in
§ 9-516(b)(5) that is incorrect, but only if the secured party or
purchaser reasonably relied on the incorrect information in giving value. The information
specified in UCC § 9-516(b)(5) consists of (i) a mailing address for the debtor, (ii) an indication
of whether the debtor is an individual or an organization, (iii) if the financing statement indicates
that the debtor is an organization, (x) a type of organization for the debtor, (y) a jurisdiction of
organization for the debtor; and (z) the debtor's organizational identification number or an
indication that the debtor has none. In evaluating this new filing requirement it is important to
understand the structure of the statute. If any of the specified information is missing, the filing

vce

24. A financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest if it contains the
names of the debtor and secured party and indicates the collateral that it covers. vec § 9-502(a).
If, for example, the name of the debtor were incorrect and seriously misleading, the financing
statement would not be effective and the related unperfected security interest could be avoided
under current BC § 544(a)(I). Resort to the Act's expanded powers would be unnecessary.
25. Of course, not only the proposed expanded strong arm power but also the perfection
test for preference avoidance would require adjustment to achieve the intended narrowing effect.
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office is entitled to reject the filing. 26 However, if the filing office nevertheless accepts the filing
with the missing infonnation, or if any of the infonnation is incorrect, the filing is effective to
perfect a security interest. 27 The goal of this structure is twofold. First, it encourages the
inclusion of possibly useful infonnation in the public record and thereby provides a better quality
of public notice. Second, it requires the secured party to provide this infonnation without raising
the specter of nonperfection of a security interest if the infonnation provided is inaccurate. uee
§ 9-338 strikes the appropriate balance by giving a competing secured party or purchaser a prior
claim to collateral only if the secured party or purchaser can show that it was aware of the
contents of a financing statement and actually and reasonably relied on the incorrect
infonnation. 28
Even a narrowed "actual incorrect infonnation" version of the Act's avoidance powers
would substantially increase the trustee's power over that which existed under fonner uee
Article 9 and the trustee's power that currently exists under Revised uee Article 9. This is
because former Article 9 did not require a financing statement to contain any of the infonnation
set forth in uee§ 9-338, with the single exception of a mailing address for the debtor. 29 And
under former Article 9 there were precious few reported cases in which financing statements
were held ineffective as a result of an inaccurate or incomplete mailing address for the debtor.
Some cases even upheld financing statements in the complete absence of a debtor's address
where no prejudice could be shown. Under Revised uee Article 9 (Uee § 9-338) a security
interest perfected by a filing containing this type of incorrect information will be cut off or
subordinated only in the face of actual reasonable reliance by a competing secured party or other
purchaser. But under the Act's hypothetical reliance standard, a trustee in all cases of incorrect
infonnation may assume a power rarely available to an actual purchaser outside bankruptcy and
may thereby convert a rare event in the real world into an automatic event in bankruptcy.
Because the subordination and cut-off provisions ofUee § 9-338 present a very narrow
risk and do not impair the perfection of a security interest, there is every reason to believe that the

26. uee § 9-516(b).
27. uee § 9-502(a).
28. As the official comments to uee § 9-516 make clear, reliance on the specified of
infonnation would be quite rare. And it must be shown that the reliance was reasonable. For
example, assume a prospective purchaser searches the public record and finds a financing
statement filed against the debtor's correct name. The searcher, however, notices that the address
given for the debtor is not correct. In order to benefit from uee § 9-338, the searcher would be
required to convince a court that it acted reasonably in purchasing the collateral in reliance on its
belief that the financing statement filed against the debtor's correct name was not filed against
the debtor, but actually was filed against someone else altogether.
29. Fonner uee § 9-402(1).
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infonnation prescribed by VCC § 9-516(b)(5) that is found on actual, filed financing statements
is much more likely to contain inaccuracies than the more important perfection-related
infonnation (name of debtor, name of secured party, an identification of collateraI30). For this
reason, one could expect that even the narrowed version of the Act would render ineffective
many security interests in transactions consummated before the Act would take effect.
A likely effect of a narrowed avoidance provision in the Act would be either the repeal of
VCC § 9-338 or the elimination of the infonnation specified in VCC § 9-516(b)(5) from Article
9 by state legislatures. This result would recognize that the drafters of Revised VCC Article 9,
and the state legislatures that have enacted it, would never have required this additional
infonnation to be included in a financing statement if the result of an inaccuracy would be the
certain avoidance by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.
Finally, much of the discussion of effects and policy in sections B. and C. above is
relevant as well even to a narrowed version of the Act's avoidance powers.

IV.

Recovery of Certain Administrative Expense Claims from Property Securing
Allowed Secured Claims: Subordination; "Super" Priority Administrative Expense
Claims.
A.

Description, Application, and Interpretation.

Section 203(a) of the Act would add a new paragraph (7) to BC § 503(b). New paragraph
(7) would create a new class of administrative expense priority claims for claims arising out of
the breach of a fiduciary duty under ERISA or applicable state law relating to a debtor's pension
plan. Under section 203(c) of the Act the new administrative expense claims would receive a
"super" priority, superior to other administrative expense priority claims under BC § 507(a)(l).
Section 203(b) of the Act also would modify BC § 506 by adding a new subsection (e). That
subsection would provide that the holders of unpaid administrative claims of the type specified in
proposed BC § 503(b)(7) "may recover any unpaid amount of such claims from any property
securing an allowed secured claim."
Note that subordination under new superpriority would extend beyond traditional secured
transactions. An "allowed secured claim" also includes a right of setoff under BC § 506(a).
Consequently this section would afford an administrative expense claim priority over a bank's
right of setoff against a deposit account and other rights of setoff.
This report does not address on the merits the proposed creation of a new priority
administrative expense claim. It does address, however, the proposed superpriority rule and
proposed new BC § 506(e). As an initial proposition, proposed new BC § 506(e) is unclear as to
how it would be applied because it does not specify a method for detennining which property

30. UCC § 9-502(a).
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securing which secured claims would be applied first to satisfy the new administrative priority
claims. Would the application be pro rata among all secured claimants and the property securing
the claims? Would any such pro rata distribution be based on the value of the collateral
involved or (if different) the amount of the secured claim? Would the "unpaid amount" be
calculated after or before taking into account distributions to the super-priority claimants from
unencumbered assets (presumably after, but the provision does not specify)? Or, would these
claimants look first to the property that secures secured claims before looking to unencumbered
assets?
Example 4. Debtor owns assets valued at $800,000. One asset has a value of
$100,000 and is subject to a security interest held by Lender securing a $10,000
loan. Lender is "oversecured" and its allowed secured claim is $10,000. (For
purposes of simplicity, ignore accruing interest, expenses, etc.) There are superpriority pension-related administrative claims under new BC §506(e) in the
amount of $800,000. After application of the $700,000 in value of the
unencumbered assets, a $100,000 unpaid priority claim remains.
Example 4 presents the simple case involving only one secured claim. Presumably the priority
claimants would recover $10,000 in value from Lender's collateral (the allowed secured claim),
reducing Lender's secured claim to zero. Then the priority claimants would recover the
remaining $90,000 in value. The end result is that a fully-secured, indeed over-secured, creditor
would recover nothing. Nor would the other remaining unsecured creditors.
In sum: What is clear from the proposed new BC § 506(e) is that one person's property
(a secured claimant's) would be transferred to another person (the holder of the new superpriority administrative claim), even though the basis of the priority claim (breach of pensionrelated fiduciary duty) and the secured claim are in no respect related. In that respect, the
proposal has the substantive effect of a limited avoidance power from the perspective of the
secured claimant, although in fonn it is structured as a subordination.

As noted above, under a new BC § 507(b)(2), the new pension-related administrative
expense claims would receive a "super" priority, superior to other administrative expense priority
claims under BC § 507(a)(I). Under this provision, claimants afforded a super priority under
current BC § 507(b) (which would be renumbered as BC § 507(b)(I)) would share pro rata with
the new BC § 507(b)(2) claimants if there were insufficient assets to satisfy all super priority
claims. 31 Claimants under BC § 507(b)(I) (after the proposed renumbering) are those for whom
adequate protection of their secured claims failed--it proved to be inadequate protection.
Consequently, the new BC § 507(b)(2) claimants could dilute satisfaction ofBC § 507(b)(I)
(fonnerly secured) claims in addition to having consumed (under new BC § 506(e)) the collateral
that originally secured those claims.

31. BC § 726(b).
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B.

Transactional and Economic Impact; Rationale.

The rationale indicated by the sponsors for the subordination rule of proposed new Be §
506(e) is that it would "create[] an incentive for financial institutions to protect their collateral by
requiring assurances that the company is living up to its fiduciary obligations."32 This
explanation is implausible and is not based on an accurate assessment of the role of secured
credit in the economy. Apparently the sponsors believe that secured creditors generally are
financial institutions. That is widely known to be incorrect. Apparently they believe as well that
secured creditors have the ability to effectively monitor performance of a debtor's fiduciary
obligations and compel the debtor's performance. That is incorrect as well. Indeed, the
sponsor's justification for 506(e)--that it would promote financial institution monitoring of a
debtor's pension-related behavior--is based on fundamental misunderstandings of the theory and
practice of secured transactions.
Credit agreements in ongoing relational credits often contain representations and
warranties and affirmative and negative covenants, including financial covenants and financial
reporting requirements. But these arrangements are, by necessity and by law, largely selfpolicing on the part of the borrower. In the first place, lenders are not in a position to second
guess auditors, auditing committees of boards, or regulators, or to serve as daily monitors and
gatekeepers for their borrowers. Moreover, since the lender liability litigation of the 1980s, well
advised lenders have taken precautions not to step across the boundaries of corporate governance
by interjecting themselves in the management of their borrowers. To be sure, this normally
passive role does not protect a lender that discovers or participates in corporate wrongdoing. The
BC already contains the means for a court to equitably subordinate a claim, security interest, or
other lien in an appropriate case under BC § 51 O(c). The point here is simply that there is no
reason to believe that the draconian penalties in proposed new BC § 506(e) would cause lenders
to take on a daily monitoring role that is both impractical and improper under established legal
doctrine. Instead, new BC § 506(e) would likely cause lenders not to extend credit in reliance on
collateral or to extend less credit at higher rates of interest. Clearly these effects would not
redound to the benefit of the debtor's employees.
Even if some relational secured creditors were positioned to be effective monitors (and
they are not), the sponsors apparently believe that these relationships are a dominant feature in
secured transactions. That also is incorrect. Much secured credit, especially that entered into
with large, public firms, tends to be more of the "one-shot" or "asset-based" variety. That is to
say, a lender places substantial reliance on the collateral value for the very reason that the
collateral materially reduces the lender's need to monitor the debtor's financial condition.
Indeed, that is one factor that has been identified as a justification for the social benefits of
secured credit. Moreover, in some markets the relationships among market participants are large
in number and high in volume. Consider, for example, the securities markets. Functioning of the
largest such market, that for U.S. federal Treasury and agency securities, for example, depends

32.

Section-By-Section Summary at 4.
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on short-tenn (often overnight) financing in truly staggering amounts. Participants in these
markets cannot be expected to tolerate the possibility that their interests in securities are
constantly exposed to a potentia.l subordination. The same can be said of the commodity futures
markets in which providing collateral ("margin") is a daily event.
Assuming that the sponsors' beliefs about the identity of secured creditors and their
abilities to effectively monitor were correct, the sponsors' stated rationale nonetheless does not
support enactment of proposed new BC § 506(e). The provision is essentially unjust because it
does not reflect a sound or balanced policy. There is no rational basis for singling out one group
of property claimants who must give up their property as a fonn of bankruptcy tax for the benefit
of another unrelated favored class. If the goal is to protect these priority claimants at all cost,
why not confiscate a lessor's residual value for the claimants' benefit or pennit the lessee-debtor
to use the leased property rent free for an indefinite period as well? Better yet, why not look to
the people who are unquestionably those best situated to prevent a breach of fiduciary duties by
providing for confiscation of the property of the debtor's managers and their families?
Finally, proposed BC § 506(e) in tandem with the super priority under proposed BC §
507(b)(2) could yield exactly the opposite results that the sponsors seek to promote. These
provisions give the pension-related claims first calIon all of a finn's assets, save only the
possibility of sharing with failed adequate protection claimants discussed above. Such a high
level of "insurance" could give rise to a serious "moral hazard" problem for the finn's managers
during the period before bankruptcy. It is entirely plausible that this "protection" actually could
induce managers to play fast and loose with pension assets, or at least reduce substantially the
deterrence provided by the nonbankruptcy overlay of legal, accounting, and regulatory
constraints.

c.

Bankruptcy Policy and History.

BC § 506(e) represents a radical departure from and well-accepted bankruptcy policies
concerning the interrelationship between secured claims and priority claims.
Priority claims among unsecured creditors have long been a part of bankruptcy law.
Inasmuch as they contravene the general principle of creditor equality, the justification for
priority claims sometimes has been controversial. But they have proven to be a resilient feature
of the bankruptcy law landscape. For this reason, this report takes no position on the new
proposed pension-related administrative expense priority claims.
However, priority claims must not be confused with secured claims, in which a secured
claimant has a property interest (a security interest created by agreement or another lien) securing
an obligation. The relationship between the treatment of priority claims and secured claims
generally has not been controversial. Secured claims are satisfied first out of (but only to the
extent of) the property securing the claims. Priority claims then are satisfied out of remaining
unencumbered assets in their respective order of priority under BC § 507(a). If any assets
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remain, the non-priority unsecured creditors are next in line. New BC § 506(e) would change all
of this solely for the benefit of the new pension-related priority claims. These priority claims
would override and subordinate a secured claimant's property interest. This being the case, it is
perhaps not surprising that, as discussed above, it is unclear just how proposed BC § 506(e)'s sui
generis conceptual structure would be applied in practice and that its statutory construct seems
incomplete.
Not only proposed BC § 506(e) but also the new super priority status under proposed BC
§ 507(b)(2) conflicts with the BC's essential structure for dealing with secured and priority
claims. The essential point of the existing BC § 506(a) and (b) is to provide for a secured
claimant to receive the value of its collateral or, if fully secured, the full amount of its claim. The
BC goes to pains to meet this goal, in particular, by entitling a secured claimant to adequate
protection of its interest in a variety of circumstances in which its property interest is being used
by the debtor in bankruptcy.33 The idea is straightfolWard. If the debtor in possession wishes to
use the secured claimant's collateral in the debtor's attempts to reorganize for the benefit of the
unsecured creditors, it must adequately protect the collateral. In effect, if the unsecured creditors
wish to roll the dice they should not be entitled to bet the secured claimant's collateral. If the
judge awards adequate protection (say, a lien or periodic payments) that turns out to be
inadequate, the system has failed the secured claimant. That is the basis for the remarkable super
priority found in current BC § 507(b)--the inadequately protected secured claimants are entitled
to look to all of the finn's unencumbered assets ahead of any other claimant as a fonn of
compensation for the use of the secured claimants' property interest. But the Act's proposed
super priority would pennit the new pension-related administrative priority claimants to share on
a pro rata basis with the claims of the inadequately protected former secured claimants (after
those pension-related claimants had already received the entire value of all remaining
encumbered assets under proposed BC § 506(e)). Whatever the merits of the proposed
administrative expense priority for pension-related claimants, proposed BC §§ 506(e) and
507(b)(2) would yield for secured claims an unprecedented and unfair statutory structure indeed.
Finally, we note the position taken by the American Bar Association House of Delegates
in August 1991, as proposed by the Section of Business Law:
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association opposes the
enactment, in the absence of the most compelling circumstances, of special
interest legislation designed to increase the types of claims entitled to priority
under the Bankruptcy Code.
Our concerns about sections 203(b) and (c) of the Act are fully consistent with the ABA's
opposition.

33. The right to adequate protection derives from the interplay ofBC §§ 361-364.
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v.

Recharacterizing Sales and Other Transactions.
A.

Description, Application, and Interpretation.

Section 102 of the Act would add a new subsection (e) to BC § 105, which deals with the
power of courts exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction. Proposed BC § 105(e) would confer power
on a court to "recharacterize as a secured loan, a sale, lease, or transaction if the material
characteristics of the sale, lease, or transaction are substantially similar to the characteristics of a
secured loan." The new provision apparently would make the characterization of a putative sale,
lease, or any other transaction a matter of federal bankruptcy law as opposed to state property
law, which normally governs these questions.

B.

Transactional and Economic Impact; Rationale

Most state law on the issue of recharacterizing property transactions is case law that has
developed well-understood guidelines that enable counsel to give customary written legal
opinions on the characterization of a transaction in a variety of settings. This is true not only for
securitization transactions, mentioned below, but for leases and various other transactions in
which a property interest is transferred. In stark contrast, the proposed federal test provides no
guidelines whatsoever other than a vague "material characteristics"/"substantially similar" test.
Indeed, it is quite conceivable that a court could conclude that a putative sale is a secured loan
merely because it involves the transfer of funds in exchange for a transfer of a property interest,
which are the "material characteristics of a secured loan."
Each year a huge amount of funding is provided through securitization transactions.
These transactions can provide a lower-cost method of providing liquidity to virtually all firms,
but the cost savings of securitization transactions are most dramatic for those that cannot issue
investment grade securities. For example, by allowing the firm to sell receivables to a special
purpose entity that will issue securities backed by the receivables, the firm's cost of financing can
be substantially reduced. But these cost savings can be realized only if the rating agencies are
satisfied that there is little or no risk that the receivables would be treated as property of the
firm's estate were the firm subsequently to file a bankruptcy petition. They generally rely on
"true sale" legal opinions. By removing the sale characterization from state la~ and imposing a
vague, unpredictable, and open-ended federal "test," the Act would create an indeterminate range
of uncertainty on the true sale question, which would be commercially devastating. This
uncertainty also could impose additional risks and costs in "repo" transactions in the securities
markets as well as on more traditional non-recourse factoring arrangements.
Note also that proposed Be § 105(e) is agnostic as to whether a putative sale, lease, or
other transaction purports to transfer property by or to a debtor. In either case a court could
recast the sale as a secured loan. Moreover, the statute does not explicitly confer on a court the
power to recast a secured loan as a sale or lease. The proposed revision, then, leaves the
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characterization of transactions partially to a federal standard and partially to state-law standards.
The role of state law is discussed further below.

c.

Bankruptcy Policy and History.

The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an "estate" that in general includes "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.,,34 What is
"property" in this context conceptually is a question for federal bankruptcy law. But as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Butner case, courts must look to nonbankruptcy-normally state--Iaw in order to determine whether and the extent to which property of the debtor
exists "unless some federal interest requires a different result.,,35 As discussed above, Section
102 of the Act would add a new BC § 105(e), which would give a court explicit authority to
recharacterize a transaction, such as a sale, as a secured loan ifhas the characteristics of a secured
loan.
We do not question the proposition that a court should attempt to characterize the
economic substance of a transaction in determining its appropriate character for purposes of
applying bankruptcy law. This happens regularly under current law by the application of wellestablished state laws. We do question, however, the wisdom of statutorily federalizing this
important issue of property law for purposes ofbankruptcy--at least without additional thought
and deliberation. Weare aware that a very few states have enacted laws that would permit "true
sale" treatment for transactions without regard to economic substance and we express no view on
the merits of those laws. 36 Instead, we suggest that the question of the effectiveness of those laws
in bankruptcy be left to the courts in their determination as to whether a conflicting federal
interest exists, as Butner instructs. 37 Thus, to the extent that state law may create or lead to
abuses from a bankruptcy perspective, federal law already contains the cure. The proposed
statutory fix is totally unnecessary, particularly given the devastating impact that it would have
on an industry that supplies much needed capital to business enterprises both here and abroad.
State law, when examined in the bankruptcy context, for the most part has proved workable and
sensible. 38

34. BC § 541(a)(l).
35. Butner v. United States, 400 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).

36. See, e.g., 6 Delaware Code §§ 2702A, 2703A.
37. If the statute were merely an effort to codify Butner's "federal interest" test it could
do so with much narrower language.
38. While the negative impact on securitization transactions may present the most
obvious problem raised by the proposed recharacterization test, it is important to note as well the
extreme breadth of the proposal. It encompasses not only sales and leases but virtually any
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VI.

Retroactive Effectiveness.
A.

Description, Application, and Interpretation.

Section 106 of the Act provides that Title I (including the proposed revised avoidance
powers and recharacterization provision) is immediately effective upon enactment and applies to
bankruptcy cases and proceedings "commenced before, on, or after the date of enactment of this
Act." Avoidance or recharacterization would mean that pre-existing and vested property rights
would be upset even in pending cases. Under Section 206 of the Act, Section 203(b)
(subordinating secured claims to the new pension-related administrative expense priority claims)
would apply only to "liens created on or after the date of enactment of the Act."

B.

Transactional and Economic Impact; Rationale.

The immediate and retroactive application of Title I of the Act upon enactment would
have a material impact. Because it would apply even in pending bankruptcy cases and
proceedings, it would spawn many new avoidance actions under both the strong ann and
preference avoidance powers. Perfected security interests previously entitled to adequate
protection and secured claims that ultimately would have been satisfied by a distribution or under
a reorganization plan would become unsecured. Depending on the stage and posture of a case or
proceeding, difficult procedural questions well might arise. For example, what would be the
effect of the Act in a pending case in which a plan already had been confinned based on the preAct avoidance regime?

c.

Bankruptcy Policy and History.

In a report on bankruptcy legislation the Chair of the Section of Business Law of the
American Bar Association observed:
Most American laws are designed to operate prospectively. This is not the place
for an extended exposition on the meaning of Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3 of the
United States Constitution, which provides that no "Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed." The sense in that constitutional provision is that it is

property-related transaction, such as consignments, licenses, and all fonns ofbailments. It would
apply not only to personal property but also to real property. We are unaware of any bankruptcyrelated problems that would require such broad statutory authority. For example, cases are legion
in which bankruptcy courts have applied state law to recharacterize putative leases of goods as
secured transactions subject to the perfection and priority rules ofUee Article 9. See uee § 1203 (Leases Distinguished From Security Interests) (revised 2001); UCC § 1-201(37) (definition
of "security interest," including guidelines on the lease versus security interest distinction) (as
generally enacted).
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fundamentally unfair to change rights which existed, and on which citizens relied,
prior to the time that Congress or another appropriate body changed the law."
George Clemon Freeman, Jr., Report, at 7 (August 1991). Although Mr. Freeman recognized
that federal taxation legislation sometimes operated from the time it was introduced in Congress,
he lamented that in the case of bankruptcy legislation "[r]etroactivity had become fashionable."
Id. at 10.
Unfortunately, as Mr. Freeman noted, bankruptcy legislation has not always spoken only
prospectively. However, the proposed immediate and retroactive effect of the Act generally is
much more aggressive than other recent bills. Especially given the striking nature of the
modifications of property rights that the Act would impose, the immediate and retroactive
application of the proposed avoidance and sale-recharacterization provisions would be both
unwise and unfair.

VII.

Open Hearings on Appropriate Notice.

We note the position taken by the American Bar Association House of Delegates in
August 1991, as proposed by the Section of Business Law:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association opposes amendment of the
Bankruptcy Code by a legislative process which avoids fair opportunity for open
hearings, on well-publicized notice, before the judiciary Committees of Congress
(the Committees in whose jurisdiction bankruptcy legislation is vested).
The flaws in the Act which we have identified in this report illustrate the wisdom of the
position taken by the ABA, which we support. In addition, it is essential that well-publicized
legislative hearings be held before the Congress or any of its committees takes action on the Act
or any of its provisions. In particular, all affected parties and organizations must be given a
reasonable opportunity to be heard or represented.

VIII. Conclusion.
We seriously doubt that responsible legislators such as the Act's sponsors fully appreciate
the enonnous adverse effects that would result from enactment of the provisions of the Act
discussed here. The sponsors and their staffs may have received some ill-conceived or
incomplete advice as to the operation and effects of these provisions. This observation
underscores the need for a careful, deliberate, and transparent legislative process. The process
should employ open and well-publicized hearings and afford opportunities to testify to a broad
spectrum of affected persons and entities.
It is commonly known that there exists considerable political turmoil in the fall of this
election year. This largely results from highly publicized recent examples of corporate
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misbehavior, large corporate bankruptcy filings, and waning public confidence in the economy.
Having studied the Act, we have grave concerns about attempts to enact material amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code in a rush to react to these events in the present political climate. The
provisions of the Act that we have addressed here would have an immediate and severe adverse
effect on the national economy. They should not become law.
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I. Introduction and Overview
II. Major Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankrupt~y Procedure- Effective December

1,2002
A. Rule 1004. Involuntary Petition Against a Partnership.
After' filing an involuntary petition under § 303(b)(3) ofthe Code, (1) the petitioning
partners or other petitioners shall promptly send to or serve on each general partner who is
not a petitioner a copy of the petition; and (2) the clerk shall promptly issue a summons for
service on each general partner who is not a petitioner. Rule 1010 applies to the form and
service of the summons.

Explanation and Analysis: This amendment eliminates a prior provision (1004(a) which
implied that all general partners must consent to the filing of a voluntary petition by a partnership.
Since this isa matter ofsubstantive law beyond the scope ofthe bankruptcy rules ("the rules"), Rule
1004 (a) has been deleted. See Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945); Jolly v. Pittore, 170 B.R. 793
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Union Planters National Bankv. Hunters Horn Associates, 158 B.R. 729 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1993). With the deletion ofRule 1004(a), the rules do not, in purpose or effect, establish
a substantive standard for the commencement of a voluntary case by a partnership.

B. Rule 1004.1. Petition for an Infant or Incompetent Person.
Ifan infant or incompetent person has a representative, including a general guardian,
committee conservator, or similar fiduciary, the representative may file a voluntary petition
on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person who does
not have' a duly appointed representative may file a voluntary petition by next friend or
guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent
person who is a debtor and is not otherwise represented or shall make any other order to

l© 2003 Professor Mary Jo Wiggins, USD School of Law. Please do not cite or quote
without pennission. Professor Wiggins is a member of the U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules. The views and opinions expressed in this document do not
necessarily represent the views of the Advisory Committee or the U.S. Judicial Conference.
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protect the infant or incompetent debtor.

Explanation and Analysis: This is a completely ~ew rule. It has been added to establish
the manner in which a case is commenced on behalf of an infant or incompetent person. This Rule
is derived from Rule 17(c) F.R. Civ. P. Presumably, case law interpreting the provisions ofthe civil
rule will provide an analytical frame ofreference for future interpretations ofthe procedural aspects
of this new bankruptcy rule.

c.

Rule 2004. Examination.

*****
(c) COMPELLING ATTENDANCE AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. The
attendance of an entity for examination and for the production of documents, whether the
examination is to be conducted within or without the district in which the case is pending,
may be compelled as provided in Rule 9016 for the attendance ofa witness at hearing or trial.
As an officer of the court, an attorney may issue and sign a subpoena on behalf of the court
for the district in which the examination is to be held if the attorney is admitted to practice
in that court or in the court in which the case is pending.

Explanation and Analysis: This rule amendment clarifies that an examination ordered under
Rule 2004 can be held outside ofthe district in which the case is pending. Additionally, the rule now
makes clear that an attorney may issue and sign the subpoena ifthat attorney is authorized to practice
in either of two places: l)in the court in which the case is pending or, 2)in the court for the district.
in which the examination will be held. According to the Committee Notes, this amendment is
intended to more closely conform Rule 2004 to Rule 45 F.R. Civ. Pro and to facilitate efficient intra
district law practice.

D. Rule 4004. Grant or Denial of Discharge.

*****
(c) GRANT OF DISCHARGE.
(1) In a chapter 7 case, on expiration ofthe time fixed for filing a complaint objecting
to discharge and the time fixed for filing a motion to dismiss a case under Rule 1017(e), the
court shall forthwith grant the discharge unless:
(A) the debtor is not an individual,
(B) a complaint objecting to the discharge has been filed,
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(C) the debtor has filed a waiver under § 727(a)(10),
(D) a motion to dismiss the case under § 707 is pending,
(E) a motion to extend the time for filing a complaint objecting to discharge is
pending,
(F) a motion to extend the time for filing a motion to dismiss the case under Rule
1017 (e) is pending, or
(G) the debtor has not paid in full the filing fee prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)
and any other fee prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States under
28 U.S.C. § 1930(b) that is payable to the clerk upon the commencement of a case
under the Code.

*****

Explanation and Analysis: This rule amendment to Rule 4004(c)( 1)(0) should be ofgreat
interest to attorneys for consumer debtors in cases where creditors and/or trustees bring motions to
dismiss under § 707 of the Code. This rule amendment to 4004(c) widens the scope of dismissal
motions that postpone the entry of the discharge. It provides that the filing ofa motion under § 707
of the Code postpones the entry ofdischarge. Prior to this rule change, only motions brought under
§ 707(b) ("substantial abuse") postponed entry of discharge. This directly changes a result that had
made its way into the case law in several jurisdictions.

E. Rule 9014. Contested Matters
(a) MOTION. In a contested matter not otherwise governed by these rules, relief
shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall be
afforded the party against whom relief is sought. No response is required under this rule
unless the court directs otherwise.
(b) SERVICE. The motion shall be served in the manner provided for service ofa
summons and complaint by Rule 7004. Any paper served after the motion shall be served
in the manner provided by Rule 5(b) F. R. Civ. P.
(c) APPLICATION OF PART VII RULES. Unless the court directs otherwise, the
following rules shall apply: 7009,7017,7021,7025,7026,7028-7037,7041,7042,7052,
7054-7056, 7064, 7069, 7071. An entity that desires to perpetuate testimony may proceed
in the same manner as provided in Rule 7027 for the taking of a deposition before an
adversary proceeding. The court may at any stage in a particular matter direct that one or
more of the other rules in Part VII shall apply. The court shall give the parties notice of any
order issue under this paragraph to afford them a reasonable opportunity to comply with the
procedures prescribed by the order.
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(d) TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES. Testimony ofwitnesses with respect to disputed
material factual issues shall be taken in the same manner as testimony in an adversary
proceeding.
(e) ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. The court shall provide procedures that enable
parties to ascertain at a reasonable time before any scheduled hearing whether the hearing
will be an evidentiary hearing at which witnesses may testify.
Explanation and Analysis: Rule 9014 has been amended in significant ways that seek
mainly to clarify and make more transparent the handling ofcontested matters in bankruptcy courts.
Pursuant to this rule change, Rule 7009 and Rule 7017 are included in the list ofmles applicable in
contested matters. Additionally, it is now clear that papers after the initial motion can be served
under Rule 5(b) F.R. Civ. P. and that testimony regarding material factual matters must he taken in
the same manner as in adversary proceedings. Finally, the rule directs local bankruptcy courts to
provide procedures that will enable attorneys to know whether the presence ofa witness is necessary
for a hearing. Attorneys should consult local procedural rules and/or standing orders for these
procedures.

F. Rule 9027. Removal
(a) NOTICE OF REMOVAL

*****
(3) Time for filing; civil action initiated after commencement ofthe case under the
Code.
If a claim or cause of action is asserted in another court after the commencement of a case
under the Code, a notice of removal maybe filed with the clerk only with the shorter of (A)
30 days after receipt, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting
forth the claim or cause of action sought to be removed, or (B) 30 days after receipt of the
summons if the initial pleading has been filed with the court but not served with the
summons~

*****
Explanation and Analysis: This amendment clarifies that the time limits for the filing of
a notice of removal ofa claim or cause of action apply to any claim or cause of action initiated after
the commencement of the bankruptcy case, regardless of whether the bankruptcy case is pending,
suspended, dismissed, or closed.

G. Technical amendments
Rule 2015(a)(5)
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H..Official Forms
Form 1
Form 15

III. Major Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure-Effective
December 1, 2003 2
A. Rule 1005. Caption of Petition
The caption of a petition commencing a case under the Code shall contain the name
of the court, the title of the case, and the docket number. The title of the case shall include
the following information about the debtor: name, employer identification number, last four
digits of the social security number, any other federal tax identification number, and all
names used within six years before filing the petition. If the petition is not filed by the
debtor, it shall include all names used by the debtor which are known to the petitioners.

Explanation and Analysis: Rule 1005 will alter the information required in the caption of
a bankruptcy petition. Only the last four digits of the debtor's social security number will need to
be disclosed on the petition. The policy objective behind this rule change is to ensure some degree
of privacy in the filing process. Other numerical identifiers must still be set out in full and the
debtor must list any other federal tax identification number(s) that may be in use. Pursuant to
proposed rule l007(f), infra, debtors must submit with the petition a verified statement setting out
the debtor's full social security number or stating that the debtor does not have such a number.

B. Rule 1007. Lists, Schedules, and Statements; Time Limits
(a) LIST OF CREDITORS AND EQUITY SECURITY HOLDERS, AND
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STATEMENT.

2The amendments were endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court on March 27, 2003. The
amendments were transmitted to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2075. Unless altered
by Congress, the amended rules will take effect December 1, 2003. For more information,
including committee notes, committee summaries, and transmittal letters, see the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Court's web site at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules6.html.
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(1) Voluntary Case. In a voluntary case, the debtor shall file with the petition a list
containing the name and address of each creditor unless the petition is accompanied by a
schedule of liabilities. If the debtor is a corporation, other than a governmental unit, the
debtor shall file with the petition a corporate ownership statement containing the infonnation
described in Rule 7007.1. The debtor shall file a supplemental statement promptly upon any
change in circumstances that renders the corporate ownership statement inaccurate.

*****
(c) TIME LIMITS. The schedules and statements, other than the statement of
intention, shall be filed with the petition in a voluntary case, or ifthe petition is accompanied
by a list ofall the debtor's creditors and their addresses, within 15 days thereafter, except as
otherwise provided in subdivisions (d), (e), (f), and (h) of this rule. In an involuntary case,
the schedules and statements, other than the statement of intention, shall be filed by the
debtor within 15 days ofthe entry ofthe order for relief. Schedules and statements filed prior
to the conversion of a case to another chapter shall be deemed filed in the converted case
unless the court directs otherwise. Any extension of time for the filing of the schedules and
statements may be granted only on motion for cause shown and on notice to the United States
trustee and to any committee elected under § 705 or appointed under § 1102 of the" Code,
trustee, examiner, or other party as the court may direct.. Notice ofan extension shall be given
to the United States trustee and to any committee, trustee, or other party as the court may
direct.

*****
(f) STATEMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER.
An individual debtor shall submit a verified statement that sets out the debtor's social
security number, or states that the debtor does not have a social security number. In a
voluntary case, the debtor shall submit the statement with the petition. In an involuntary
case, the debtor shall submit the statement within 15 days after the entry of the order for
relief.

*****
Explanation and Analysis: This proposed rule change will impose new requirements on
both corporate and individual debtors. Rule 1007 will require corporate debtors to disclose any
parent corporation and any publicly held corporation that owns more ten (10) percent or more of its
equity. The purpose of this amendment is to assist judges in recusal d~tenninations. Subsection (f)
requires individual debtors to submit a verified statement that sets out the debtor social security
number ofstating that the debtor does not have such a number. The statement will be submitted, not.
filed, and thus will not become part of the public court record in the case. See § 107 of the Code
(noting that only papers filed in a case and the docket of the court are public records).
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C. Rule 2003. Meeting of Creditors or Equity Security Holders

*****
(b) ORDER OF MEETING.

(1) Meeting of Creditors. The United States trustee shall preside at the
meeting of creditors. The business of the meeting shall include the examination of
the debtor under oath and, in a chapter 7 liquidation case, may include the election
of a creditors' committee, and if the case is not under subchapter V 0 f chapter 7, the
election of a trustee. The presiding officer shall have authority to administer oaths.

*****
Explanation and Analysis: This proposed rule amendment makes clear that, in a Chapter
7 liquidation case, the creditors' meeting may include the election of a creditor's committee and
the election of a trustee. However, pursuant to § 782 if the Code, the meeting of creditors in a
multilateral clearing organization liquidation cannot include the election of a trustee since the
designation of the trustee is the province of the Federal Reserve Board. The new sub chapter V of
Chapter 7 (§§ 782-784), enacted in December, 2002, makes multi-lateral clearing organizations
("clearing banks") eligible for Chapter 7 liquid.ation.

D. Rule 2016. Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses

*****
(c) DISCLOSURE OF COMPENSATION
BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER.

PAID

OR

PROMISED

TO

Every bankruptcy petition preparer for a debtor shall file a declaration under penalty of
perjury and transmit the declaration to the United States trustee within 10 days after the date
of the filing of the petition, or at another time as the court may direct, as required by §
110(h)(I). The declaration must disclose any fee, and the source of any fee, received from
or on behalf of the debtor within 12 months of the filing of the case and all unpaid fees
charged to the debtor. The declaration must describe the services performed and documents
prepared or caused to be prepared by the bankruptcy petition preparer. A supplemental .
statement shall be filed within 10 days after any payment or agreement not previously
disclosed.
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Explanation and Analysis: This proposed rule has been amended to add subsection (c).
Pursuant to § 110(h)(1) of the Code, a bankruptcy petition preparer must file with the court a
declaration disclosing any fee received from or on behalf of the debtor within 12 months before the
filing. This rule simply implements the disclosure mandates of that section.

E. Rule 7007.1 Corporate Ownership Statement
(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURE. Any corporation that is a party to an adversary
proceeding, other than the debtor or a governmental unit, shall file two copies ofa statement
that identifies any corporation, other than a governmental unit, the directly or indirectly owns
10% or more of any class of the corporation's equity interests, or states that there are no
entities to report under this subdivision.
(b) TIME FOR FILING. A party s~all file the statement required under Rule
7007.1(a) with its first pleading in an adversary proceeding. A party shall file a
supplemental statement promptly upon any change in circumstances that this rule requires
the party to identify or disclose.

Explanation and Analysis: This proposed rule requires non-governmental corporate parties
to an adversary proceeding to disclose any corporation that owns 10% or more ofits equity. The rule
is derived from Rule 26.1 ofthe Federal Rules ofAppellate Procedure. The rule is designed to assist
judges in making recusal detenninations. The Committee Notes to the proposed rule state that the
rule does not prevent local districts from adopting disclosure rules that go beyond those contained
in this rule. It is difficult to predict whether such districts will adopt additional disclosure rules.
Much depends, of course, on whether respective districts think these rules go too far or not far
enough toward striking the proper balance between promoting disclosure and minimizing
transactions costs.
F. Technical Amendments

Rule 2002(a)(I)
Rule 2009
G. Official Forms
Forms 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16A, 16C, 17and 19.

IV. Conclusion.
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I

Introduction - History and Importance of Student Loan Dischargeability Provisions
A.

B.

C.

Evolution of Current Law and Legislative Proposals
1.

1978 -loans dischargeable if5 years old, chapter 13, or undue hardship

2.

Current law - Only undue hardship left

3.

Proposed bill- would add for-profit loans

Student Loan Creditor Remedies
1.

Tax intercept - Loss of Earned Income Credit

2.

Wage garnishment

3.

Other federal benefit intercept including social security and veterans
benefits

4.

No statute of limitations

Nonbankruptcy Remedies - See 34 C.F.R § 682.402
1.

Disability discharge

2.

Closed school discharge

3.

Ability to benefit test

4.

Unpaid refund discharge

5.

Income contingent consolidation loan

6.

W-5 Fonn - Advance Payment of Earned Income Credit
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,

II

What is a Minimal Standard of Living for Purposes of the Brunner Test?
A.

B.

ill

IV.

Typical Income Levels Found Minimal by Courts
1.

Virtually never under $20,000 per year

2.

Usually cuts off between $25,000 and $30,000 depending on family size
and other circumstances

Accepted Measures of Minimal Living Standards - See In re Ivory, 269 B.R. 890
(Bankr.N.D.Ala. 2001).
1.

Poverty level universally discredited

2.

Self-sufficiency standard

3.

Use of debtor's budget - Lender attempts to nitpick the budget

4.

Need to recognize necessities debtors often go without,~, dental care,
auto, insurance, home repairs.

Proof that Income is not Likely to Increase Significantly
A.

Past Work History and Education

B.

Future Job Prospects

C.

Is Expert Testimony Needed?

D.

Standard is Likelihood, not Certainty

Effect of the Availability of Income Contingent Repayment Plans (ICRP)
A.

What is Available?
1.

Pay only amount detennined by income; nothing if income below poverty

2.

Can have negative amortization

3.

After 25 years, debt discharged; maybe taxable discharge of indebtedness
income

F-2
5

B.

V.

1.

Poverty level below a minimal standard of living

2.

Code provision asks whether repayment would cause hardship

3.

Postponement of problem does not eliminate future hardship

4.

Logical conclusion of lenders' argument is that undue hardship discharge
would never be available. Congress did not intend to repeal §523(a)(8) by
implication and, in fact, amended it after enactment of income contingent
provisions

5~

Most courts will take it into consideration. Could provide relief to debtor
for a few years until income increases. Availability of ICRP by itself does
not preclude hardship discharge. See In re Ford, 269 B.R. 673 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2001).

Partial Discharge
A.

B.
VI.

Interplay with Code Provisions

Is it Permitted?
1.

Sixth and Ninth Circuits Allow - In re Saxman, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
6999 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Hornsby, 144 F.3d 433 (6 th Cir. 1998).

2.

Other Courts say Statutory Language Does not Permit.

Is Availability Good or Bad for Debtors?

Student Loans in Chapter 13
A.

B.

When should dischargeability be determined?
1.

Desirability of knowing at the outset of the case

2.

In re Ekenasi, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 7157 (4thCir. 2003) - Normally
should be determined at end unless clear earlier.

Propriety of Provisions determining undue hardship
1.

In re Andersen, 179 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999) - provisions finding undue
hardship binding on creditor

2.

In re Pardee, 193 F.3d 1083 (9 th Cir. 1999) - provision waiving
postpetition interest binding on creditor
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Vil.

3.

Other courts have threatened sanctions

4.

Nothing improper, provided adequate notice is given
a.

Plan is debtor's proposal- terms not permitted by Code are often
allowed ifno party objects.

b

Any terms not inconsistent with statute permitted - §1322(b)(10)

c.

Rule 7001 allows injunctive or equitable relief through plan

Eleventh Amendment Limits on Student Loan Litigation
1.

In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003) - Not an issue in 6th Circuit

2.

Other Circuits - Can't Sue State Directly

3.

Can Use Ex Parte Young Doctrine - Ellett v. Goldberg, 254 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.
2001).
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
INRE:
Evelyn Hatfield-Smith,

Bankruptcy No. 98-30182

PlaintifflDebtor

Adversary No. 00-863

V.
Michael Hershock, President,
Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Agency,
Defendant

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Evelyn Hatfield Smith is 59 years old. (Tr.9).

2.

Ms. Smith did not complete the 10th grade. (Tr.9)

3.

Ms. Smith's sole sources of income are her job at Ampco Express Parking and workers'
compensation payments.(Tr. 13-17).

4.

Ms. Smith eams $7.40/hr at her job which, although she has worked all her life since 10th
grade, is the highest wage she has ever eamed in her life. She now can only work part
time because she is partially disabled from a work injury to her back that makes it
impossible for her to sit or stand for long periods of time.(Tr. 14,23,37)

5.

Ms. Smith suffers from disc problems in her back. The pain Ms. Smith suffers from her
injury makes her unable to work more than four hours a day, and she sometimes cannot
work that long. Her condition is not improving, but instead is getting worse.(Tr. 18-19,
48-49)

6.

Although Ms. Smith has training in cosmetology, her injury does not pennit her to take a
job in that field, which would require too much standing and bending. She also cannot
perfonn the tasks required by manufacturing jobs she previously had. (Tr.19, 49)

7.

Although Ms. Smith took a course related to computers, she did not obtain training from
that course that enabled her to obtain employment in that field and none of the people she
knows who completed the course were able to obtain such employment. She can type
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only ten words per minute and is not familiar with software programs currently in use.
She is also unable to sit for the prolonged periods such a job would require.(Tr.20-23)
8.

In the year 2000, Ms. Smith's gross wages from her job were $2,039.24 and from January

through October of2001 her gross wages were $5882.57. Her net wages for the first ten
months of2001 were $4837.74. (Exhibits P-l, P-2)
9.

Ms. Smith receives $193.02 every two weeks in workers' compensation benefits, which
replaces the income she cannot earn because she cannot work full time.(Tr. 16-17)

10.

Ms. Smith has no health benefits from her employment and therefore cannot afford to
pay for prescription pain medications or treatment that might alleviate her back problems.
She cannot afford the payroll deductions necessary to obtain health insurance through her
employer. (Tr.23-25, 30)

11.

Ms. Smith has no retirement plan that would afford her income beyond social security
when she retires.(Tr.23)

12.

Ms. Smith lives alone in her home, which she owns subject to two mortgages.(Tr.9-10)

13.

The second mortgage was an emergency loan from the Pennsylvania Housing Finance
Agency that was necessary to prevent foreclosure when Ms. Smith was unable to make
payments on her first mortgage. (Tr.l0)

14.

The payments on the first mortgage are $310 per month and on the second mortgage are
$25 per month.(Tr.1 0)

15.

Ms. Smith's utility expenses are $25/month for telephone, $30/month for water, $30 per
month for electricity and $50-$150/month for gas. The amounts listed for gas take into
account a reduction due to energy assistance payments made on her behalf to the gas
company.(Tr.1 0-11)

16.

Ms. Smith also pays $35 for cable television, which is her primary source of recreation.
She does not subscribe to any newspapers or magazines or go out for entertainment such
as movies or restaurant meals, except for an occasional fast food meal. She previously
paid $59 per month for expanded service but could not afford to continue paying that
rate.(Tr. 12, 27)

17.

Ms. Smith cannot afford necessary repairs on her home to correct leaking pipes,
nonfunctioning electric outlets and other wiring defects.(Tr. 12-13)

18.

Ms. Smith cannot afford to repair or replace a broken washer and, as a result, must spend
$40 per month at a laundromat.(Tr. 13)

19.

Ms. Smith owns a 1977 Mercury automobile, which she needs to travel to work and
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medical appointments, as well as to shopping and the laundromat, because her disability
makes it very difficult for her to use public transportation.(Tr.25-26)
20.

Ms. Smith spends $69 per month for car insurance and $60 per month for gas and oil.
The car needs brakes and the transmission is slipping, but Ms. Smith cannot afford to
make these repairs. (Tr. 25-26)

21.

Ms. Smith spends about $200 per month on food, but sometimes runs low because she
cannot afford to spend that much.(Tr.26-27,30)

22.

Ms. Smith spends money on clothes only if she can afford them.(Tr.26, 30)

23.

Ms. Smith's income does not permit her to meet all of her basic needs, much less allow
for any cushion to meet unexpected expenses.

24.

Ms. Smith paid in full earlier student for cosmetology training.(Tr.27-28).

25.

Ms. Smith has paid many hundreds of dollars towards the student loans she now owes, as
demonstrated by the fact that her principal balance went down by approximately $700,
but was unable to continue the payments once she was no longer earning as much money.
At that point, she applied for and received deferments on the loan. (Tr.28-29, 75-77; Ex.

26.

Ms. Smith fell behind on her bills other than student loans, as well as her mortgage,
when she was unemployed and receiving public assistance, and the burden of those bills
caused her to file her bankruptcy case. (Tr.29-30).

27.

The balance on the student loan is $2451.30.(Tr.59)

28.

Ms. Smith cannot maintain, based on her current income and expenses, a minimal
standard of living if forced to repay her student loans.

29.

Due to her age, disability, and lack of training in any skills that would enable her to earn a
higher income, Ms. Smith's financial situation is not likely to change in a way that would
enable her to repay her student loans and maintain a minimal standard of living.

30.

Ms. Smith has made good faith efforts to repay her student loans.

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. "Undue hardship" under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) requires a three-part showing: (1) that the
debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a minimal standard of living for
herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist
indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment
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period for student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. In
re Brightful, 267 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2001).
2. A debtor need not be living at the poverty level to be at a minimal standard of living. (See
attached Memorandum).
3. A debtor need not show that it is certain that her situation will not improve sufficiently to
repay her student loans, but only that it is "likely". In re Brightful, 267 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir.
2001).
4. Although the lack of quality in the education obtained by a debtor is not by itself grounds for
an undue hardship discharge, the Court may take it into consideration in determining the
likelihood of the debtor earning a higher income. In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.
1998).
5. The debtor need not introduce expert medical testimony to prove her medical condition. In re
Brightful, 267 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2001).
6. There is no requirement that a debtor must have applied for every possible loan forbearance
or deferment program prior to obtaining an undue hardship discharge.
7. The availability of an income-contingent consolidation loan is not, by itself, a basis for
denying an undue hardship discharge. In re Newman, Bankr. No. 00-30784, Adv. No. 01-271
(Memorandum of Fox, J., dated Jan.7, 2002, attached hereto as Exhibit A).
8. The good faith efforts test does not require that the debtor show that she made payments
during periods when she was unable to make payments. In re Buzoiu, (Memorandum of
Raslavich, J., dated Oct.3, 2001, affd, McLaughlin, D.J. by Order dated Jan.28, 2002, both
attached hereto as Exhibit B); In re Williams, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1541 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1999)
and cases cited therein.
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Bankruptcy No. 98-30182

INRE:
Evelyn Hatfield-Smith,

Adversary No. 00-863

PlaintifflDebtor

V.
Michael Hershock, President,
Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Agency,
Defendant

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff has previously submitted to this court a memorandum of law covering most of
the legal issues raised by this case. The evidence at trial fully supported the arguments made in
that memorandum. See Transcript and Exhibit References in attached. Proposed Findings of
Fact. That evidence demonstrated that plaintiff does not have sufficient income to meet her
basic needs, even without making payments on her student loans. It demonstrated that plaintiff is
partially disabled and that her condition is, if anything, getting worse as she nears retirement age.
It demonstrated that, despite attempting to better her situation throughout her life, plaintiffhas
never been able to earn more than her current wage. Moreover, it demonstrated that even if
plaintiffs disability disappeared her income would not change appreciably. She would lose her
workers' compensation income, which replaces the wages she has lost due to he being able to
work only part time. Finally, the evidence demonstrated that plaintiff has made good faith efforts
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to pay her current and previous student loans.
No contrary evidence was introduced by defendant. Defendant offered no evidence that
plaintiff earns more than she stated or that she is capable of earning higher wages than she ever
earned before. Defendant offered no evidence to rebut the evidence that plaintiff is partially
disabled. 1 Defendant offered no evidence that plaintiff has not made efforts to pay her student
loans when she was able to do so.
This Memorandum will not repeat the arguments made in plaintiffs earlier
memorandum, to which plaintiff refers the Court. Rather, it will address several issues raised by
defendant at the trial which were not fully addressed in the prior memorandum.

I

THE POVERTY LEVEL IS NOT A MINIMAL STANDARD OF LIVING.
In closing arguments, counsel for defendant argued that because plaintiff's loans are

small, she can afford to make small payments on them. This argument assumes that plaintiff has
some income which is not necessary for plaintiff to maintain a minimal standard of living. The
evidence is to the contrary. Even without making student loan payments, plaintiff does not have

1 At the trial, plaintiff moved the admission into evidence of Exhibit P-4, a letter from
plaintiffs physician that provided additional evidence of her disability. The court reserved ruling
on the admissibility of the document. Although there is sufficient other evidence of her
plaintiffs disability, Exhibit P-4 is admissible under Fed.R.Ev. 801 (d)(2)(B) because defendant
manifested an adoption of the statement by offering it in support of his summary judgment
motion. The circumstances in this case are very similar to those in In re Japanese Electronic
Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 300-301 (3d Cir. 1983), reversed on other grounds,
475 U.S. 574, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). In that case, a party manifested
adoption of documents by referring to them in responses to interrogatories, thereby indicating
that it intended the opposing party to rely on the truth of those documents. In this case, defendant
included Exhibit P-4 in Exhibit 13 to its motion for summary judgment and referred to it in its
Factual Allegation No.36 in connection with that motion, obviously intending that the Court rely
upon the truth of the document.
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sufficient funds for prescription pain medications, necessary repairs to her home and her car,
adequate clothing and other basic needs. Even if her income were several thousand dollars
greater, she would have no money to pay her student loans.
As discussed in plaintiffs summary judgment memorandum (pp.9-11), courts have
regularly found debtors living well above the poverty level to be suffering undue hardship. See
also In re Salinas, 258 B.R. 913 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. 2001)(poverty level is not test of minimal
standard of living, citing Faish); In re Yapuncich. 266 B.R. 882 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2001)(debtor
not required to live in substandard housing, citing Faish). This is not surprising, since the poverty
level is generally regarded as an outmoded standard, which does not take into account the higher
costs of living in urban areas. See Apgar, Standard of Living Eroding for Poor, Study
Detennines, 8 N.J. Law. 2641 (1999); Bernstein, Family Needs Far Exceed the Official Poverty
Line; Study Lays Out Costs of Getting By in City, New York Times, September 13, 2000,
Section B, p.1; The Living Wage Movement: Building a Political Link from Market Wages to
Social Institutions, 34 Journal of Economic Issues 527 (2000). Many antipoverty programs
recognize this fact by granting benefits to families above the poverty line. For example, the Low
Income Home Energy Assistance Payments that the plaintiff receives are afforded to families
with incomes up to 150% of the poverty level. 45 U.S.C. § 8624(b)(2)(B). Moreover, the court
can take judicial notice of the fact that plaintiffs expenses are extremely modest in comparison
to the costs of housing, transportation and other necessities in the Philadelphia area.
The circumstances of Ms. Smith are not dissimilar to those of the debtor in In re Buzoiu,
supra, decided recently by Judge Raslavich and affinned by the district court. That debtor had
recently earned $8.50 per hour, more than Ms. Smith. Ms Buzoiu also was much younger and
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was not disabled. Like Ms. Smith, Ms. Buzoiu was far below the living standard of the debtor in
Faish and could not make ends meet on her income; indeed, her expenses were below what the
Court thought would be necessary. Also like Ms. Smith, and unlike the debtors in Faish and In re
Brunner, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.1987), Ms. Buzoiu was not a college graduate, and had only
whatever minimal skills she might have picked up in for profit trade schools. Like Ms. Buzoiu,
Ms. Smith has requested discharge of her loans only after years of trying to deal with the loans
and pay them in good faith.
Another recent case with facts remarkably similar to those in this proceeding is In re
Ford, 269 B.R. 673 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001). The debtor in that case was 62 years old and also
partially disabled. However, her income was $1338 per month, substantially more than that of
Ms. Smith. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel had no difficulty in finding that the evidence amply
supported the trial court's conclusion that the debtor could not make student loan payments while
paying reasonable living expenses.
Courts that have denied undue hardship discharges have done so in cases in which
debtors earned, or could earn, substantially more than plaintiff in this case. In Faish, supra, for
example, the debtor in 1993 earned $27,000 per year, lived in the lower cost central Pennsylvania
area, and had one school-aged child. In In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7 th Cir. 1993), cited by
the Faish court, the court found that the debtor, whose only dependent expense was $120/week in
child support, would within a few years be able to resume earning over $30,000 per year, which
he had previously earned before losing his driver's license. In In re Brightful, 267 F.3d 324 (3d
Cir.2001), the Court of Appeals found that the debtor would within two years have no
dependents and would be able to earn the full-time salary of a skilled legal secretary. The debtor
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in In re Brunner, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987), also relied upon by Faish, was similarly a single
person with no dependents, a college degree and a good earning capacity that was likely to place
her income above the self-sufficiency level. In In re Harmon, (Opinion attached to defendant's
response to plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment as Exhibit B) , Judge Raslavich
denied an undue hardship discharge to a debtor who had earned $20,000 ten years earlier and
showed no reason why she could not resume work in a similar position, which with inflation
would presumably pay over $25,000, if she chose to do so.
In all of these cases in which an undue hardship discharge was denied, the debtors earned,
or were likely to be able to earn, well over $20,000 per year. All were college graduates or had
other job skills that would command higher wages. None resembled the plaintiff in this case,
who has less than a 10th grade education, is 59 years old and disabled, and has never earned more
than $7.40 per hour. This Court need not determine a bright line measure of a minimal standard
of living in order to recognize that, wherever that line might be, plaintiff is far below it.

II

PLAINTIFF'S ELIGIBILITY FOR VARIOUS REPAYMENT PROGRAMS DOES
NOT PRECLUDE AND UNDUE HARDSHIP DISCHARGE
In closing arguments, defendant's counsel also argued that this proceeding is "premature"

because plaintiff should instead apply for income-sensitive repayment programs offered by
PHEAA and the Department of Education. This argument must fail for a number of reasons.
Primary among these reasons is that any repayment program that is available would
require Ms. Smith to make some payments toward her student loans. Defendant's witness
testified that, the repayment programs offered by PHEAA would require monthly payments of at
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least $59.77 at some point. (Tr.61) The Department of Education's Income Contingent
Repayment Plan, available to a debtor who enter into a consolidation loan with the Department,
requires debtors to make payments if their income is even a few dollars above the poverty level.
34 C.F.R. §209(a)(2) Thus, either of these progrcims would require plaintiff to make payments
on her student loans, since her income is slightly above the poverty level, which is $8,860 for a
family of one. 67 Fed. Reg. 6931-33 (2002). As discussed above, Ms. Smith cannot afford to
make any payments, and could not afford to make any payments even if her income increased
somewhat.
If Ms. Smith were to enter into any such payment arrangement and default, PHEAA
could employ a range of draconian remedies against her. It could garnish her wages, student
loans being virtually the only types of debts other than child support for which wage garnishment
is available in Pennsylvania. 20 U.S.C. § 1095a The loan could be sent to a collection agency,
which would be authorized to add collection fees. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(2). Once Ms. Smith
begins receiving Social Security benefits, even a portion of those benefits might be seized. 31
U.S.C. § 3716. There is no statute of limitations on student loans. 20 U.S.C. § 1091a Moreover,
even if plaintiff were able to make small payments under the Federal Income Contingent
Program, interest would continue to accrue, and indeed it would be capitalized up to 10% of the
loan. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c)(5) At the end of the repayment period, any portion of the loan not
paid and therefore forgiven, which with interest accrual and capitalization could amount to many
times the current balance, would result in deemed discharge of indebtedness income, potentially
leaving Ms. Smith with a substantial tax debt she could not pay.
Thus, Defendant's argument that Plaintiff should be precluded from an undue hardship
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discharge under the good faith test is inconsistent with Faish and with the Bankruptcy Code. The
law is clear in this circuit that undue hardship is detennined not based on Department of
Education regulations but rather based upon the Faish test. If a bankruptcy debtor cannot make
any payments on student loans without undue hardship, the statute mandates that it be
discharged. Defendant's argument simply ignores the fact plaintiff has not applied for payment
arrangements because she is unable to make any payments on her loans and any repayment would
impose undue hardship.
Moreover, based upon Defendant's argument, no debtor could ever obtain an undue
hardship discharge, because alternative payment arrangements would always be available.
Congress has not, in enacting various payment arrangements for student loans, repealed the
undue hardship discharge provision in the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, it cannot be the case that
the availability of such arrangements, no matter how generous, renders it impossible to prove
that payments on the loans would be an undue hardship. Otherwise, section 523(a)(8) would
effectively be surplusage, read out of the statute. Courts should not interpret statutes in a way that
renders them meaningless. As Judge Fox recently held in In re Newman, (Memorandum
attached as Exhibit A), the existence of the income contingent repayment alternative does not
preclude an undue hardship discharge and is simply a factor to take into consideration. (For
example, a debtor might have a short-tenn inability to pay which would be alleviated by the
income contingent repayment program until the debtor was able to make substantial payments.)
See also In re Ford, supra (forbearance or defennent availability merely one factor to consider,
and particularly unrealistic for an older debtor).
Finally, defendant's suggestion that plaintiff should have waited until a later time before
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bringing this action is disingenuous at best. Plaintiff filed her bankruptcy due to pressure from
debts other than her student loans. Once in bankruptcy, she had a right to seek the student loan
undue hardship discharge. If she were to follow defendant's suggestion and obtain a federal
income-contingent consolidation loan, the Department of Education would argue that the debt
was a postpetition debt and could not be discharged. See In re Clarke, 266 B.R. 301
(Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2001).2 She might also have difficulty reopening her case to bring the issue
before the Court, since some courts are reluctant to reopen cases for that purpose. See In re
Newman, Memorandum of April 23, 2001, attached hereto as Exhibit C).
In analyzing "good faith" it is worth considering how it fits into the statutory language,
especially since the statute does not contain the words "good faith" and the Third Circuit has
never had occasion to apply it in a case. 3 The only possible statutory basis for this prong is the
word "undue" in section 523(a)(8). In other words, the debt will not be discharged ifhardships
that would result from paying it are "due", ie. deserved by the debtor. This view is consistent
with the Faish court's quotation from the Bankruptcy Commission Report, stating "the debtor
may not willfully or negligently cause his own default, but rather his condition must result from
'factors beyond his reasonable control.'" 72 F.3d at 305. Certainly, Ms. Smith did not willfully
or negligently cause her own default. It is clear that the circumstances preventing her from
repaying more of her loans were beyond her reasonable control. See In re Brunner, 831 F.2d 395
(2d Cir.1987), adopting analysis of In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re

2Plaintiff does not believe Clarke was properly decided. See Collier on Bankruptcy
14007.03. However, that issue is not before this Court.
In Faish the Court of Appeals applied the first prong of the test and in In re Brightful,
267 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2001) it applied the second prong of the test.
3
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Buzoiu, slip Ope P.I0(attached hereto as Exhibit B ).

CONCLUSION
In closing arguments, defendant's counsel argued that its defense of this action was based

on a concern for "taxpayer dollars," so "the taxpayer isn't left having to pay for this."(Tr.l07)
This argument rings hollow in light of the fact that the money PHEAA has spent litigating this
proceeding is undoubtedly many times the amount it could ever hope to collect from Ms. Smith.
Ms. Smith easily meets the Faish test. Her education, her work history, her medical condition
and her age together demonstrate that it is extremely unlikely that she will ever be in a position to
repay her student loans without undue hardship. Ms. Smith's case is far more compelling than
the cases of most debtors who have been granted undue hardship discharges. If Ms. Smith does
not qualify for such a discharge, it is hard to imagine a debtor who would.

Respectfully submitted,

Henry J. Sommer
Attorney for Plaintiff
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHAPTER 7

Inre: TAWANDALAIANEWMAN

BANKRUPTCY NO. 00-30784

Debtor.
TAWANDALAIA NEWMAN,
Plaintiff
v.
EDUCATIONAL CREDIT
MANAGEMENT CORP,
Defendant

ADVERSARY NO. 01-271

ORDER
AND NOW, this

day of

., 2001, defendant's motion for summary

judgment is DENIED and summary judgment is GRANTED to plaintiff. Plaintiffs educational
loans are declared dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

FOX,]
cc:
Henry J. Sommer
Consumer Bankruptcy Assistance Project
1424 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Elizabeth F. Abrams
Reed Smith, LLP
2500 One Liberty Place
1650 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHAPTER 7

Inre: TAWANDALAIANEWMAN

BANKRUPTCY NO. 00-30784

Debtor.
TAWANDALAIA NEWMAN,
Plaintiff
v.
EDUCATIONAL CREDIT
MANAGEMENT CORP,
Defendant

ADVERSARY NO. 01-271

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND PLAINTIFF'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffresponds to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and hereby moves for
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. In support of her motion she avers:

1.

There are no material facts in dispute in this proceeding.

2.

Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

3.

Plaintiffis entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffrequests that the defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied
and that she be granted summary judgment declaring her student loans to be dischargeable.

HENRY J. SOMMER
Consumer Bankruptcy Assistance Project
1424 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 242-8639
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Inre: TAWANDALAIANEWMAN

CHAPTER 7

Debtor.

BANKRUPTCY NO. 00-30784

TAWANDALAIA NEWMAN,
Plaintiff

v.
EDUCATIONAL CREDIT
MANAGEMENT CORP,
Defendant

ADVERSARY NO. 01-271

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Tawadalaia Newman seeks, in this adversary proceeding, a judgment that her

student loans are dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) because repayment of those loans
would cause her undue hardship. This court's detennination ofwhether the undue hardship
standard is met is guided by the decision of our Court of Appeals in In re Faish, 72 F.3d 298 (3d
Cir. 1995). Defendant, relying on an incomplete statement of the facts, has filed a motion for
summary judgment and argued that those facts warrant judgment in favor of Defendant. 1

1 In addition, ,some of the "facts" relied upon by Defendant should be disregarded. While
plaintiffs statements in response to discovery may properly be considered by the Court, there is
no declaration or affidavit authenticating Exhibits Band D to Defendant's motion.
Unauthenticated documents and other documents not admissible into evidence may not be
considered in deciding a summary judgment motion. F.R.Civ.P. 56(e), incorporated in Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 7056. See First Nat'l Life Ins. v. California Pac. Life, 876 F.2d 877,881 (11th Cir.
1989) (unauthenticated photocopies of out of state court proceedings were inadmissible
evidence); Moore's Federal Practice' 56.11[7][c].
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As demonstrated below, and by the attached declarations, Defendant's version of the facts
omits important facts. Indeed, Defendant's case is so weak that even the facts submitted by
defendant do not support judgment in favor of Defendant. When the full factual record is
examined, it reveals that plaintiff is an indigent single mother of 5 who is unable to make ends
meet on her income, has struggled to remain out of default on her student loans, and will not see
sufficient improvement in her situation to enable her to repay those loans. That factual record,
which Defendant cannot dispute, provides ample basis for the Court to grant plaintiffs crossmotion for summary judgment.

II

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant's motion for summary judgment appears to be based on a fundamental

misunderstanding of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056 and its counterpart, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Defendant seems to believe that in deciding a motion for summary
judgment the Court can consider only discovery materials and pleadings. It is, of course, in a
counteraffidavit or declaration that a party normally sets forth facts that complete the factual
record, adding those facts which the original movant has failed to mention, as plaintiffhas done
here. It was not the duty of plaintiff to prove her case in the pleadings or in discovery, as
Defendant seems to believe. Considering only the answers to Defendant's discovery inquiries
and submissions would be like deciding the case based only on cross-examination and
presentation of the defendant's case, with no direct examination or presentation of the plaintiffs
case. When the full factual record is examined, including plaintiffs declaration, that record
militates in favor ofjudgment for the plaintiff.
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Defendant also apparently believes that under the summary judgment rule it may argue
for factual findings that have no support in the record. As discussed below, Defendant asks this
Court to draw inferences in its favor about plaintiffs ability to rebudget her scant income, about
her ability to obtain much higher paying work, about her ability to have others pay the mortgage
on her home, and about her good faith, which not only are not compelled by the evidentiary
record but in fact are devoid of any support in that record. With respect to all these issues, the
declarations submitted by plaintiff supply the relevant facts, facts very different than the
assertions conjured up by Defendant.

III

PLAINTIFF'S CURRENT INCOME DOES NOT SUPPORT
EVEN A MINIMAL STANDARD OF LIVING
Defendant makes no argument that plaintiff does not meet the first prong of the Faish test

- that she cannot currently repay the loans and at the same time maintain a minimal standard of
living for herself and her dependents. Her annual income is below the federal poverty standard
for a family of6, which is $23,690.66 Fed. Reg. 10695 (Feb. 16, 2001). Moreover, as detailed
in the attached Declaration of Professor Mark Stem, the federal poverty standard greatly
understates the cost of a minimal standard of living for a family in Philadelphia. Perhaps for this
reason, the Court of Appeals in Faish held that a debtor need not live in "abject poverty" to meet
this prong of the test. 72 F.3d at 305.
It is clear from her Declaration that Plaintiff cannot make ends meet with her income.
(~~1,

2, 4) She amassed substantial debts prior to her bankruptcy case that she could not pay and

that were discharged.(~6) Since then she has incurred new debts that she cannot afford to
pay.(Answer to Interrogatory No.8) She fell behind on her mortgage payments and was saved
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from foreclosure only by a state assistance program, which required additional payments on a
new loan.('4) She is currently unable to pay another mortgage on her home arising from a home
equity loan.('2) She has no financial cushion at all to deal with emergency expenses, home
repairs or repairs to her car, which she needs to get to work, buy groceries, and transport her large
family to doctors' appointments and on other necessary trips.('2) There are necessary expenses
for her family that plaintiff simply cannot afford to pay.('2) Thus, plaintiff already suffers
financial hardship due to her low income. By any measure, plaintiff is currently unable to
maintain a minimal standard of living for herself and her children, even without making
payments on her student loans.

IV

PLAINTIFF'S CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE
Plaintiff is a woman who has worked most of her life in addition to raising a family of

five children, for a number of years, on her own. She continuously tried to better her position, by
going to school, or by moving to jobs with better wages or more hours.(Newman Declaration
'10; Answer to Interrogatory No.2) She has never earned more than $11.64 per hour and
received that wage for only a few months in a temporary position in which she could not
remain.(Newman Declaration '11) Except for that position and a temporary part-time position
with the Bureau of the Census, her earnings have never significantly exceeded the $8 per hour
she currently earns.(Answer to Interrogatory No.2)
As set forth in the Declaration of Mark Stem, plaintiffwould have to earn approximately
$4582 per month, over $50,000 per year, to achieve minimal self-sufficiency for her large family
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in Philadelphia. 2 (Stem Declaration '4) Defendant has not suggested that she can earn that
amount or anything close to it. Despite the fact that Ms. Newman is young and employable, there
is no hope that plaintiffs income will increase enough to enable her to maintain a minimal
standard of living for her large family and also pay her loans.
As described in the Declaration of Professor Stem and its attachments, the SelfSufficiency Standard is a much more accepted and realistic standard for a minimal standard of
living than the outmoded poverty standard and is adjusted for the wide geographic variations in
living costs. The Self-Sufficiency Standard (as opposed to the poverty standard) is also
remarkably consistent with the leading cases on student loan discharges. In Faish, supra, for
example, the debtor in 1993 earned $27,000 per year, lived in central Pennsylvania, and had one
school-aged child. Even in 1998, the self-sufficiency standard for such a debtor was well below
that amount for the Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle MSA. In In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th
Cir. 1993), cited by the Faish court, the court found that the debtor, whose only dependent
expense was $120/week in child support, would within a few years be able to resume earning
over $30,000 per year, which he had previously earned before losing his driver's license. In In re
Brightful, 267 F.3d 324 (3d Cir.2001), the Court of Appeals found that the debtor would within
two years have no dependents and would be able to earn the full-time salary of a skilled legal
secretary, well above the self-sufficiency standard for one adult. The debtor in In re Brunner, 831
F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987), also relied upon by Faish, was similarly a single person with no

By way of comparison, under the "means test" proposals now pending in Congress, a
Pennsylvania debtor with a family of 6 would not be subjected to the means test, designed to
extract payments to unsecured creditors from debtors who supposedly can afford to pay some of
their unsecured debts, unless that debtor had a gross income of approximately $70,000. See
proposed new 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7), which would be added by H.R. 333 §102 (107 th Cong.).
2
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dependents, a college degree and a good earning capacity that was likely to place her income
above the self-sufficiency level.
On the other hand, in In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108 (9th Circuit 1998), the debtors' net
income (for an adult couple) was $20,976, well above the poverty line. Even though one of the
debtors' wages had increased twice during the course of the case, the Ninth Circuit found that
"[c]learly, in these circumstances the Penas could not maintain a minimal standard of living and
payoff student loans."155 F.3d at 1113. In In re Cheesman, 25 F.3d 356 (6 th Cir. 1994) the Sixth
Circuit affinned the undue hardship discharge (with a temporary stay of the order) of debtors
who had an income of$15,676 in 1991, even though one spouse was hoping for a promotion and
the other was actively seeking employment, because their employment history did not indicate
that the second spouse's employment would improve sufficiently to pay their loans.
Defendant offers several arguments in support of its claim that Ms. Newman will be able
to pay her loans in the future. It first argues that four of Ms. Newman's children will attain
majority in the next eleven years. While this is true, none of these children will attain majority in
the next four years, and Ms. Newman will continue to have three dependent children for the next
nine years. The self sufficiency standard for the family Plaintiff will have from six to eight years
from now, in 1998 dollars, is $2464 per month, a wage of$14.00 per hour, (Stem Declaration '5)
which is much more than Ms. Newman has ever earned and almost twice what she has earned in
any job except for two brief temporary positions. There is no basis in the record for any
conclusion, based upon the preponderance of the evidence, except the conclusion that Ms.
Newman will not be likely to have the ability to repay her loans and maintain a minimal standard
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of living even after her family's size is reduced to four. 3 Moreover, Defendant cites no case
which denies a student loan discharge based upon the prospect of reduced expenses so far in the
future and plaintiff is not aware of any such case. Indeed, the Faish decision is quite clear that a
debtor need only prove inability to pay "for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans." 72 F.3d at 305 (emphasis supplied). See also In re Brightful, 267 F.3d 324,_
(quoting In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7 th Cir. 1993) that test looks to whether debtor
"will lack the ability to repay for several years").
Defendant next argues that Ms. Newman will be capable of working full time within the
next three years without any costs of child care because her older children can care for the
younger ones afer school and, presumably, during school vacations. It is, first of all,
presumptuous and unrealistic for Defendant to assume that Ms. Newman's children should be
required to give up after-school activities to be continuously available to provide childcare to
enable Ms. Newman to repay her student loans. Her children did not incur the student loans. In
any event, even if Ms. Newman were working full-time, her earned income at $8 per hour would
be well under $20,000 per year, still below even the poverty level. She still would not have
anything close to enough income to achieve self-sufficiency, which in three years would still
require an income of over $43,000 in 1998 dollars (the self-sufficiency standard for an adult, two
schoolage children and a teenager, augmented by $800 per month for two additional teenagers.)
It must also be remembered that a significant portion of Plaintiffs income consists of

Although the Third Circuit in In re Brightful, 267 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2001) did quote a
bankruptcy court opinion speaking of a "certainty of hopelessness," it also stated it was applying
the Faish test which looks to whether it is "likely" that the debtor's inability to pay will persist.
Faish, 72 F.3d at 305. The Court gave no reason to believe that the normal preponderance of the
evidence standard is to be discarded in favor of some other standard, such as "certainty."
3
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benefits that are phased out as income increases and that other costs would rise as income
increases. If her earned income did increase significantly, not only would her taxes be far higher
but she would no longer receive food stamps, her mortgage payments to PHFA would increase,
she would not be eligible for low income discounts on gas and electricity, her son would no
longer receive SSI, and her family would no longer receive medical assistance. 4 (Newman
Declaration "2-5) All of these benefits are afforded to her to bring her family closer to, but
nowhere near, self-sufficiency. It has sometimes been noted that a family in this situation faces
the equivalent of a marginal tax rate approaching 100% due to the loss, as income increases, of
so many income-dependent benefits.
Lastly, Defendant argues that but for Ms. Newman's choice to "prioritize" her home
mortgage and home equity debts she would be able to pay her student loans. However, this
decision to prioritize her housing expenses (including a home equity loan used for home repairs)
is expressly authorized by the Faish test. That test looks to whether a debtor can maintain a
minimal standard of living and certainly that standard of living must include housing. The
debtor's total payments on her mortgage loans, which she cannot even afford to make at present,
along with her other housing related costs other than maintenance, are less than the cost of
housing, based upon rent, for a family of four in the Self-Sufficiency Standard. (Stem
Declaration '7) Thus, if Ms. Newman were renting, her housing expenses would be higher, and if
she were not paying a portion of her rent, instead of not paying a home equity loan, she would
have been evicted and her family would be homeless. Defendant has not suggested where she

4 Ms Newman's current employer does not provide medical benefits. (Newman
Declaration '2)
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might live with her five children if she did not "prioritize" her mortgage payments. Defendant
also suggests that other individuals should be paying the mortgage on Ms. Newman's home, but
those individuals never were expected to make these payments, are not doing so, and will not do
so. (Newman Declaration 117-8) Ms. Newman's fonner husband already provides support to her
family, to the extent that he is able, in other ways.(Newman Declaration 18).

V

PLAINTIFF HAS DEMONSTRATED GOOD FAITH
Finally, Defendant argues that plaintiff has not met the "good faith" prong of the Faish

test. In analyzing "good faith" it is worth considering at the outset how it fits into the statutory
language, especially since the statute does not contain the words "good faith" and the Third
Circuit has never had occasion to apply it in a case. 5 The only possible statutory basis for this
prong is the word "undue" in section 523(a)(8). In other words, the debt will not be discharged if
hardship.s that would result from paying it are "due", ie. deserved by the debtor. This view is
consistent with the Faish court's quotation from the Bankruptcy Commission Report, stating "the
debtor may not willfully or negligently cause his own default, but rather his condition must result
from 'factors beyond his reasonable control. '" 72 F.3d at 305.
Aside from repeating its arguments concerning Plaintiffs earning capacity and ability to
have others pay the mortgages on her home, Defendant's principal argument on good faith is that
Ms. Newman has not "taken advantage of various payment arrangements available to her. There
is no admissible evidence in the record of what these arrangements might be. However, as
described in Defendant's brief, even the most liberal of these arrangements would require

5 In Faish the Court of Appeals applied the first prong of the test and in In re Brightful,
267 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2001) it applied the second prong of the test.
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payments if Ms. Newman's income rose even slightly above the poverty level, something she
could not afford while at the same time maintaining a minimal standard of living for her family,
as discussed above and in Professor Stem's Declaration. See also Newman Declaration ~14
Defendant argues that under the income contingent repayment arrangements it believes
would be available, Ms. Newman would not currently be obligated to make any payments. If this
is the case, it is difficult to see how these arrangement have much to do with the Faish issue of
good faith efforts to repay the loans. Ms Newman, as Defendant concedes, has in fact already
consistently sought deferments and forbearance with respect to her payment obligations, to the
extent that she is not even currently in default. (Newman Declaration ~13) Defendant repeatedly
granted those deferments on the basis of hardship, thereby agreeing that based on the income she
received, which differs little from her current income, she could not afford to pay the loans. Ms.
Newman has also made payments on her loan when she had any ability to do so, at all times
trying in good faith to be responsible with respect to those 10ans.(Newman Declaration ~13)
Thus, Defendant's argument that Plaintiff should be precluded from an undue hardship
discharge under the good faith test is inconsistent with Faish and with the Bankruptcy Code. The
law is clear in this circuit that undue hardship is determined not based on Department of
Education regulations but rather based upon the Faish test. If a bankruptcy debtor cannot make
any payments on student loans without undue hardship, the statute mandates that it be
discharged. Defendant's argument simply ignores the fact plaintiff has not applied for payment
arrangements because she is unable to make any payments on her loans and any repayment would
impose undue hardship. (Newman Declaration ~14)
Moreover, based upon Defendant's argument, no debtor could ever obtain an undue

F - 32

hardship discharge, because alternative payment arrangements would always be availa:ble.
Congress has not, in enacting various payment arrangements for student loans, repealed the
undue hardship discharge provision in the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, it cannot be the case that
the availability of such arrangements, no matter how generous, renders it impossible to prove
that payments on the loan would be an undue hardship. Otherwise, section 523(a)(8) would
effectively be surplusage, read out of the statute. Courts should not interpret statutes in a way that
renders them meaningless.

CONCLUSION
It is hard to imagine a debtor who could have a better case than plaintiff for an undue
hardship detennination. She is a single mother of five young children whose income cannot
support a minimal standard of living and who has no prospect of obtaining an income that will
do so. Ms. Newman has worked all her life and attempted for years to deal with her student
loans in good faith, struggling to make payments and seeking defennent after defennent. The
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY J. SOMMER
Consumer Bankruptcy Assistance Project
1424 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102
(215) 242-8639
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, ruptcy and then raise the discharge defensively in the
applicable state or federal forum. 426
If a bankruptcy court determination is desired, there
is no time limit to commence an adversary proceeding to
resolve the dischargeability issues. In fact, the applicable rule even speaks of allowing cases to be reopened in
order to obtain determinations on issues related. to dischargeability.427
14.4.3.8.1.2 Undue hardship test

The sole remaining exception to the nondischargeability of student loans is available when excepting the
debt from discharge would cause the debtor or the debtor's dependents undue hardship. Courts have long
struggled to define the term "undue hardship" found in
section 523(a)(8). Although most of the published opinions on the subject agree that "undue" means more than
the "garden variety" hardship that arises from the expense of future payments,428 each judge seems to bring a
unique set of values to the process of defining and implementing the applicable standard.
Several circuit courts of appeals have adopted a definition of undue hardship that employs a three-part
test.429 Under this test, undue hardship exists if:
• the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a 'minimal' standard of living
for the debtor and the debtor's dependents if forced
to repay the loans;
• additional circumstances exist indicating that this
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant
portion of the repayment period of the student
loans; and
• the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the
loans.

426 See, e.g., Indiana Univ. v. Canganelli, 501 N.E.2d 299 (Ill.

427
428

429

-

App. Ct. 1986) (discharge can be raised as a defense to
collection of student loans in postbankruptcy state court
proceedings).
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(b).
E.g., Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Kopf, 245 B.R. 731
(Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (while "garden variety" hardship may
not be sufficient, on the other extreme debtors should not
be required to prove a "certainty of hopelessness" or "total
incapacity").
In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Faish, 72
F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1995), eert. denied, 518 U.S. 1009 (1996);
Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993); Cheesman v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp., 25 F.3d 356
(6th Cir. 1994)~ eert. denied, 513 U.S. 1081 (1995); Brunner
v. New York State Higher Education Services, 831 F.2d 395
(2d Cir. 1987).
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.In ge~eral, low-income. debtors are most likely t~"~
taln a discharge under this test. 4JO They should seell
hav~ the court foc~s o~ their income and expensesaslti
baSIS for a determInation of undue hardship. Certaihi(
any debtor who can demonstrate some personali"D:i.
misfortune, disability or unique underprivilege shaU
bring that factor to the attention of the court.431 Si
la~ly, every effor~ shou!d be ~ade. t.o.establish lack ofj
SkIlls, lack of available Jobs, dlsabIhtles and other facto'
which make it improbable that a low-income debtor Wi
have better prospects in the future. 432 The test requirr"
a good faith effort to pay the loan does not require the
repayment act~ally occurred, although it may requii
some effort to deal with the loan prior to bankruptcy:" .'
In evaluating student loans that were incurred fot . ~
vocational school education., two additional considei:rt
ations related to discharge are appropriate. First,
student's undue hardship argument may be strength~;1
ened if the student loan arose from a private vocationat~~
f,

theil

.':!f
430 In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1998). See also In re:;"j:
Hornsby, 144 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998) (debtors did not need:
to be at poverty level to show undue hardship).
431 See, e.g., In re Cline, 248 B.R. 347 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000)
(single woman unable to increase income would need decades to repay $53,000 in loans); In re Johnson, 121 B.R. 91
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (single mother of two not receiving support); In re Reilly, 118 B.R. 38 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990)
(debtor was divorced mother of three whose ex-husband
was incurably ill and therefore not contributing support); In
re Zobel, 80 B.R. 950 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (unemployed debtors who had made numerous unsuccessful attempts to find work); In re Wilcox, 57 B.R. 479 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1985) (debtor holding down subsistence job; wife
suffering from crippling arthritis and confined to wheelchair); In re Dockery, 36 B.R. 41 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1984)
(debtor had suffered severe industrial injuries and several
heart attacks); In re Diaz, 5 B.R. 253 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1980) (divorced mother of four who had a series of illnesses,
heart trouble, and alcoholic problem, need for future surgery, and a husband confined to a mental clinic presented
"classic" hardship case); In re Bagley, 4 B.R. 248 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1980) (debtor and husband lived on $560 per month
earned by him as an Army private and had postpetition
debts of over $4,000 for hospitalization of their baby); In re
Fonzo, 1 B.R. 722 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979) (policemandebtor had expenses exceeding income for himself, wife,
and four children).
432 E.g., In re Price, 25 B.R. 256, 258 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982)
(relevant considerations include "whether the education
enabled or would enable the debtor to obtain substantially
higher income"); Matter of Powelson, 25 B.R. 274 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1982) (vocational degree in hairstyling did not enhance debtor's job skills or employability). See also In re
Pena, 207 B.R. 919 (B.A.P. 9th Cif. 1997), affd 155 F.3d
1108 (9th Cir. 1998) (debtors did not have to show "exceptional circumstances" to show they were unlikely to improve
their financial situation in the future).
433" In re Coats, 214 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997): In re
Hornsby, 201 B.R. 195 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995), aJl·d L44
F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998); In re Maulin, 190 B.R. 153 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1995).
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school that closed down or defrauded the student. Not
only do courts sense the unfairness involved in making a
student repay a loan for a valueless education, but also
the absence of acquired skills makes it less likely that the
debtor will be able to obtain employment that could
make possible future loan rcpayment. 4J4 In fact, under
recent legislation, the debtor may be excused from paying the loan, even without a bankruptcy case. 435
Evidence that a student obtained no benefit from
their trade school education is relevant to the issue of
whether the debtor will be able to pay in the future,
because it suggests lack of skills necessary to obtain
income for repayment. 436 It is also relevant to the debtor's payment history, because the debtor may not have
had the ability to make any payments and because a
valueless vocational school education is outside the
Congressional concern about highly skilled professionals shedding loan obligations prior to a lucrative career. 437
A further argument related to the dischargeability of
trade school loans is that absent discharge, the debtor
may be ineligible for future government educational
loans. 438 If a discharge is not granted, a low-income student will not be able to go back to school, and will not be

434 See, e.g., In re Law, 159 B.R. 287 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993)
(repayment of $20,000 student loan for two and a halfweeks
of useless flight training would be undue hardship); In re
Evans, 131 B.R. 372 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (trade school
education in word-processing did not put debtor in a position to repay her student loans); In re Correll, 105 B.R. 302
(Bankr. W.O. Pa. 1989) (student loan discharged where
debtor received no benefit from the education); In re
Carter, 29 B.R. 228 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (loan discharged where debtor did not obtain a marketable skill); In
re Love, 28 B.~. 475 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983) (college education did not provide marketable skill); In re Price, 25 B. R.
256, 258 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1982) (relevant considerations
include "whether the education enabled or would enable
the debtor to obtain substantially higher income"); Matter
of Powelson, 25 B.R. 274 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982) (vocational
degree in hairstyling did not enhance debtor's job skills or
employability); In re Ford, 22 B.R. 442 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1982) (court considered that debtor obtained little benefit
from her education); In re Littell, 6 B.R. 85 (Bankr. D. Or.
1980) (whether the debtor benefitted economically from
schooling should be a "substantial factor in determining
whether undue hardship exists).
435 See National Consumer Law Center, Unfair"and Deceptive
Acts and Practices § 11.4 (4th ed. 1997 and Supp.). This
manual should be consulted for other nonbankruptcy student loan discharges available to debtors in addition to the
closed school discharge, such as those based on the gebtor~s
permanent and total disability and a schoors false certification of the debtor's eligibility.
436 E.g., Matter of Powelson, 25 B.R. 274 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1982).
437 In re Evans, 131 B.R. 372 (Bankr.-S.O. Ohio 1991).
438 See National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices § 11.5 (4th ed. 1997 and Supp.).
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able to obtain a decent paying job, making repayment
now or in the future an undue hardship.
Sometinles, even in fairly strong hardship cases, student loan creditors offer to take very low payments.
While it could be argued that the court should only look
to the payments actually due under the terms of the
note, such offers of low payments can make it more
difficult to assert that the loan, as modified by the creditor, presents a hardship. Perhaps not surprisingly,
courts have been attracted to this method of compromising on the outcome of the case, sometimes finding no
hardship solely because of the reduced-payments offer.
In fact, a few have even devised other solutions short of
complete nondischargeability in difficult cases, by reducing the term and/or amount of the loan. 439 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals approved a bankruptcy court's
order ruling that a debtor's loans were dischargeable,
but stayed enforcement of its order for eighteen months
to see if the debtor's situation improved. 440 The authority for such actions without the creditor's consent is
dubious, since this section of the statute, unlike others,
does not use the phrase "to the extent" in describing
whether a loan is dischargeable. 441
In a similar vein, student loan creditors have argued in
recent cases that there cannot be undue hardship because the Department of Education's regulations provide for payment relief in the form of Income Contingent Repayment Plans (ICRP).442 Several courts have
found the availability of these repayment plans relevant
under the various hardship tests. 443 These courts fail to
apply the statute as written, which affords the debtor an
opportunity to obtain an absolute discharge, and fail to
consider the student loan that the debtor actually has as
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439 In re Hornsby, 144 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998) (partial discharge is permitted under court's equitable powers); In re
Andresen, 232 B.R. 127 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999) (discharging
two of three student loans); In re Griffin, 197 B.R. 144
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996) (discharging accrued interest and
attorney fees on loans, but not principal); In re Hinkle, 200
B.R. 690 (Bankr. W.O. Wash. 1996) (discharging three out
of six student loans); In re Littell, 6 B.R. 85 (Bankr. D. Or.
1980) (each debtor ordered to pay $10 per month for remainder of 5 year period after initial loan due date); In re
Hemmen, 7 B.R. 63 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1980) (court conditioned discharge of loan on debtor using best efforts to find
employment and paying any sums he received in excess of
$3,600 per year after taxes toward student loan for remainder of five years after loan matured).
440 In re Cheesman, 25 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 1994), eert. denied,
513 U.S. 1081.
441 In re Skaggs, 196 B.R. 865 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996)
(court's authority limited to determination whether entire
debt is dischargeable).
442 See 20 U.S.C. 1078(m) and 1087a; 34 C.F.R.
685.209(a)(2)(i).
443 See, e.g., In re Standfuss, 245 B.R. 356 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
2000) ("flexibility of an ICRP plan considered in determining debtors' ability to repay student loan).
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opposed to some modification of that loan. 444 If Congress had intended the payment programs to meet all
hardship situations, it would have repealed the undue
hardship provisions. It has not done so and has, in fact,
amended them since these programs were enacted.
14.4.3.8.2 Procedure for dischargeability determination
A proceeding to determine dischargeability of a student loan may be brought at any time. 445 It usually must
be commenced by a complaint pursuant to the adversary
proceeding rules. 446 Because a state student loan creditor may argue that it'is immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment, it is often wise to name the head
of the student loan agency as a defendant so that the suit
may proceed under the principles of Ex parte Young. 447
The debtor has at least the burden of going forward with
proof in such a case, but courts have differed regarding
whether the debtor has the ultimate ,burden of proof,
since in other dischargeability proceedings the creditor
bears that burden. 448 Alternatively, at least if the student loan creditor does not object, the dischargeability
of a student loan may be determined by a provision in
the debtor's chapter 13 plan which, if the plan is confirmed, becomes binding upon the creditor. 449
Although a debtor has the option of seeking a determination related to dischargeability in a nonbankruptcy
forum after the bankruptcy is completed,450 some state
or nonbankruptcy federal courts may be unwilling to
make a decision on what they perceive to be a bankruptcy issue especially if the open question is "undue
hardship."451 If the facts are favorable during the bank-

ruptcy casc, the better practice is to seek to have 7£
issue decided in bankruptcy court prior to discharger
If an unfavorable decision is received and circumstan"
subsequently change for the worse, dischargeabilitYj
student loan obligations gencrally may be relitigated
reopening a prior complaint or bringing a new proceea~~
ing even if the dcbtor's bankruptcy case has beea~
closed. 453
-'-t~!
$

14.4.3.8.3 Raising defenses to student loan debts

'~~

}'f~
~:-~

If it is not likely that a student loan debt will be fou~if~
dischargeable (and especially in chapter 13 if paymeni~·
on the debt are going to be made), the debtor should-'
consider whether there are defenses to the debt, partic~
ularly if there was a close relationship between the
school and the lender. If possible, the debtor should
consider bringing school-related defenses (e.g., breach
of contract, warranty, fraud or unfair trade practice) to
the proof of claim filed by the originating lender or
guarantee agency.454 A decision disallowing the claim
based on a valid defense is as good or better than a
decision that the loan is dischargeable. 455
14.4.3.8.4 Special issues regarding student loans in
chapter 13
In the past, because student loan debts were dischargeable upon completion of a chapter 13 plan, chapter 13 was an attractive option for those who sought to
deal with student loan debt burdens. However, changes

444 See In re Kopf, 245 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (no
matter how flexible or "humanely executed" such programs
may be, they simply are not the equivalent of a discharge).
445 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(b).
446 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001 et seq.
447 See § 13.3.2.2supra. See also In re Innes,184 F.3d 1275 (10th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 120 S. Ct. 1530, 146 L.
Ed. 2d 345 (2000) (state consented to litigation in federal
court by signing participation agreement with U.S. Department of education agreeing to oppose dischargeability complaints); In re Phelps, 237 B.R. 527 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1999)
(bankruptcy court's had jurisdiction to determine dischargeability notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment due to
its jurisdiction over debtors and the estate); In re Muir, 239
B.R. 213 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (loan guaranty agency
failed to establish it was an arm of the state).
448 In re Fox, 163 B.R. 975 (Bania. M.D. Pa. 19~3) (debtor has
burden of going forward but not burden of proof); In re
Alliger, 78 B.R. (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Norman, 25
B.R. 545 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
)
449 In re Andersen, 179 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999). But see note
459, infra.
450 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).
451 See Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corp. v.
Taylor, 390 Mass. 755, 459 N.E.2d 807, Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) , 69,788 (1984) (implying that if undue hardship
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claim not raised in bankruptcy court it is waived).
452 Of course, if no decision is obtained in the bankruptcy court
for some reason, debtors, in appropriate circumstances,
should feel free to raise discharge on the basis of hardship in
response to a later collection case. Alternatively, removal of
the collection case to the bankruptcy court may be sought..
28 U.S.C. § 1452; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9027. See generally
§ 13.4.1, supra.
453 11 U.S.C. § 350; Fed. R. Banke. P. 4007(b); In re Sobh, 61
B.R. 576 (E.D. Mich. 1986). See In re Fisher, 223 B.R. 377
(Hanler..M.D. Fla. 1998) (debtor who had not sought discharge of student loan during bankruptcy could reopen case
to seek undue hardship discharge in light of postbankruptcy
accident which reduced her ability to repay).
454 See 10 NCLC REPORTS, Deceptive Practices and Warranties Ed. 29, (Sept/Oct 1991); National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices § 11.9 (4th ed.
1997 and Supp.). See also Tipton v. Secretary of Education,
768 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. W. Va. 1991).
455 To the extent the claim is disallowed, the debtor would have
a binding judgment that the debt is not owed. Additionally,
the creditor would not be entitled to any dividend available
from the estate. Finally, attorneys fees might be availahle to
counsel to the extent that a determination is based on unfair
and deceptive acts or practices or another statute involving
fee shifting.

The Discharge: Protecting It and Using It

in the law eliminated many of the advantages of the
chapter 13 option. Code section 1328(a)(2) now incorporates section 523( a)(8) by reference so that student
loans that would be nondischargeable in chapter 7 are
no\valso nondischargeable in chapter 13.
Nevertheless, student loan issues continue to arise in
cbapter 13 cases that are filed for other reasons. Additionally, in some cases a chapter 13 plan may still provide advantages during the term of the plan, even if the
debt is ultimately nondischargeable.
Given that amended section 1328(a) simply incorporates section 523(a)(8), issues of dischargeability of student loans in chapter 13 cases should be treated almost
identically to those arising in chapter 7 cases. For example
one court addressing dischargeability in chapter 13 determined undue hardship just as if the case had proceeded
under chapter 7. 456 The mere fact that the debtor can
afford chapter 13 plan payments should not be dispositive
of the ability to pay a student loan. 457 In many cases those
payments go almost entirely to secured creditors to ensure
a debtor continued shelter, transportation to work or other
necessities, or are made at great sacrifices that cannot be
sustained beyond the plan period.
As in chapter 7, the debtor must affirmatively request a
finding of undue hardship for the debt to be found dischargeable during the bankruptcy case. Although a plan
provision might provide that confirmation of the plan will
constitute a finding that undue hardship exists,458 such
provisions will probably be disfavored if a party objects. 459
A few courts have even sanctioned counsel for placing
such provisions in pl~ns,46o although such decisions are
contrary to both the concept of the chapter 13 plan as a
proposal by the debtor which can include any provision not
contrary to title 11 461 and the case law which has held that
such provisions can be approved and binding. As discussed
above, the procedure used in most cases for resolving
questions related to dischargeability in bankruptcy is the
one set out in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007 which provides for an
adversary proceeding.
Since most chapter 13 cases continue for the three (or
five) year length of the plan and because the nondischargeability of student loans can be raised at any time,
careful considerations of timing should be brought to
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bear in order to ensure that the issues arc heard when
the debtor faces maximum financial pressures. I-fowever, some courts may take the position that no determination on dischargcability can be made until the end
of the case. 462
In a few districts, the chapter 13 standing trustee has
taken the position that nondis~hargeablestudent loan
debts must be fully paid in a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.
That position is incorrect. Even if a student loan is not
dischargeable, it nevertheless. remains an unsecured
claim during the bankruptcy case (unless the creditor
holds a nonavoidedjudgment lien), subject to those provisions of the Code applicable to unsecured debts.
For most cases,"this means that during the bankruptcy
plan, the student loan creditor is entitled to the greater
of what it would receive under the best interests of the
creditors test463 or the ability to pay test 464 just like any
other unsecured creditor. 465 Certainly, any arguments
that a ~ase must be dismissed because the debtor's filing
was made in bad faith merely in order to improperly
discharge student loans should be put to rest. 466
Thus, the debtor can propose treatment of a student
loan creditor during a bankruptcy plan that is no different than treatment of any other unsecured creditor. 467
The student loan creditor will not be entitled to additional regular payments outside the plan prior to the
debtor's discharge.
However, if the student loan is nondischargeable, it is
in the debtor's interest to make sure that as much of the
loan as possible is paid during the bankruptcy. Frequently this means that the debtor wishes to propose a
plan to separately classify the student loan and have it
paid at a higher percentage than other unsecured
debts. 468 Several judicial decisions have explicitly held
that a separate classification in favor of a student loan

456 In re Evans, 131 B.R. 372 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
457 In re Goranson, 183 B.R. 52 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.1995) (income
used for plan payments would not be available at end of plan,
since major portion of payments was for car payments and
other expenses that would continue after the plan).
458 In re Andersen, 179 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999). See also In
re Pardee, 193 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) (creditor bound by
confirmed plan provision discharging postpetition interest
on student loan).
459 In re Mammel, 221 B.R. 238 (Bankr. D. Iowa 1998); Matter
of Key, 128 B.R. 742 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
460 E.g., In re Evans, 242 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999).
461 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10).
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462 See, e.g., In re Cleveland, 89 B.R. 69 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988)
(decision on dischargeability of HEAL loan cannot be made
until close of chapter 13 plan); In re Raisor, 180 B.R. 163
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995) (dischargeability based upon undue hardship c3:finot be determined until end of plan).
463 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). See § 12.3.1, supra.
464 11 U .S.C. § 1325(b). See § 12.3.3, supra.
465 See In re Owens, 82 B.R. 960 (Bankr.. N.D. IlL 1988) (potentially nondischargeable HEAL loan may be treated like
other unsecured debts during chapter 13); In re Gronski, 65
B.R. 932 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (same).
466 Examples of such cases include: In re Stewart, 109 B.R. 998
(D. Kan. 1990); In re Makarchuk, 76 B.R. 919 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1987). For other reasons, decisions requiring
minimum payments to unsecured creditors beyond those
required by the ability to payor best interest of the creditors
tests are obsolete. See Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.1987); In re Owens, 82 B.R. 960
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998). See generally § 12.3, supra.
467 Some courts have held, however, that a nondischargeable
student loan debt continues to accrue interest during the
life of the plan. See note 410, supra.
468 See generally § 12.4, supra.

The Discharge: Protecting It and Using It
law eliminated many of the advantages of the
cr 13 option. Code section 1328(a)(2) now incorcs section 523( a )(R) by reference so that student
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.\Iso nondischargeable in chapter 13.
:vcrtheless, student loan issues continue to arise in
ter 13 cases that are filed for other reasons. Addilily, in some cases a chapter 13 plan may still proadvantages during the term of the plan, even if the
is ultimately nondischargeable.
iven that amended section 1328(a) simply incorpos section 523(a)(8), issues of dischargeability of stut loans· in chapter 13 cases should be treated almost
ltically to those arising in chapter 7 cases. For example
court addressing dischargeability in chapter 13 deterted undue hardship just as if the case had proceeded
Ier chapter 7. 456 The mere fact that the debtor can
Jrd chapter 13 plan payments should not be dispositive
:he ability to pay a student loan. 457 In many cases those
{Illents go almost entirely to secured creditors to en~ure
.ebtor continued shelter, transportation to work or other
cessities, or are made at great sacrifices that cannot be
stained beyond the plan period.
As in chapter 7, the debtor must affirmatively request a
Iding of undue hardship for the debt to be found dislargeable during the bankruptcy case. Although a plan
rovision might provide that. confirmation of the plan will
Jnstitute a finding that undue hardship exists,458 such
rovisions will probably be disfavored if a party objects.459
\. few courts have even sanctioned counsel for placing
uch provisions in plans,46o although such decisions are
:ontrary to both the concept of the chapter 13 plan as a
>roposal by the debtor which can include any provision not
;ontrary to title 11 461 and the case law which has held that
iuch provisions can be approved and binding. As discussed
above, the procedure used in most cases for resolving
questions related to dischargeability in bankruptcy is the
one set out in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007 which provides for an
adversary proceeding.
Since most chapter 13 cases continue for the three (or
five) year length of the plan and because the nondischargeability of student loans can be raised at any time,
careful considerations of timing should be brought to
456 In re Evans, 131 B.R. 372 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
457 In re Goranson, 183 B.R.52 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.1995)(income
used for plan payments would not be available at end of plan,
since major portion of payments was for car payments and
other expenses that would continue after the plan).
458 In re Andersen, 179 F.3d 1253 (10th eire 1999). See also In
re Pardee, 193 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) (credi-tor bound by
confirmed plan provision discharging postpetition interest
on student loan).
459 In re Mammel, 221 B.R. 238 (Bankr. D.lowa 1998); Matter
of Key, 128 B.R. 742 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
460 E.g., In re Evans, 242 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999).
461 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10).
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bear in order to ensure that the issues arc heard when
the debtor faces maximum financial pressures. However, some courts may take the position that no determination on dischargcability can be made until the end
of the case. 462
In a few districts, the chapter 13 standing trustee has
taken the position that nondischargeablc student loan
debts must be fully paid in a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.
That position is incorrect. Even if a student loan is not
dischargeable, it nevertheless remains an unsecured
claim during the bankruptcy case (unless the creditor
holds a nonavoidedjudgment lien), subject to those provisions of the Code applicable to unsecured debts.
For most cases, this means that during the bankruptcy
plan, the student loan creditor is entitled to the greater
of what it would receive under the best interests of the
creditors test 463 or the ability to pay test 464 just like any
other unsecured creditor. 465 Certainly, any arguments
that a case must be dismissed because the debtor's filing
was made in bad faith merely in order to improperly
discharge student loans should be put to rest. 466
Thus, the debtor can propose treatment of a student
loan creditor during a bankruptcy plan that is no different than treatment of any other unsecured creditor. 467
The student loan creditor will not be entitled to additional regular payments outside the plan prior to the
debtor's discharge.
However, if the student loan is nondischargeable, it is
in the debtor's interest to make sure that as much of the
loan as possible is paid during the bankruptcy. Frequently this means that the debtor wishes to propose a
plan to separately classify the student loan and have it
paid at a higher percentage than other unsecured
debts. 468 Several judicial decisions have explicitly held
that a separate classification in favor of a student loan
462 See, e.g., In re Cleveland, 89 B.R. 69 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988)
(decision on dischargeability of HEAL loan cannot be made
until close of chapter 13 plan); In re Raisor, 180 B.R. 163
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995) (dischargeability based upon un;.
due hardship c~nnot be determined until end of plan).
463 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). See § 12.3.1, supra.
464 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). See § 12.3.3, supra.
465 See In re Owens, 82 B.R. 960 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (potentially nondischargeable HEAL loan may be treated like
other unsecured debts during chapter 13); In re Gronski, 65
B.R. 932 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (same).
466 Examples of such cases include: In re Stewart, 109 B.R. 998
(D. Kan. 1990); In re Makarchuk, 76 B.R. 919 (Banke.
N.D.N.Y. 1987). For other reasons, decisions requiring
minimum payments to unsecured creditors beyond those
required by the ability to payor best interest of the creditors
tests are obsolete. See Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Owens, 82 B.R. 960
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998). See generally § 12.3, supra.
467 Some courts have held, however, that a nondischargeable
student loan debt continues to accrue interest during the
life of the plan. See note 410, supra.
468 See generally § 12.4, supra.
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creditor does not Hdiscriminate unfairly" within the
nleaning of II U.S.C. § 1322(b)( 1).4()<) At least one court
has held that there is a reasonable basis for the separate
classification hoth because the debt is nondischargeable
and hecause absent payment the debtor may be unable
to return to school to obtain a degree. 47o And even if
separate classification is not permitted, the debtor has
the absolute right to provide in the plan for a cure of all
defaulted payments and maintenance of current payments under Code section 1322(b)(5) if the loan's last
payment is after the plan's last payment. 471

14.4.3.8.5 Health education assistance loans and other
special loan programs
Congress created an additional student loan exception
to discharge for certain student loans in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. Section 292f(g) of title 42,
U.S. Code 472 provides that no bankruptcy discharge may
be granted as to a Health Education Assistance Loan
("HEAL") within seven years after the date repayment is
to begin. During this seven year period no hardship discharge is available for such loans. 473 Even after the seven
years, the loan is dischargeable only if the bankruptcy
court finds that denial of a discharge would be unconscionable. 474 This nondischargeability provision has been held
to apply in chapter 13 as well as in chapter 7. 475 Because
the provision contains language making discharge available after seven years based on unconscionability, a discharge should be possible in a chapter 13 -case that is filed
within seven years of the first repayment due date, if the
discharge is not entered until after the seven-year period

has cxpired:Ph Several courts have held that in the context
of a chapter 13 plan, the student loan creditor can be
treated like other unsecured creditors and that a determination as to discharge can only be nladc at the conclusion
of the plan. 477 Moreover, based on the language of section
523(b), HEAL loans may be dischargeable in a second
bankruptcy filing under the more lenient standards of section 523(a) if the prior case resulted in a discharge.-·nx
As with section 523(a)(8), the provision making
HEAL debts nondischargeable is self-executing. The
burden is on the debtor to request and establish grounds
for a court to find the loan dischargeablc. 479 Courts have
held that nondischarge of the loan would he unconscionable if it was "excessive, exorbitant," "lying outside the
limits of what is reasonable or acceptable," "shockingly
unfair, harsh, or unjust" or "outrageous."4XO
Several other health education programs have similar
provisions which make debts arising in those programs
nondischargeable.48I Generally the operation of these
provisions is similar to that of the HEAL provisions.

469 In re Cox, 186 B.R. 744 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1995); In re Boggan,
125 B.R. 533 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1991); In re Freshley, 69 B.R. 96
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987). Similarly, separate classification of
nondischargeable debts for support arrearages have been allowed. E.g., In re Leser, 939 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1991); In re
Storberg, 94 B.R. 144 (Banke. D. Minn. 1988); In re Davidson,
72 B.R. 384 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987). But see In re Groves, 39
F.3d 212 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming bankruptcy court's refusal
to permit separate classification).
470 In re Freshley, 69 B.R. 96 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987). See also
§ 12.4, supra for additional discussion of classification of
claims.
471 In re Chandler, 210 B.R. 898 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1997); In re
Sullivan, 195 B.R. 649 (Bankr. W.O. Tex. 1996); In re Benner, 156 B.R. 631 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
472 This section replaces the former applicable provision, 42
U.S.C. § 294f(g).
473 In re Hampton, 47 B.R. 47 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985). However, for bankruptcy cases commenced prior to the statute's
amendment changing the five-year nondischargeability period to seven years, the five-year period is still applicable. In
re Barrows, 159 B.R. 86 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993).
474 42 U.S.C. § 292f(g).
475 Matter of Johnson, 787 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1986).
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476 In re Nelson, 183 B.R. 972 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (also
holding that under § 292f(g), the time period was not tolled'
during forbearance periods).
477 United States v. Lee, 89 B.R. 250 (N.D. Ga. 1987), affd, 853
F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1988) (debt is conditionally dischargeable
during pendency of chapter 13 plan); In re Cleveland, 89 B.R.
69 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (upon completion ofchapter 13 plan,
issue would be whether nondischarge of loan would be unconscionable); In re Battrell, 105 B.R. 65 (Bankr. D. Or. 1989); In
re Owens, 82 B.R. 960 (Bankr.- N.D. Ill. 1988). See also In re
Gronski, 65 B.R. 932 (Banke. E.D. Pa. 1986).
478 In re Tanski, 195 B.R. 408 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1996).
479 United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580 (7th Cir. 1991). See
also United States v. Erkard, 200 B.R. 152 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(United States, as guarantor of HEAL obligation must be
made a party to dischargeability proceeding).
480 In re Rice, 78 F.3d 1144 (6th Cir. 1996) (nondischarge of
HEAL obligation not unconscionable when debtor and his
wife had $60,000 income and payment would not reduce
family's income to anything close to poverty level); Matthews v. Pineo, 19 F.3d 121 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
820, 115 S. Ct. 82 (1994) (nondischarge not unconscionable
when debtor chose to move to a small town and earn less
than she could elsewhere as physician, rather than fulfill
requirement of service in medically underserved area); In
re Malloy, 155 B.R. 940 (E.D. Va. 1993) (nondischarge not
unconscionable in case of debtor who was healthy, college
educated and steadily employed); In re Nelson, 183 B.R.
972 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (nondischarge would be unconscionable based on debtor's psychological and emotional
health); Kline v. United States, 155 B.R. 762 (Bankr. \V.D.
Mo. 1993) (nondischarge would be unconscionable in view
of debtor's chronic depression, anxiety and panic disorder).
481 In re Brown, 79 B.R. 789 (Banke. N.D. IlL 1987) (National
Health Services Corp. Scholarship Program..:.-.42 U.S.C.
§ 2540(d». See also 37 U.S.C. § 302g(e) (pertaining to refund
obligations of military reselVist physicians who receive special
pay and who terminate their selVice early). Unlike HEAL
loans, these provisions have not been amended to change the
five year absolute bar on discharge to seven years.
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14.4.3.8.1 Student loan dischargeability tests

14.4.3.8.1.1 Former seven year test
to notes 417, 418.

417
418

. Page 368
Addition to note 429.

Add to text immediately
before signal for note 430:
Addition to note 430.

Add to text at end of sentence
containing note 430:

14.4.3.8.1.2 Undue hardship test
429

But see In re Crowley, 259 B.R. 361 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (8th Circuit uses more flexible totality of
circumstances test).

Generally speaking, debtors with incomes lower than $25,000 are found to be at a minimal
standard of living.
430

See also In re Cline, 248 B.R. 347 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2(00) (single woman in good health who earned $25,000
and is unlikely to earn more granted discharge); In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1998) (discharge
granted to childless couple with income of $20,976); In re Nary, 253 B.R. 752 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (income
of $48,000 for family of five, though 2.2 times poverty standard, would justify discharge based on family
expenses if it could not be increased); In re Coulson, 253 B.R. 174 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (mother and two
children with income of $23,975 could not repay loans); In re Ivory, 269 B.R. 890 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001)
(citing studies showing that income far higher than poverty level is needed for lninimal standard of living).;
In re Turretto, 255 B.R. 884 (Banke. N.D. Cal. 2000) (debtor with one child in her care could not repay
loans with income of over $25,000).

, but debtors need not be at the poverty level to demonstrate undue hardship. Most debtors
who have been denied an undue hardship discharge had incomes several times greater than
the poverty level. 430.1
430.1

Add to text after sentence
containing note 432:

The official and Lawyers' Edition citations for denial of certiorari in the Hiatt case are 513 U.S. 1154, 130
L. Ed. 2d 1074.
The official and Lawyers' Edition citations for denial of certiorari in In re Woodcock are 516 U.S. 828,
133 L. Ed. 2d 52.

E.g., In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993) (court found debtor could earn over $30,000).

Debtors who do not demonstrate that they are not likely to earn significantly more in the
future are often denied discharge of their loans. 432 . 1
432.1

E.g., Goulet v. Educational Credit Management Corp., 284 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2002) (record devoid of
evidence that debtor's problems with alcoholism and a felony conviction prevented debtor from being
gainfully employed); In re Rifino, 245 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2001) (debtor had Masters degree and was
already earning over $27,000 with additional increases likely); In re Brightful, 267 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2001)
(debtor who did not introduce evidence showing why she could not use her skills as legal secretary to earn
more income denied discharge of loan).

Addition to notes 433, 439,
441. 443.

433

Page 369

439
441

In re Brown, 239 B.R. 204, 209 (S.D. Cal. 1999) and cases cite therein; In re Ivory, 269 B.R. 890 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 2001) (no bad faith when debtor never had ability to repay loan); In re Turretto, 255 B.R. 884
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2000).
In re Saxman, 263 B.R. 342 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (partial discharge).
In re Pincus, 280 B.R. 303 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (n<? language in § 523(a)(8) permits granting of partial
discharge).
In re Wallace, 259 B.R. 170 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (remand for further proceedings on impact of ICRP; debtor's
lack of diligence in pursing payment plans, even those presented for first time during discharge
proceedings, may prove lack of good faith effort to repay the loans).

443

Page 370
Add to text following
sentence containing note 444:

Other courts have recognized that placing a debtor in a twenty-five-year repayment plan that
is not likely to payoff, or sometimes even reduce, the loan does not mitigate the undue
hardship the loan would cause. 444. 1 Payments must be made if the debtor's income is even
slightly above poverty level,. which still does not afford a minimal standard of living. 444.2 The
income contingent repayment plan actually allows the loan balance to go up, with capitalization of some interest and does not prevent the discharge of a remaining balance after
twenty-five years from being deemed taxable income to the debtor. 444.3
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444.1
444.2

444.3

In re Long, 271 B.R.3i2 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002).
See n.430, supra. See also In re Ford, 269 B.R. 673 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001) (availability of ICRP is merely
one factor considered in totality of circumstances test and not detenninative in case where ICRP would
result in 62-year-old woman with arthritic condition carrying large and increasing debt that would not be
forgiven until she was 87 years old).
See 34 C.ER § 685.209(c) (5); National Consumer Law Center, Student Loan Law § 8.2.2.6 (2d ed. 2002
and Supp.)

14.4.3.8.2 Procedure for dischargeability determination
4ddition to notes 447, 450,
451.

447
450
451

Add to text at the end of
subsection:

A few courts have read section 523(a)(8) to provide that a student loan is not dischargeable
unless a court has determined that it is dischargeable. 453 .1 While, as a practical matter, student
loan creditors will continue collection efforts absent such a determination, the language of
section 523(a)(8) clearly provides that a loan is dischargeable if it meets the undue hardship
test; it does not provide the loan is nondischargeable until a court finds otherwise. Like tax
debts, student loans are either discharged or not discharged depending solely upon whether
they fit the description in section 523(a).453.2 Unlike the dischargeability provisions listed in
section 523(c), there is no requirement that a proceeding be brought before the bankruptcy
case is concluded.
453.1
453.2

Page 371
Addition to note 458.

Add note 461.1 after the
word ((any tilne" in sentence
before sentence containing
note 462.

The official citationfor denial of certiorari in In re Innes is: 529 U.S. 1037. Add: See also In re Lees, 264
B.R. 884 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (student loan agency was not arm of state entitled to immunity).
Standifer v.. Alaska, 3 P.3d 925 (Alaska 2000) (debtor could move to vacate postbankruptcy default
judgment on student loan to obtain determination of undue hardship dischargeability).
See In re Kapsin, 265 B.R. 778 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (refusing to reopen case to consider changed
circumstances alleged to cause undue hardship).

See, e.g., In re Janc, 251 B.R. 525 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 2000) (erroneously holding that discharge of student
loan not effective unless and until a court has determined undue hardship exists).
See Collier on Bankruptcy <1 4007.03.

14.4.3.8.4 Special issues regarding student loans in chapter 13
458

But see Banks v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp., 299 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2002) (confirmed plan providing for
discharge of postpetition interest violated student loan creditor's due process rights when creditor not
served with adversary complaint and summons).

461.1

In re Ekenasi, 271 B.R. 256 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (debtor need not wait until end of chapter 13 plan to bring
dischargeability proceeding).

471

Add at end ofnote: But see In re Labib-Kiyarash, 271 B.R. 189 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (use of § 1322(b)(5)
subject to debtor showing that classification is fair under § 1322(b)(1»; In re Thibodeau, 248 B.R. 699
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2000).

Page 372
Addition to note 471.

14.4.3.8.5 Health education assistance loans and other special loan programs
Addition to note 480.

Page 373

480

See also In re Ascue, 268 B.R. 739 (Banke. W.O. Va. 2001) (partial discharge, eliminating $300,000 in
interest on National Health Service Corps loan for debtor whose earnings were limited).

14.4.3.9 Debts Incurred Through Drunk Driving-It U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)

Add note 483.1 to end of
sentence following sentence
containing note 483.

483.1

Addition to notes 488, 489.

488

See In re Longhenry, 246 B.R. 234 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (loss of consortium is a personal injury).

See also In re Bames, 266 B.R. 397 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001) (discussing admissible evidence of intoxication).
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ISSUES UNDER BANKRUPTCY MEANS TESTING

I.

POWERPOINT PRESENTATION .....................•............... G-l

II.

SAMPLE APPLICATION OF § 707(b)(2) MEANS TEST •.•..•..•........ G-ll

SECTIONG

The H.R. 975 Means Test:
Impact on Consumer Bankruptcy
1.

Goal

2.

Mechanism
Actual effect

3.

I.The Goal of the Means Test
"[If] repayment is possible by an individual
... then he or she will be channeled into
chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code which
requires people to repay a portion of their debt
as a precondition for limited debt cancellation.
The bill does this by providing a means test to
steer filers who can repay a portion of their
debts away from chapter 7 bankruptcy."
Remarks of Senator Charles Grassley,
initiating floor debate on S. 420 (3/5/01).

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

Fits into a new § 707(b) of the Code
Employs a 3-step abuse presumption
Limits rebuttal of presumption
Creates new duties for debtors' counsel
and case trustees

Fits into a new § 707(b) of the Code
(grounds for dismissal of a Chapter 7
case)

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

Standing under the New §707(b)
Debtor's income Debtor's income
at or below
greater than
applicable median applicable median

Fits into a new § 707(b) of the Code
"Abuse," not "substantial abuse"
Bad faith and "totality of circumstances" stated as grounds of abuse

General grounds: Judges, U.S.
All parties in
bad faith, totality Trustee only (like interest
of circumstances current law)
The means-test
presumption of
abuse

General standing if debtor's income is
above the median

G-1

Nobody at all

All parties in
interest

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

Fits into a new § 707(b) of the Code

Fits into a new § 707(b) of the Code

"Abuse," not "substantial abuse"

Employs a 3-step abuse presumption

Bad faith and "totality of circumstances" stated as grounds of abuse

Limits rebuttal of presumption
Creates new duties for debtors' counsel
and case trustees

General standing if debtor's income is
above the median
Option of conversion to Chapter 13

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The means test is designed to create a
presumption that a Chapter 7 case is an
abuse wherever the debtor appears to have
sufficient income to pay substantial
amounts of general unsecured debt. To
determine whether the presumption applies,
three steps are required.

The 3 steps:
1. Calculate "current monthly income"
2. Subtract allowed deductions
3. Compare result to trigger points

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test
The 3 steps:

The 3 steps:

1. Calculate "current monthly income"
Debtor's 6-month average income

1. Calculate "current monthly income"
NOT the debtor's current income

But what 6 months?

G-2

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test
The 3 steps:
1. Calculate "current monthly income"
Debtor's 6-month average income
If the debtor files a "schedule of
current income"The 6 calendar months preceding filing

The 3 steps:
1. Calculate "current monthly income"
Debtor's 6-month average income
Without filing a "schedule of current
income"- "the 6-month period
ending on the date on which current
income is determined by the court"

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The 3 steps:
1. Calculate "current monthly income"
Debtor's 6-month average income

The 3 steps:
1. Calculate "current monthly income"
Debtor's 6-month average income
+ regular contributions to expenses
- Social Security benefits
- victim payments (war crimes,
international or domestic terrorism)

+ regular contributions to expenses
- Social Security benefits
- victim payments
= "current monthly income"

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)
National (food, clothing, personal)
Local (housing and transportation)
only a cap on actual expenses?

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)
National (food, clothing, personal)
an absolute allowance
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2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
• Living expenses (IRS standards)
• National (food, clothing, personal)
• Local (housing and transportation)
"amounts specified under the ...
Local Standards"

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
• Living expenses (IRS standards)
• National (food, clothing, personal)
Local (housing and transportation)
Other Necessary (misc. expenses)
actual expenses, not Hreasonable"

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
• Living expenses (IRS standards)
• National (food, clothing, personal)
Local (housing and transportation)
Other Necessary (misc. expenses)
but only in specified categories

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
• Living expenses (IRS standards)
• National (food, clothing, personal)
• Local (housing and transportation)
Other Necessary (misc. expenses)
•

Adjustments: + 5% food/clothing

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)

•

•

•

National (food, clothing, personal)
Local (housing and transportation)
Other Necessary (misc. expenses)
Adjustments: + care of invalids

G-4

National (food, clothing, personal)
Local (housing and transportation)
Other Necessary (misc. expenses)
Adjustments: + heating costs

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The 3 steps:

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)

2. Subtract allowed deductions:
•

Living expenses (IRS standards)
• National (food, clothing, personal)
• Local (housing and transportation)
•
•

•

Other Necessary (misc. expenses)
Adjustments: + domestic violence

National (food, clothing, personal)
Local (housing and transportation)
Other Necessary (misc. expenses)
Adjustments: + kids' education

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)

•

•

National (food, clothing, personal)
Local (housing and transportation)

•

National (food, clothing, personal)
Local (housing and transportation)

Other Necessary (misc. expenses)

Other Necessary (misc. expenses)

Adjustments: $125/kid<18/month

Adjustments: - de~t repayment

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)

The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)
Secured debt (1/60 of 5-yr payments)

Secured debt (1/60 of 5-yr payments)
arreages only ifcritical property

Priority debt (1/60 of 5-yr payments)
Charitable donations (up to 15% gross)
Ch. 13 fees (up to 10% of payments)
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2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test
The 3 steps:
2. Subtract allowed deductions:
Living expenses (IRS standards)
Secured debt (1/60 of5-yr payments)
Priority debt (1/60 of 5-yr payments)
Charitable donations (up to 15% gross)
Ch. 13 fees-counting mortgages?

The 3 steps:
3. Compare result to trigger points:
$166.67 or more, presumed abusive
$100 to $166.66, maybe presumed
abusive- if enough to pay 25% of
general unsecured claims over 5
years (so, claims of$24 - 40,000)

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

The 3 steps:
3. Compare result to trigger points:

Fits into a new § 707(b) of the Code
Employs a 3-step abuse presumption

•

Limits rebuttal of presumption

$166.67 or more, presumed abusive
$100 to $166.66, maybe presumed
abusive
$99.99 or less, not presumed
abusive

Creates new duties for debtors' counsel
and case trustees

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

Limits rebuttal of presumption
Debtor must "itemize each
additional expense or adjustment of
income"

Limits rebuttal of presumption
Debtor must show "special circumstances that justify additional
expenses or adjustments of current
monthly income for which there is
no reasonable alternative."
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2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

Limits rebuttal of presumption
Debtor must "provide documentation for such expense or adjustment
to income and a detailed explanation of the special circumstances
that make such expenses or adjustment to income necessary and
reasonable."

Limits rebuttal of presumption
Debtor must "attest under oath to
the accuracy of any information
provided to demonstrate that
additional expenses or adjustments
to income are required."

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

Limits rebuttal of presumption
The additional expenses or adjustments to income must bring the
debtor's income less deductions to
below the applicable trigger point.

Fits into a new § 707(b) of the Code
Employs a 3-step abuse presumption
Limits rebuttal of presumption

Creates new duties for debtors'
counsel and case trustees

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

Creates new duties for debtors' counsel
and case trustees

The debtor "shall include a statement of
the debtor's current monthly income, and
the calculations that determine whether a
presumption arises under [under the
means test, and] that shows how each
such amount is calculated."

G-7

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test
The UST must review all materials submitted by the debtor, and, within 10 days
after the §341 meeting, file a statement with
the court as to whether the debtor's case
raises a presumption of abuse.

The debtor's attorney must certify the
accuracy of the financial information
provided by the debtor, subject to
monetary penalties.

This will be the case trustees' job.

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

If the presumption applies, and if the debtor's
income is at or above the applicable median,
then, within 30 days after filing the presumption statement, the UST must file either a
§707(b) motion or a statement explaining
why such a motion is not being filed.
This will be the case trustees' job.

"[N]ot later than 5 days after receiving a
statement under subparagraph (A), the court
shall provide a copy of the [presumption]
statement to all creditors."

3.The Actual Effect of the Means
Test

2. The Mechanism of
the Means Test

Few cases of presumed abuse under the means test.
New § 707(b) depending more on "totality of
circumstances" than on the means test.
Consumer bankruptcy more expensive for all
participants.
Chapter 7 trustees undercompensated.

No additional compensation for statements.
No additional compensation for unsuccessful
§707(b) motions.
For successful §707(b) motions, payment from
debtor's attorney only if Rule 9011 violation.
Payment from debtor treated only if case
proceeds in Chapter 13 (§ 1224 of Act),
prorated over term of plan.

Greater power and responsibility for U. S. Trustee.
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3.The Actual Effect of the Means
Test
Few cases of presumed abuse under the means test.
New § 707(b) depending more on "totality of
circumstances" than on the means test.
Consumer bankruptcy more expensive for all
participants.
Chapter 7 trustees undercompensated.
Greater power and responsibility for U.S. Trustee.
"Disposable income" in Chapter 13 limited
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Sample Application of § 707(b)(2) Means Test
Hypothetical debtor:
Head of household, annual household income $120,000 ("Current Monthly Income" is $10,000)
married with 2 children, living in Wheaton, Illinois (moderately upscale Chicago suburb)
Assets: $500,000 home
One $35,000 automobile
One $20,000 automobile
Children attend private school

Deductions:

IRS Defined Costs
IRS National Standard (food, clothing,
personal care, entertainment)

$ 1497

5% extra for food and clothing

57

IRS Local Standard housing

1941

IRS Local Standard transportation ownership
costs

756

IRS Local Standard transportation operating
costs

370

Total IRS Defined Costs

$ 4621

IRS Other Necessary Expenses
Child care

500

Taxes (income and property)

3000

Health care

250

Life insurance

250

Total IRS Other Necessary Expenses

4000

Chapter 13 expenses

355

10% of secured debt
payment

200

Children's education
Secured debt (mortgage)

2500

2000

offsets local standard

Secured debt (car loans)

1050

330

offsets local standard

$11506

TOTAL DEDUCTIONS
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I.

Standards for Imposing Sanctions.
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 requires an attorney for a represented party to sign every

paper filed in a bankruptcy case "except a list, schedule, or statement, or amendments
thereto." Bankruptcy Rule 9011(a). The exception has led some courts to question
whether the rule applies to a debtor's counsel when misrepresentations are made in the
debtor's schedules and statement of affairs. 1 But subpart (b) of Rule 9011, as amended in
1997, provides for sanctions not only with respect to documents signed by an attorney,
but also documents he "presents" by "filing" or "later advocating." Bankruptcy Rule
9011(b). Courts have relied on this language to hold counsel accountable for
inaccuracies and misstatements in schedules. 2
The pending Bankruptcy Reform Act and its predecessors over the past few years
have included a "sense of Congress" that Rule 9011 should be amended to require all
documents, including schedules, to be submitted only after the debtor or debtor's attorney
has made a reasonable inquiry to verify the information. 3 That proposed legislation
implies that Rule 9011 does not currently empower the court to sanction the debtor's
counsel for misleading schedules. 4 To the extent Rule 9011 is inapplicable, however,
some courts have employed their "catch all" powers under Bankruptcy Code § 105 and
inherent authority of the court to sanction misconduct, including with respect to

I See In re Ostas, 158 B.R. 312, 319 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Palumbo Family Ltd. Partnership,
182 B.R. 447, 475-76 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); In re Engel, 246 B.R. 734, 788-89 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa.2000).
2 See In re Kelley, 255 B.R. 783 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2000)
3 S.420 § 319; H.R. 333 § 319, as passed by the Senate and House of Representatives.
4 Kelley, 255 B.R. at 786.
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bankruptcy schedules. 5
The standards for imposition of sanctions are different under Bankruptcy Rule
9011 and under Code § 105. Rule 9011 provides that all documents within its scope
require the lawyer's certification of proper purpose, warranted by law or a non-frivolous
argument for extension or reversal of the law, and evidentiary factual support.
Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b).6 Sanctions accordingly require only a showing of objectively
unreasonable conduct, or alternatively, a subjective determination of an improper
purpose. 7
In contrast, sanctions may be imposed under the inherent power of the court and
Code § 105 only upon a finding of "bad faith.,,8 This concept "contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will,,,9 or a "defiling of the very
temple ofjustice."IO

See In re Rimsa!, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1048 (7 th Cir. 2000)(affirming sanction under § 105
and Rule 9011); In re Bryson, 131 F.3d 601, 603 (7 th Cir. 1997)(§ 105 permits punishment of
conduct Rule 9011 cannot reach); In re Rainbow Magazine, 77 F.3d 278, 284-85 (9 th Cir.
1996)(same); In re Clark, 223 F.3d 859, 864 (8 th Cir. 2000); Engel, 246 B.R. at 789; Kelley, 255
B.R. at 786;
6 If specifically identified, a factual contention may be designated as likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery and a denial be
reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b)(3), (4).
7 In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 661-62 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 2000)(extensive citations); In re
Mahendra, 131 F.3d 750, 759 (8 th Cir. 1997) (objective detennination of whether a party's
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances); In re Marsch, 36 F.3d 825, 830 (9 th Cir.
1994)(consider frivolousness and improper purpose on a sliding scale; the more compelling the
showing as to one element, the less decisive need to show the other); Singer Furniture Acquisition
Corp. v. SSMC, Inc., 254 B.R. 46,59 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (need only show one of three alternatives:
legally baseless, factually baseless, or improper purpose).
8 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,44,111 S.Ct. 2123, 2135 (1991). The finding need
not be set forth explicitly in those "magic words", however. In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039,
1047 (7 th Cir. 2000).
th
9 Engel, 246 B.R. at 790, quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 139 (6 ed. 1990).
th
10 Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 722 (5 Cir. 1999); In re Smyth, 242 B.R. 352, 360-61
(W.D. Tex. ,1999)(standard met by lie to court).
5
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There are other sources for sanctions authority as well. Bankruptcy Rule 7037
sanctions failure to cooperate in discovery, and Bankruptcy Rule 7016 sanctions failure
to comply with court scheduling and pretrial orders or cooperate in discovery and pretrial
practice. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 also prohibits unreasonable and vexatious litigation. I I
Incompetent representation, not complying with the Bankruptcy Code and Rules, may
also be sanctioned through denial of court approval of employment. 12 Obnoxious and
abusive behavior toward opposing counsel, parties or the judge may likewise be
sanctioned under Rule 9011 and the court's inherent authority. 13 The federal bankruptcy
court must apply federal sanctions laws, however, not state counterparts. I4

II.

Ethical Obligations of Counsel for a Debtor Filing Documents.
Ethics rules are in accord with Rule 9011. 15 Ethically and legally, counsel can

only advise the debtor, who makes the decisions. I6 But counsel exerts some or even

See In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985)(discussing Rule 9011 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
In re Seeburg Products Corp., 215 B.R. 175 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997).
th
13 In re First City Bancorporation of Texas, Inc., 282 F.3d 864, 867 (5 Cir. 2002); In re 60
th
East 80 Street Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2000) (bad faith and vexatiousness are
evident from disparaging and unsubstantiated allegations impugning integrity ofjudge and
trustee); In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 519, 523 (D.D.C. 1999) (vituperative sanctions motion).
th
14 In re Larry's Apartment, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 837-38 (9 Cir. 2001).
15 See Model Rule 3.1 (lawyer shall not bring or defend any action or assert or controvert an
issue without non-frivolous basis for doing so including good faith argument for any position
contrary to existing law); Model Rule 3.2 (make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent
with client interests); Model Rule 3.3 (lawyer shall not knowingly make false statement of material
fact or law, fail to disclose material fact except as required by law, or fail to disclose legal authority
in controlling jurisdiction); Model Rule 3.4 (lawyer shall not willfully obstruct another party's
access to evidence; make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent efforts to
comply with proper discovery, allude to irrelevant material at trial, or obstruct others from giving
relevant information to another party in most cases).
16Model Rule 1.2(a)("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation...."); Model Rule 1.4(b)("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. tt); Model
Rule 1.13(a)("A lawyer employed or retained by an' organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents."); Bankruptcy Rule 9001(5). Hansen, Jones & Leta P.C.
v. Segal, 220 B.R. 434 (D. Utah 1998); In re Rivers, 167 B.R. 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994)(attomey
may not make decisions for client, even if DIP is incompetent); see In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R.
11

12
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considerable influence on bankruptcy strategy. I? Counsel can and should develop "client
control" through advising the client on the parameters of available alternatives and
remedies, and not allowing a client to dictate activity in a case inconsistent with legal
.. requirements. IS Lawyers can and must take care to assure that representations to the
court are accurate. 19
Vigorous advocacy is ethical and appropriate in bankruptcy as in other cases, as
long as it meets Rule 11 standards with a good faith basis for the facts and law asserted
on positions taken for reasons other than harassment or delay. In Chapter 11 cases, good
faith turns in part on whether reorganization is still possible. 2o Thus, acquiescing in and
carrying out a client's "scorched earth" strategy or otherwise assisting insiders in actions
detrimental to the estate and creditors, if it is shown that counsel knows reorganization is
hopeless, likely would not meet the good faith standards of ethics and Bankruptcy Rule
9011. 21 Pursuing a plan that benefits insiders, at the considerable expense of the annslength creditors, may also exceed the boundaries of good faith in some circumstances,

925 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992)(incumbent on DIP counsel to advise other DIP professionals of their
resronsibilities under Code and disclosures necessary to fulfill those responsibilities).
7In re SIDCO, Inc., 173 B.R. 194 (E.D. Cal. 1994); In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D.N.I.
1995); In re Whitney Place Partners, 147 B.R. 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); In re Stamford Color
Photo, Inc., 98 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re Nephi Rubber Products Corp., 120 B.R. 477
(Bankr. N.D. TIL 1990).
18 In re Berg, 268 B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2001).
19 In re Dreiling, 233 B.R. 848 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999)(lawyer is officer of the court, and
statements to the court are virtually made under oath).
20See Matter of Little Creek Development Co., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1986).
21 See FE&B v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215 (3d Cir. 1995); In re JLM, Inc., 210
B.R. 19 (2d Cir. BAP 1997); In re Marathon Home Loans, 101 B.R. 216,222 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
1989)(counsel for trustee wrongfully carrying out "scorched earth attrition" policy in Chapter 7
case; sanctions awarded under Rule 9011 even though each document objectively reasonable and
not frivolous).
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and be considered DIP self-dealing. 22 Acquiescing in DIP management self-dealing,23
without any attempt at counseling and without full disclosure to the court and creditors of
insider involvement in (and benefit from) transactions, is a breach of DIP counsel's
duties. 24 Advocating a sale agreement with a "no shop" clause instead of seeking or
entertaining other offers to maximize the estate's value, especially if the clause is not
disclosed, violates fiduciary duties. 25
A thorough analysis of the legal theories underpinning -- and delimiting -- the
fiduciary duties of DIP counsel is found in Hansen, Jones & Leta, p.e. v. Sega1. 26 The
court explains that DIP counsel's client is the DIP, not the "estate," and identifies the
duties counsel owes to the DIP and to the court. The court further explains why DIP
counsel does not owe duties to the DIP client's beneficiaries, the equity holders and
creditors who have conflicting interests. The court holds that estate interests are
protected when the court focuses on whether DIP counsel breached counsel's fiduciary

22In re Humble Place Joint Venture, 936 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Kendavis Industries
International, Inc., 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Downtown Investment Club ill,
89 B.R. 59 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1988); In re Global International Airways Corp., 82 B.R. 520 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Golden Recipe Chicken, Inc., 109 B.R. 692 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990)(DIP's
counsel, using estate assets, secured release of shareholder's personal liability); In reRusty Jones,
Inc., 134 B.R. 321 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 1991); In re Bonneville Pacific Corp., 147 B.R. 803 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1992) rev'd. in part Hansen, Jones & Leta P.C. v. Segal, 220 B.R. 434 (D. Utah 1998).
23 A DIP's attorney or other agent also may not purchase or self-deal in estate assets, even at a fair
price. 18 U.S.C. § 154; In re Lowry Graphics, Inc., 86 B.R. 74 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); In re
Q.P.S., Inc., 99 B.R. 843 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989)(DIP's accountant prohibited from buying estate
car); In re Exennium, 23 B.R. 782 (9th Cir. BAP 1982), rev'd. on other grounds 715 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1993)(former DIP counsel barred from purchasing lease from trustee after conversion).
24In re JLM, Inc., 210 B.R. 19 (2d Cir. BAP 1997)(explaining findings needed to justify fee
denial on basis that services were not reasonably likely to benefit estate); In re Cent. Florida Metal
Fabrication, Inc., 207 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997); In re Wilde Horse Enterprises, Inc., 136
B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); See In re Seeburg Products Corp., 215 B.R. 175 (Bankr. N.D. nl.
1997)(attorney incompetently handled questionable chapter 11 case).
25In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 233 B.R. 768 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1999)
26
220 B.R. 434 (D. Utah 1998).
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duty to the client DIP, violated Code obligations or failed to provide services that benefit
the estate (instead of insiders). The rights and powers vested in creditors and other
parties in interest provide further protection. Another excellent analysis of DIP and DIP
counsel fiduciary duties is set forth in In re Water's Edge Ltd. Partnership.27

III.

Sanctionable Filings in Bankruptcy Cases
A.

Serial Cases

Courts allover the country have found multiple filings to frustrate secured
creditor foreclosure efforts to be sanctionable by order~ prohibiting additional filings by
the same debtor or a related debtor holding the coilateraL 28 Bankruptcy Code § 349(a)
authorized the court to dismiss a bankruptcy case with prejudice, and Code § 109(g)
prohibits individual and family fanner repeat filings within 180 days of a case dismissal
for either willful failure to abide by court orders, or a voluntary dismissal after a stay
relief request. Code § 109(g) underscores Congress' distaste for bad faith serial filings,
and the public policy in favor of sanctions for such abuses. It does not preclude
comparable or more severe relief for debtors falling outside its express provisions. 29 The

27 251 B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000); see also ICM Notes, Ltd. v. Andrews & Kurth,
L.L.P., 278 B.R. 117 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
th
28 See, ~ In re Casse, 198 F.3d 327 (2d Cir. 1999) (4 bankruptcy [chapter 13] dismissed as
void when filed after injunction; extensive citations of cases from all circuits); In re Jolly, 143
B.R. 383 (E.D. Va. 1992), affd. Jolly v. Great Western Bank, 45 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1994) (seven
filings by debtor or related parties over three years to forestall foreclosure; dismissal with
prejudice upheld); Matter of Mitan, 168 B.R. 326 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (five chapter 11 and
13 cases; dismissal with prejudice); Terio v. Great Western Bank, 166 B.R. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd, 52 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1995) (warning that future filings without court permission were
prohibited and could warrant sanctions); In re Stathatos, 163 B.R. 83 (N.D. Tex. 1993)
(injunction of any future filings for 24 months upheld, where debtor filed 3 chapter 13 cases to
hinder evictions).
29 Jolly, 143 B.R. at 386-87.
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Code's broad grant of equitable power in § 105 has also been cited as authority for such
prohibitions on re-filing of bankruptcy cases. 30
Not every serial filing is wrongful. The United States Supreme Court has held a
serial filing of chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases is not categorically foreclosed. 31 The test
for a bad faith filing is "whether a debtor is attempting to unreasonably deter and harass
creditors or attempting to effect a speedy, efficient reorganization on a feasible basis.,,32
It is incumbent on bankruptcy counsel to know the law on bad faith serial filings.
Counsel may be sanctioned along with her client when the bankruptcy case is found to be
a bad faith serial filing. 33 A lawyer is not excused by purportedly not knowing this aspect
of bankruptcy law. 34 The lawyer must "closely inquire and determine the true intent and
honesty ofpurpose of the debtor's new petition and financial capacity to consummate a
plan and overcome the prior reasons for termination of the stay and/or dismissal".35
Counsel should undertake the easy task of checking for previous bankruptcies via Pacer,
instead of simply accepting the client's representations of no previous filings.

B.

Otherwise Legally Unsupportable Cases

Serial cases are not the only ones that may be filed in bad faith. First-time filers,
too, may proceed solely to delay a creditor with no realistic possibility of reorganizing a
debtor under Chapter 11, or file merely to resolve a two-party dispute. Section 707(b) of

E.g. Casse, 198 F.3d at 336-39.
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 2156 (1991).
32 Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828.
33 In re Jones, 41 B.R. 263, 268 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984)(sanctions against attorney who filed six
petitions for sole purpose of delaying secured creditor)
34 See In re Hutton Valley Farms, 251 B.R. 522, 524 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000) (lawyer's claim
that he was not familiar with "new debtor syndrome" cases not a defense to sanctions).
35 In re McFarland, 17 B.R. 242, 245 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); Model Rule 1.2(d).
30

31
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the Code specifically authorizes the court to dismiss petitions by consumer debtors that
are considered a "substantial abuse" of Code provisions. Counsel are ethically obliged
not to file such petitions, and may be sanctioned for doing SO.36

•

The Debtor Cannot Reorganize. A chapter 11 case may be filed by a

corporation whose charter has been revoked. Under state law, the corporation continues
as a "body corporate" only for the limited purpose of winding up its affairs. 37 A revoked
corporation may be a debtor, but it is only eligible for liquidation. 38 The Prism court
analyzed the various decisions addressing bankruptcies of corporations with revoked
charters and the relevant state statutes on rights of dissolved entities. It concluded that
"[t]he Bankruptcy Court is not empowered to continue a corporation's existence through
reorganization as a going concern when state law dictates that it no longer exists... State
law provides, however, that after revocation a corporation may continue to act to preserve
and pursue assets and claims and settle liabilities, and accordingly the Debtor may
liquidate under the Bankruptcy Code, either via a liquidating Chapter 11 plan or under
Chapter 7.,,39 The debtor also may be unable to reorganize as a practical matter, having

36 See In re Maurice, 69 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Lederman Enterprises, Inc., 997 F.2d
1321 (10th Cir. 1993)(counsel fees disallowed for bad'faith chapter 11); In re Coones Ranch, Inc., 7
F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1993)(same); In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 136 B.R. 545, 554 (9th Cir. BAP
1992)(caselaw re sanctions allocated between client and counsel according to their relative
culpability); In re Villa Madrid, 110 B.R. 919 (9th Cir. BAP 1990) (attorney who knew or should
have known petition was being filed in bad faith is liable for sanctions); In re Start the Engines, Inc.,
219 B.R. 264, 271-72 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1998)($10,000 sanctions against attorney and client,jointly
and severally).
37 E.g. Fidelity Metals Corp. v. Risley, 175 P.2d 592, 594 (Cal. App. 1946) (statute is "self
executing law"); Porter v. Tempa Min. & MilL Co., 93 P.2d 741, 745 (Nev. 1939) (upon
revocation, corporation is dead for all purposes except that it has a right for a period of years after
the date of forfeiture of its charter to dispose of its property).
38 In re Prism Properties, Inc., 200 B.R. 43 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996).
39 200 B.R. at 47.
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no employees or operations or likelihood of rehabilitation. 40
Sanctions may be imposed under Rule 9011 on counsel filing a chapter 13 case
when the chapter 13 debtor is ineligible to proceed with his or her plan. 41 The integrity of
the chapter 13 system rests in the first instance with the debtors' bar, and courts expect
them to make responsible judgments about eligibility of debtors before filing chapter 13
petitions, in compliance with Rule 9011. The fact that a chapter 13 debtor is unable to
confirm a plan does not necessarily mean the case was filed or pursued in bad faith,
however, especially if the debtor otherwise complies with all Code requirements. 42

•

Case Filed for Improper Purpose. A chapter 7 case may have no

reasonable basis to proceed, just like a reorganization. The estate may have no assets to
protect, or no need to discharge debts, and be filed merely to serve a non-economic
motive, generally delaying a creditor. 43 A bankruptcy case may be filed simply to forumshop when undesirable results are reached in state court. 44 Or a "new debtor" entity may
be created in to file a bad faith case. 45

•

Solvent Estate. When an estate is solvent, DIP fiduciary duties may

preclude a bankruptcy filing at all. Insolvency and inability to pay debts are not

40 In re Computer Dynamics, Inc., 252 B.R. 50, 61 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); Singer Furniture
Acquisition Corp. v. SSMC Inc. N.V., 254 B.R. 46, 52 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
41 In re Smith, 234 B.R. 852 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1999); see also In re Jones, 41 B.R. 263 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1984).
42 In re McNichols, 258 B.R. 892, 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001).
43 In re Primestone Investment Partners L.P., 272 B.R. 554 (D. Del. 2002) (totality of
circumstances shows patently abusive case); In re Addon Corp., 231 B.R. 385, 389 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1999) (corporate debtor ineligible for discharge, no assets .to protect, seeking only to delay
eviction from terminated lease); In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 657 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 2000); In re
Hutton Valley Farms, 251 B.R. 522 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000) (debtor formed just before filing to
hold land and delay foreclosure).
44 In re Singer Furniture Acquisition Corp., 261 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001); In re
Y.J. Sons & Co., Inc., 212 BR. 793 (D.N.J. 1997).
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prerequisites for bankruptcy relief under the Code. 46 However, bankruptcy cannot be a
mere tactical device for litigation leverage. If a solvent debtor is not suffering any
adverse financial or operational effects, a bankruptcy petition may be deemed filed in bad
faith, under chapter 11 or 7. 47 Even if the filing is proper, a solvent DIP may not use
avoidance powers to obtain a windfall for the equity holders at the expense of the noninsider creditors. 48

c.

Inadequate Schedules

In addition to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 requirements, counsel is obligated both
ethically and as an officer of the court not to file schedules and other disclosure
documents he believes inaccurate. 49 Thus, courts have cautioned that before filing a
petition, schedules, etc., it is incumbent upon counsel to "take all possible steps to assure
himself that the information listed in his client's petition is correct ... inquire as to
amounts owed [secured by any assets] and to explain the requirements of full disclosure
••. •,,50

This means that a lawyer cannot simply accept his client's statement that he does

45 In re Guaranteed Retirement, 112 B.R. 263 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (analyzing standards for
determining when "new debtor" case is inappropriate).
46 In re Stolrow's Inc., 84 B.R. 167, 171 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989).
47 In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Smith, 257 B.R. 344 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 2001); In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 657 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
48 Dunes Hotel Associates v. Hyatt Corp., 245 B.R. 492 (D. S.C. 2000).
49 See § I, supra, regarding applicability of Rule 9011 to counsel with respect to schedules;
Model Rules 1.2, 1.4,8.4; In re Davila, 210 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996). The attorney
likewise must take care not to file a disclosure statement overlooking known assets, or a plan
counsel knows the debtor cannot fund. In re Ligon, 50 B.R. 127, 132 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1985)(sanctions against attorney); In re Jones, 41 B.R. 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984)(same, chapter
13); In re Bonneville Pacific Corp., 147 B.R. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992) rev'd in part, Hansen,
Jones & Leta v. Segal, 220 B.R. 434 (D. Utah 1998)(all fees ordered disgorged where DIP counsel
found to have aided misconduct by insiders, and disclosure statement and plan were wholly
irreconcilable with examiner's report, schedules and monthly reports). Counsel has also been
sanctioned for misrepresentations in a final report, certifying that all administrative claims had been
paid without verifying it. In re Kliegl Bros., 238 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).
50 In re Engel, 246 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2000)(citing 1 NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW & PRACTICE 2d § 27:25 at 27-76 (1998); In re Martinez, 22 B.R. 419, 421 (Bankr. D. N.M.
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not know the value of an asset, but must ask follow-up questions. 51 Concepts such as
"market value" entail legal judgments and the advice of experienced counsel. 52 Counsel
must explain the matter to the extent necessary to pennit the debtor client to make
infonned decisions about the information set forth in the schedules. 53
Even if a lawyer is negligent in initially omitting an asset from schedules, he may
be sanctioned ifhe has subsequent opportunities to review and correct them. 54 The
obligation to correct errors in filed documents is a continuing duty. 55 A supervising
attorney has a specific obligation to correct an assistant's failures, especially since a
material error can support a conviction for bankruptcy fraud. 56 It is also critical that
counsel not participate in deliberately scheduling assets for less than their known market
value, or omitting creditors and claims. 57

1982); In re Stebel, 54 B.R. 199 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985). See In re Cossey, 172 B.R. 597 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1994)(counsel sanctioned for not fully disclosing insurance settlement on schedules). The
lawyer cannot delegate schedule preparation entirely to a paralegal. In re Hessinger & Assoc., 192
B.R. 211 (N.D. Cal. 1996); In re Davila, 210 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996).
51 In re Kelley, 255 B.R. 783, 785 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2000) (lawyer did not ask about value of a
judgment, when a simple inquiry of the state court attorney would have elicited the judgment
amount and the existence of $5,000 held in the attorney's trust account to pay it).
52 In re Engel, 246 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. W.O. Pa. 2000) (citing Associates Commercial Corp.
v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 117 S.Ct. 1879 (1997) on meaning of "value").
53 Engel, 246 B.R. at 791 (citing Model Rule 1.4(b».
54 Engel, 246 B.R. at 790 (lawyer was asked for an opinion letter on impact of bankruptcy on
debtor's ability to transfer unscheduled asset).
55Id.

Engel, 246 B.R. at 784 (citing Model Rule 5. 1(c)(2), 5.3 (c)(2».
Engel, 246 B.R. at 786-87 (belated attempt to schedule asset at negative book value day
before selling for $50,000, and scheduling land at $58,000 despite awareness of$132,000
appraisal); In re Woodward, 229 B.R. 468, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999) (state litigation
scheduled at $50,000 exemption limit, despite knowledge of $100,000 settlement offer); In re
Moix-McNutt, 220 B.R. 631 (E.D. Ark. 1998)(attorney deliberately omitted creditor to conceal
debtor's ineligibility for chapter 13). Knowingly filing false schedules also is criminal. 18 U.S.C.
§ 152; United States v. Webster, 125 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1997)(aiding and abetting false schedules);
United States v. Franklin, 837 F.Supp. 916 (N.D. fil. 1993) (attorney advised client to shield assets
through fake gambling scheme); Coughlan v. United States, 147 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied
325 U.S. 888, reh. denied 326 U.S. 805 (1945)(predecessor statute, concealing property by not
listing or scheduling); Ruby v. United States, 61 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1932), cert. denied 288 U.S. 617
56

57
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The duty to disclose assets on schedules includes disclosure of all potential causes
of action.58 That includes causes of action against the debtor's principals for negligence,
mismanagement, and breach of fiduciary duty, when such a suit would be beneficial for
the estate (albeit not the debtor's insiders).59 Failure to disclose potential fraudulent
transfer claims against insiders may be deemed a fraud on the court. 60
While counsel has an obligation to encourage disclosure, the creditors should not
have to pay more for an incompetent or deceptive debtor who thwarts disclosure, through
shouldering increased counsel fees. 61 Courts have suggested guidelines for counsel
working with debtors on disclosure to resolve this tension:
1.
Explain the requirement of full, complete, accurate and honest disclosure of
all information required of the debtor;
2.
Ask probing and pertinent questions designed to elicit full, complete,
accurate and honest disclosure from the debtor;
3.
Check the debtor's responses in the petition, statements and schedules to be
sure they are internally and externally consistent, and follow up if they are not; check
readily available Pacer information for previous bankruptcies;
4.
Demand of the client full, complete, accurate and honest disclosure of all
information required by the debtor prior to the attorney's signature being placed upon the
document, or before filing the client-signed document;

(1933)(same).
58 Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936 (9 th Cir. 2001)(list all causes of action that accrued prior to
bankruptcy separately; "songrights" insufficient to schedule cause of action for prepetition
royalties); In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 207-09 (5 th Cir. 1999)(non-disclosure may
judically estop estate from pursuing litigation); In re Guttman, 237 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1999); In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1986) (discharge denied unless full disclosure of
fraudulent conveyance and recovery of property before filing).
59Louisiana World Exposition v. FDIC, 858 F.2d 233 (5th eire 1988); In re Microwave Products
of America, Inc., 102 B.R. 666, 674 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989).
60 In re R&R Associates of Hampton, 248 B.R. 1,7-8 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2000).
61 See In re Matthews, 154 B.R. 673 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); In re Huerta, 137 B.R. 356
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Saturley, 131 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991)(diligent and thorough
effort to assist debtor in assembling, presenting and filing required date is part of counsel's job;
expending large sums to test the accuracy and completeness through a title· search is not
appropriate).
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5.
Seek relief from the court of the client representation in the event that the
attorney learns he has been misled by the client. 62
The debtor's counsel should also take heed of objections and motions by creditors, which
may disclose serious problems and concerns with the DIP's operations and
representations to counsel. 63

D.

Compensation and Conflict Disclosures

There are far too many cases in which counsel have claimed to be disinterested
when seeking court approval of employment as DIP counsel, without disclosing the ties
of firm members to the debtor, its management, or the creditors. It is not for the DIP or its
counsel to determine unilaterally whether a connection is relevant; the court is to review
all connections and decide whether there are any disqualifying conflicts. 64 Disclosures
must be sufficiently detailed to enable the court to understand the magnitude of the
connections and potential conflicts, and must be strictly accurate. 65 An employment

re Matthews, 154 B.R. at 680 and In re Huerta, 137 B.R. at 379:
re Alderson, 114 B.R. 672, 680 (BankI.. D. S.D. 1990)(duty of DIP counsel to ascertain
andJ?resent debtor's true financial condition).
Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F43d 54 (1st Cir4 1994); In re Hathaway Ranch Partnership, 116 B.R.
208, 219 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990); Matter of Arlan's Department Stores, 615 F.2d 925, 932 (2d Cir.
1979); Halbert v. Yousif, 225 B.R. 336 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
651n re Park-Helena Corp., 63 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 712 (1996)(failure
to provide details of retainer payment; strict compliance with disclosure rules required); In re Cook,
223 B.R. 782 (10th Cir. BAP 1998)(creditor representatIon disclosed, but not contingency fee
agreement); In re LSS Supply, Inc., 247 B.R. 280 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000)(failure to disclose
connections with corporate insiders and control and multiple capacities of insiders with debtor); In
re Filene's Basement, Inc., 239 B.R. 845 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999)(accounting fmn's prior
representation and Chinese Wall disclosed, but not identity ofparties, nature of litigation, or other
facts alerting court of potential problem); In re Filene's Basement, Inc., 239 B.R. 850 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1999)(law firm's description of litigation and extent of attorney-client relationship with
creditor misleading); In re Granite Partners, L.P., 219 B.R. 22 (Bankr. S4D.N.Y. 1998)(extent of
representation and client restrictions not disclosed); In re Southmark Corp., 181 B.R. 291 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1995) (affidavit disclosed fact of prior services for creditor unrelated to debtor but not
type of services or substantial compensation by creditor); In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1995)(description of types of information needed); In re Amdura Corp., 139 B4~ 963
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1992)(disclosure of creditor as client insufficient due to not disclosing magnitude
of relationship); but see In re Missouri Mining, Inc., 186 B.R. 946 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995)
62In

63 In
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application with full disclosure must be made for each professional finn employed;
undisclosed subcontracting is impermissible. 66 Disclosure through the schedules and
statement of affairs, an exhibit to the petition, testimony at the first meeting of creditors,
or monthly operating report entries is inadequate. The court has no duty to search the file
and ferret out infonnation on conflicts. 67
Disclosure is an ongoing responsibility. If potential conflicts arise after the initial
application and disclosure, they should be brought to the court's attention promptly.68
Full disclosure of all aspects of fee arrangements is also required. 69 Even if an
attorney limits her representation to prepetition advice or even petition preparation alone,
a Rule 2016 statement must be filed. 7o The absence of full disclosure of fee payment
arrangements in a chapter 13 case means the client's plan disclosures are likewise
erroneous, impairing the client and creating a conflict. 71 Complete disclosure of

(attorney promptly corrected erroneous disclosures and was not sanctioned); In re CIC Investment
Corp., 175 B.R. 52 (9th Cir. BAP 1994) (court may excuse failure to disclose).
66 In re United Companies Financial Corp., 241 B.R. 521 (Bankr. D.Del. 1999); In re Gulf
Coast Orthopedic Center, 243 B.R. 135 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
67Halbert v. Yousif, 225 B.R. 336, 351 (E.D. Mich. 1998); In re Smitty's Truck Stop, Inc., 210
B.R. 844, 849 (10th Cir. BAP 1997)..
68In re Lewis, 113 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Granite Partners, L.P., 219 B.R. 22
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998}(later-arising facts bearing on disinterestedness and adverse interest); In re
Sauer, 222 B.R 604 (8 th Cir. BAP 1998); In re TJN, Inc., 194 B.R. 400 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1996)(disclose additional compensation received); In re Cropper Company, 35 B.R. 625
(Bankr.M.D. Ga. 1983)(after appointment, DIP began doing business with entity owned in part by
associate in firm of DIP's attorney); In re Wingspread Corp., 152 B.R. 861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993)(postpetition bank merger resulted in DIP counsel suing one subsidiary of bank while
representing another).
69 In re Kisseberth, 273 F.3d 714, 720-21 (6 th Cir. 2001); In re Independent Engineering Co.,
Inc., 197 F.3d 13, 16-17 (1 st Cir. 1999); In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1996); In re ParkHelena Corp., 63 F.3d 877,880-81 (9th Cir. 1995) cert. denieg, 116 S. Ct. 712 (1996)(strict
compliance); In re Pierce, 809 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Arlans Departments Stores, Inc.,
615 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1979).
70 In re Fraga, 210 B.R. 812, 822 (9th Cir. BAP 1997); In re Basham, 208 B.R. 926, 932-33
(9th Cir. BAP 1997).
71 In re Davila, 210 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996); see In Ie Bell, 212 B.R. 654, 657
(Bankr. E.D.Cal. 1997)(fee disclosure important in chapter 13 cases since court does not approve
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prepetition payments "in connection with" and "in contemplation of' bankruptcy must be
disclosed, in addition to disclosure of retainer arrangements.72
Rule 9011 applies to employment applications and affidavits. Thus, attorneys are
obliged to inquire into and analyze the factual and legal elements of every document
signed and filed. 73 A half-hearted inquiry into conflicts among finn members is
inadequate. It is counsel's responsibility to ensure complete disclosure. 74 Special
counsel cannot simply rely on the DIP's primary bankruptcy counsel to handle necessary
filings. 75 Committee counsel may be sanctioned like debtor's counsel for inadequate
disclosures. 76 A secured creditor's counsel may likewise be sanctioned for
misrepresenting fee arrangements when seeking fees as part of a secured claim under
Code § 506(b).77
The most common consequence of non-disinterestedness or inadequate fee
disclosure is fee denial or disgorgement of interim payments, but termination of the

debtor's counsel's employment); see also In re Beesley, 212 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Me.
1997)(sanctioning chapter 7 attorney for charging in excess of written fee agreement).
72 In re Keller Financial Services of Florida, Inc., 248 B.R. 859 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2000)(extensive analysis of § 329). Payments by the debtor's spouse must be disclosed as well.
In re Greco, 246 B.R. 226 (Bankt< E.D. Pa. 2000).
73 In re Pierce, 809 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying Rule 9011 to erroneous application to
employ counsel); In re Dreiling, 233 B.R. 848, 870 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999)(fundamental premise of
our judicial system is that attorneys are officers of the court; when they address a judge it is
virtually made under oath); Model Rule 3.1 and comment.
74 See In re Thrifty Oil Co., 205 B.R. 1009, 1014 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997) (accounting frrm's
conflict check inadequate); In re Perry, 194 B.R. 875 (E.D. Cal. 1996)(trustee's attorney failed to
conflict check purchaser of estate assets -- represented by own frrm); In re Michigan General Corp.,
78 B.R. 479, 482 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)("Unfortunately, the burdens of the Bankruptcy Code are
not met by a white heart. Negligence does not excuse the failure to disclose a possible conflict of
interests. tt).
75 In re Crook, 79 B.R. 475, 478-79 (9th Cir. BAP 1987). On the other hand, general
bankruptcy counsel has been sanctioned for failure to disclose lack of disinterestedness of other
estate professionals. Matter ofCF Holding Corp., 164 B.R. 799, 808 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
76 In re Carlton House of Brockton, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 170, 28 BCD 777 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1996)(creditors' committee counsel suspended from bankruptcy practice for one year due to false
representations of disinterestedness).
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representation is not infrequent, and sanctions have extended to suspension from practice,
disbarment, and even criminal convictions for blatant non-disclosure violations. 78 The
court may disqualify counsel from representing the DIP based upon an objective
standard, evaluating the facts of each case, regardless of the integrity or intent of the
attorney.79 An evidentiary hearing is not required before a court requires disgorgement of
fees on grounds of disqualification.80

E.

Frivolous and Bad Faith Adversary Litigation

In addition to administrative filings, adversary litigation is rife with sanctions
rulings, from frivolous adversary proceeding complaints81 to bad faith objections,82
frivolous motions and appeals,83 and failing to cooperate with discovery requests. 84
Burdensome, unnecessary discovery requests may likewise be deemed sanctionable. 85
And counsel for the debtor all too often acquiesces in his client's request to list all claims

77 In re 1095 Commonwealth Corp., 236 B.R. 530, 534 (D. Mass. 1999).
78See United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7 th Cir. 1999)(criminal conviction affirmed); In
re Gellene, 676 N.Y.S.2d 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)(disbarment); People v. Mills, 923 P.2d 116
(Colo. 1996)(attorney suspended from practice 60 days for failure to disclose and obtain
bankruptcy court approval for attorneys' fees charged and collected).
79In re Roger J. Au & Son, Inc., 65 B.R. 322, 336 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984), affd 64 B.R. 600
(N.D. Ohio 1986)(court does not render a moral judgment on the conduct of the attorneys, but
requires their disqualification); In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 181 (1st Cir. 1987); In re Gray, 64 B.R.
505 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
8°In re Land, 943 F.2d 1265, 1267 (10th Cir. 1991); In re Kendavis Industries International, Inc.,
91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
81 FE & B v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215 (3d Cir. 1995)In re Peoro, 793 F.2d 1048
(9th Cir. 1986); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Excello Press, Inc., 967 F.2d
1109 (7th Cir. 1992)(before pursuing preference action, counsel ordinarily should examine whether
any obvious defenses bar case, but no per se rule).
82 In re Arkansas Communities, Inc., 827 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Edmonds, 110 B.R. 38
(D. Kan. 1989).
th
nd
83 In re 60 East 80 Street Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109 (2 Cir. 2000)(frivolous appeal); In re
Eisen, 14 F.3d 469 (9th Cir. 1994).
84 In re Dubrowsky, 206 B.R. 30 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Bernard, 85 B.R. 864, 865
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
th
85 In re Rimsa!, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039 (7 Cir. 2000) (deposition taken in unproductive and
harassing manner).
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as disputed on the schedules, or file blanket objections to claims, which creditors may not
dispute only because economically infeasible to do so. Strategies designed to make
opponents capitulate because litigation is prohibitively expensive may result in sanctions
against counsel as well as adverse consequences to clients. 86 Irresponsibly drafted and
inflammatory language in pleadings may show their improper, sanctionable purpose. 87
Counsel may also be sanctioned under Rule 9011 for pursuing or agreeing to
reaffirmation agreements without having first ensured that the debtor is informed as to
the legal effects and consequences of the reaffirmation, and verified that the reaffirmation
will not impose an undue hardship. 88

IV.

Reacting to Client Misconduct
What should counsel do when she learns that her client has lied or her client asks

her to lie or otherwise circumvent bankruptcy law restrictions? Rather than carrying out
client directions exceeding good faith boundaries, the debtor's attorney has ethical
obligations to counsel her client with respect to its fiduciary duties. 89 As stated in the
comment to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, "The lawyer is part of a judicial

See In re S1. Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc., 184 B.R. 446, 458 (Bankr. D. V1. 1995), motion for
stay denied, Winthrop, Stimson v. S1. Johnsbury Co., 186 B.R. 53 (D. V1. 1995); In re Fr~nch
Bourekas, Inc., 175 B.R. 517, 522 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), sanctions order, 183 B.R. 695 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Marathon Home Loans, 101 B.R. 216, 222 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989)
(sanctioning harassment in the form of"a procedural war of scorched-earth attrition," even though
each "motion or paper may be objectively reasonable and, thus, not frivolous"). See also In re
Hensley, 249 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2000)(intentinally including language in chapter 13
plans in hope that creditors will fail to object and be bound by res judicata violates counsel's ethical
obligations).
87 In re Computer Dynamics, Inc., 252 B.R. 50,61 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
88 In re Melendez, 235 B.R. 173 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re Vargas, 257 B.R. 157 (Bankr.
D. N.J. 2001).
89CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355, 105 S. C1. 1986, 1994 (1985); Pepper v. Litton, 308
u.S. 295, 306 (1939); In re Perez, 30 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994); Hansen, Jones & Leta P.C. v.
Segal, 220 B.R. 434 (D. Utah 1998); In re JLM, Inc., 210 B.R. 19 (2d Cir. BAP 1997); In re
Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 549 (Bankr. N.D. TIl. 1988).
86
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system charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients
so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights.,,9o
If the operating head of the DIP entity fails to act in compliance with the DIP's
fiduciary responsibilities, the lawyer may have to refer the matter higher up the chain of
command to the chief executive officer or board of directors. The lawyer is to consider
the seriousness of any illegality and its consequences in deciding what to do within the
organization, however, and is to minimize any disruption to the entity and the risk of
revealing information to outsiders. 91 If a lawyer "develops material doubts about whether
a proposed course of action in fact serves the estate's interests, he must seek to persuade
his client to take a different course or, failing that, resign.,,92 DIP counsel may in some
cases be obligat~d to bring the DIP's breaches of fiduciary duty to the attention of the
court.93
Thus, counsel is to urge the DIP to meet its fiduciary duties to creditors, but is to
abide by the client's decisions as long as there is a nonfrivolou8 basis for doing 80. 94 If

90 In re Whitney Place Partners, 123 B.R. 117, 124 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); See also Model Rule
2.1 ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render
candid advice. If); Model Rule 1.2(e)(When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not
pennitted by the Rules ofProfessional Conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client
regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct.").
91Model Rule 1.13.
92In re Perez, 30 F.3d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Berg, 268 B.R. 250, 262 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 2001); In re Start the Engines, Inc., 219 B.R. 264, 271 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1998). In the
terminology of the Model Rules, if a client is insistent on an action that "is clearly a violation of law
and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization," the lawyer may withdraw. Model
Rule 1.13; see also Model Rule 1.16; but see In re SIDCO, Inc., 173 B.R. 194, 196 (E.D. Cal.
1994)(DIP attorney's fiduciary duty is to DIP client, not creditors and shareholders whose interests
may be adverse to DIP).
93In re JLM, Inc., 210 B.R. 19,26 (2d Cir. BAP 1997); In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135 (Bankr.
D.N.I. 1995)(in serious cases such as conversion of estate property, the professionals will
sometimes be obligated to report the debtor's breach to others); Model Rule 1.6 Comment; ABA
Formal Opinion 92-366 (August 8, 1992)(duty of "noisy withdrawal" from representation).
94Model Rules 1.2, 1.13,2.1,3.1.
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the attorney and client disagree, it is not the attorney's prerogative to act on her own as
she believes best for the estate, but rather to refrain from filing bad faith or frivolous
pleadings, and to withdraw if the high standards for withdrawal are met. If the attorney
fails to appropriately counsel the client and carries out an abusive client strategy, her fees
may well be subject to attack-refunds of previously allowed interim payments have
been mandated where the court has found unethical conduct.95
The attorney is to explain legal requirements to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions. 96 But the lawyer may not follow client
instructions if they would operate to defraud,97 and may not knowingly make or affirm a
false statement of material fact or law to others or fail to disclose a material fact
.necessary to avoid defrauding others. 98 A disclosure statement, motion to approve a
settlement or sale, or the like may well entail an evaluation of facts and law for use by
third persons often unrepresented themselves. Counsel is to disclose any limitations on
information used in making the valuation, and not state or imply that the lawyer is
disinterested rather than the advocate of her DIP client. 99
Despite her diligence, an attorney nonetheless may discover that her client has
committed perjury on his schedules and statement of affairs by concealing assets or asset
transfers, or deliberately omitting creditors or misrepresenting important facts. Counsel

95See,~, In re Humble Place Joint Venture, 936 F.2d 814, 819 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Gregory,
214 B.R. 570, 576 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
96 Model Rule 1.4(b).
97 Model Rules 1.2, 8.4.
98 Model Rule 4.1. Disclosure may be prohibited by the obligation to preserve client
confidences set forth in Model Rule 1.6. In that case counsel must withdraw instead of
countenancing an improper course of action. Model Rule 1.16(b). See In re Wilde Horse
Enterprises, Inc., 136 B.R. 830, 840 (Bankr. C.D. CaL 1991).
99

Model Rules 2.3, 4.3 and official comments.
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also may learn that the client has lied in testimony, or misrepresented facts to the attorney
that were the basis of positions taken on his behalf. The attorney must preserve client
confidences, but not to the extent of implicitly sanctioning illegality.l00 Counsel may not
further the illegal purpose, including by suggestions of concealment, nor may counsel
continue assisting in conduct discovered to be criminal or fraudulent. lol The client must
be warned that he may forfeit his discharge, be liable under th~ bankruptcy crimes statute
and criminal perjury statute, and that a trustee will likely be appointed if not already
serving. 102 The client must also be warned that the attorney-client privilege does not
protect criminal plotting or statements made to counsel about it, and that counsel may be
obliged to tum over all books and records. I03
The client should be counseled to rectify the situation as much as possible, such
as by supplemental filings mailed to affected parties. 104 If the client is unwilling to do so,
the attorney must withdraw and, if necessary to remedy the situation or the attorney

100 Model Rules 1.6, 3.3; see United, States v. Cherek, 734 F.2d 1248, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1984)
cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 2016 (1984)(criminalliability under 18 U.S.C. § 152; debtor required to
disclose existence of assets even if debtor's ownership status is questionable); United States v.
Kaldenberg, 429 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1970) cert. denied 400 U.S. 929 (1970)(debtor convicted of
failure to report rentals from estate property).
.
101 Model Rule 1.2. See U.S. v. Goodstein, 883 F.2d 1362, 1371 (7th Cir. 1989)(lawyer guilty of
bankruptcy fraud for role in unauthorized postpetition transfers); U.S. v. Dolan, 120 F.3d 856 (8 th
Cir. 1997)(counsel guilty of bankruptcy fraud, conspiracy, aiding and abetting client's bankruptcy
fraud); U.S. v. Rosen, 130 F.3d 5 (1 st Cir. 1997)(counsel guilty of mail fraud in deceiving
bankruptcy court with undisclosed side deal in connection with estate asset sale).
102 11 U.S.C. § 727; 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 1621; 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I); In re Olson, 916 F.2d 481,
484 (8th Cir. 1990)(denial discharge for failure to disclose interest in asset nominally owned by
spouse and of questionable value on schedules); In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953, 955 (10th Cir.
1990)(denial discharge for failures to disclose assets on schedules); United States v. Ellis, 50 F.3d
519 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 516 U.S. 849 (1995) (conviction for false statement about prior
bankruptcies on petition).
103 Model Rules 1.6(c), 3.3; United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292-93 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 1519 (1986); 11 U.S.C. § 542(e).
104 Model Rule 3.3 Comment; see Model Rule 1.13(b) regarding procedures when the client is an
organization; Bankruptcy Rule 1009.
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cannot withdraw, he may have to reveal the misrepresentations to the court. 105 Counsel
may withdraw or disaffirm any document, which would probably be deemed necessary to
remedy the filing of a misleading document with his signature, such as a disclosure
statement, and perhaps also to remedy the filing of fraudulent schedules and statements of
affairs signed by the client. 106
Client failures to communicate or otheIWise cooperate with counsel, insistence on
pursuing an objective the lawyer considers improper, or client conduct which renders
effective representation unreasonably difficult may also warrant a court request for
withdrawal. 107 It may also become clear that there are insufficient unencumbered assets
to pay counsel, making the representation unreasonably financially burdensome.
Although the ethical rules authorize a request for withdrawal in such circumstances, it
may not be allowed. l08 In the event of withdrawal, counsel must take reasonable steps to
protect the client's interests, such as giving the client notice and an opportunity to employ
other counsel, turning over the client's papers and property, and refunding unearned
retainers. 109

105 Model Rules J.6, 1.16,3.3; In re Gregory, 214 B.R. 570,576 (S.D. Tex. 1997)(duty to
disclose client defalcation); In re Swansea Consolidated Resources, Inc., 155 B.R. 28, 38 n. 14
(Bankr. D. R.I. 1993)(as an officer of the court, DIP counseltthad absolutely no choice but to
disclose" unauthorized diversion of $64,000 of DIP funds to a foreign bank); see also In re Brennan,
187 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D.N.I. 1995)(in serious cases such as conversion of estate property, the
professionals will sometimes be obligated to report the debtor's breach to others).
106 Model Rule 1.6 Comment; see In re Saturley, 131 B.R. 509,519 (Bankr. D. Me.
1991)(infonn trustee that schedules are incomplete if concerns about client's candor, to prompt
trustee investigation); In re Matthews, 154 B.R. 673, 680-81 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993)(same; alert
u.S. Trustee, court, or another interested party that schedules are incomplete or inaccurate; failure
to withdraw contributed to debtor's dishonesty by not setting up early alarm that something was
amiss); ABA Formal Opinion 92-366 (Aug. 8, 1992)(ethical obligation of "noisy withdrawal").
107 Model Rule 1.16; In re Alderson, 114 B.R. 672, 680-81. (Bankr. D. S.D. 1990).
108 Model Rule 1.16; In re Meyers, 120 B.R. 751, 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) and cases cited
therein.
109 Model Rule 1.16(d). The court may order turnover of the attorney's files regardless of any
charging lien rights. 11 U.S.C. § 542(e).
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v.

Procedures for Obtaining Sanctions.
Until the 1997 modification of Rule 9011, upon any violation the court was

required to impose an appropriate sanction; it exercised discretion only in deciding what
sanction was appropriate under the circumstances. 110 Now, sanctions are discretionary,
and there is a safe harbor procedure for serving a sanctions motion and giving an
opportunity to withdraw the offensive document before filing the motion. III The safe
harbor does not apply to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, however, given its immediate
and serious consequences. 112 Otherwise, it is a mandatory requirement for a Rule 9011
sanctions motion. I 13
Sanctions generally take the fonn of attorneys" fees awards to opponents; in some
cases attorneys and clients have been held jointly liable for the opponent's fees and
doubled costs, or additional monetary amounts. 114 Rule 9011 now includes a provision on
the nature and limitations of sanctions. A sanction imposed for violation of that rule is to
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct by the one sanctioned or
others similarly situated. It may consist of non-monetary directives, a court penalty, or

I1°In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 1992)(the concurrence discusses whether bankruptcy
courts also have inherent power to sanction misconduct under Chambers v. NASCO, III S.Ct.
2123 (1991)). Changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 are not incorporated by reference in
Bankruptcy Rule 9011. In re Dubrowsky, 206 B.R. 30, 35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
111 Rule 90 11(c). There is no safe harbor for filing a bankruptcy petition violating rule 9011
standards, however. Id. See In re Russ, 187 F.3d 978,981 (8 th Cir. 1999) (omissions from
schedules so serious that bankruptcy court sanctions would have been upheld, but court did not
abuse discretion in denying sanctions either).
112 Rule 9011(c)(I)(A); In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 2000).
113 In re McNichols, 258 B.R. 892, 902 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 2001).
114 FE&B v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215 (3d Cir. 1995) (disallowance of all fees);
Drearnlite Holdings Ltd. v. Kraser, 890 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1989)(refusing to "accept further filings
on behalf of clients or their attorney until award of fees and double costs paid in full and satisfactory
prooffumished to court); In re Salter & Co., Ltd., 99 B.R. 327 (E.D. La. 1989)(fees and double
costs); In re Beugen, 99 B.R. 961 (9th Cir. BAP 1989)(same); In re Start the Engines, Inc., 219 B.R.
264 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1998)($100,000 awarded against attorney and client, jointly and severally).
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an order to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a direct result of the
violation. 1 IS Sanctions may also include disgorgement of retainers or interim fees
previously awarded to DIP counsel. 116 A chapter 7 attorney may likewise be precluded
from recovering compensation for a petition filed in bad faith. 117

Sanctions under other

authority than Rule 9011, including the inherent power of the court, may be stiffer, as
described in section I, infra.
The party seeking sanctions has a duty to mitigate its damages by using
reasonable efforts to resolve disputes by inexpensive means, but need not take actions
that would impair its rights. 118 The sanctioned attorney and affected parties may stipulate
to a settlement; the court may approve it or may impose more draconian sanctions. 119
The court imposing sanctions is to consider the ability to pay of the sanctioned party or
attorney, but only if limited ability to pay is raised in a timely manner. 120
Counsel is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to explain his conduct before
sanctions are awarded, generally but not necessarily at a "show cause" hearing. 121 An
evidentiary hearing is not required, however. An opportunity to respond by brief or oral

115

Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c)(2).
116 In re Kendavis Industries International, Inc., 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
117 In re Addon Corp., 231 B.R. 385, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999).
118 In re Film Ventures Intern., Inc., 89 B.R. 80, 86 (9th Cir. BAP 1988).
119 In re Smith, 257 B.R. 344,353 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001).
120 In re Y.J. Sons & Co., Inc., 212 B.R. 793, 806-07 (D. N.J. 1997).
th
121 Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c); Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 722 (5 Cir. 1999) (court's
mention of cost-shifting was insufficient notice of personal liability for sanctions); In re Stein, 127
F.3d 292, 295 (2nd Cir. 1997) (notice and opportunity to be heard, but not full evidentiary hearing);
In re Big Rapids Mall Associates, 98 F.3d 926, 92~-30 (6th Cir. 1996)(briefs with opportunity for
affidavits sufficient); FE&B v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215 (3d Cir. 1995) (sanction
motion was sufficient notice of conduct at issue). The explanation presented may justify a reversal
of an initial inclination to award sanctions. In re Whitney Place Partners, 123 B.R. 117 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1992)(sanctions directed and OSC set); 147 B.R. 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992)(evidence
showed errors to be the result of counsel's lack of bankruptcy expertise; sanctions not imposed).
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argument may suffice. 122 A sanctions award must specify how the fees and expenses
were calculated, and how they were caused by the conduct of the parties sanctioned, so
the appellate court has sufficient basis to review the decision. 123 Adequate notice is
important before any sanctions hearing, but especially important if the severe sanction of
disbannent from the bankruptcy court is to be considered. 124 The prerequisites of
adequate notice are (1) the fact that sanctions are under consideration, (2) the reasons
why (i.e. the conduct alleged to be sanctionable), and (3) the form of sanctions under
consideration, generally including the legal rule on which sanctions will be based. 125 If
inadequate notice is given, the error may be cured by an immediate stay of the results and
a scheduled reconsideration hearing. 126
Rule 11 motions for sanctions, like all other motions, must be filed in good faith.
Rule 11 does not mandate punishment just because an adversary's theory is rejected at
trial, and is not intended to "kill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity.,,127 Courts
generally evaluate whether an objectively reasonable basis for the attorney's contentions
was asserted, in deciding on sanctions requests, even if the attorney ultimately lost on the
In re 60 East 80th Street Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 117 (2nd Cir. 2000); In re Mahendra,
131 F.3d 750, 760 (8 th Cir. 1997) (notice and opportunity to respond re sanctions on appeal); see
In re Rimsa!, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1046 (7 th Cir. 2000) (court may cite perceptions of general
litigation strategy as background and context for sanctions ruling without providing particularized
notice).
123 In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Lane, 991 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1993)(factors
to be considered in determining sanctions); In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 136 B.R. 545 (9th Cir.
BAP 1992); In re Omega Trust, 110 B.R. 665 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd in part, remanded in
part, 120 B.R. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)(detailed discussion ofRule 9011 types of sanctions and factors
that may be considered in determining which sanctions to impose).
124 In re Engel, 246 B.R. 784 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2000); In re MPM Entemrises, Inc., 231 B.R.
500,505 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
.
125 Engel, 246 B.R. at 794 (citing authorities); In re Highgate Equities, Ltd., 279 F.3d 148, 152
(2nd Cir. 2002); FE&B v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215 (3d Cir. 1995) (notice of9011
sanctions sufficient to impose sanctions for same conduct under inherent power of court).
th
126 In re Hancock, 192 F.3d 1083, 1086 (7 Cir. 1999).
122
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merits. 128 Sanctions may not be imposed against counsel merely because the court finds
the client's testimony not credible, or objects to the fonn of a respectful
communication. 129 But a sanctions motion that is itself replete with vituperation and
abuse will not be tolerated, even if it asserts a colorable claim. 130 Mitigating and
aggravating factors bearing on the type of sanctions to impose include the degree of
willfulness involved, the person~s expertise and prior history and ability to pay, the nature
and extent of prejudice and expense suffered by the offended person, and burdens on the
court system. 131

VI.

Collateral Consequences - at the Bar and in the Prison
Other possible sanctions include a reprimand, reference to bar disciplinary

authorities, an order precluding the introduction of evidence or litigation of certain issues,
default judgment or dismissal, injunctive relief limiting future access to the courts to a
party or attorney, or mandatory legal education, generally in the areas of bankruptcy and
legal ethics. 132

In re Oak Grove Village, Ltd., 90 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
.
In re Hall's Motor Transit Co., 889 F.2d 520, 523 (3d Cir. 1989) (FRAP 38); Matter of
McGuirt, 879 F.2d 182, 184 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Sea Harvest Corp. v. Riviera Land Co., 868
F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1989); Dreamlite Holdings Ltd. v. Kraser, 890 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
White v. General Motors, 908 F.2d at 680; but see In re Marathon Home Loans, 101 B.R. 216,222
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989)(each filing not frivolous, but sanctionable as part of persistent pattern of
abusive litigation activity).
129 In re Big Rapids Mall Associates, 98 F.3d 926, 930-31 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Highgate
Equities, Ltd., 279 F.3d 148, 154-44 (2nd Cir. 2002) (letter).
130 In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 519, 523 (D.D.C. 1999).
131 In re Omega Trust, 110 B.R. 665, 673-74 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1990) (extensive list of mitigating
and aggravating factors, and supporting citations).
132 Omega Trust, 110"B.R. at 673-74 (citing numerous cases, and a list of alternative sanctions);
see also In re Placid Oil Co., 158 B.R. 404 (N.D. Tex. 1993)(fee disgorgement and disbannent for
violation of court orders); In re Maurice, 167 B.R. 114, 128 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 1994) (complete 16
hours ofCLE in bankruptcy and 8 hours in legal ethics); In re Pearson, 108 B.R. 804 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1989) (9 hours banlauptcy and 3 hours ethics CLE).
127

128
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Several courts have imposed sanctions in the fonn of suspension or disbannent
from practice in the bankruptcy court. 133 Pro hac vice status may likewise be revoked. 134
The suspension may last only until sanctions are fully paid, but may last for years. 135 The
suspension may even be pennanent until and unless a reapplication is accepted. 136 The
bankruptcy court or appellate court may refer its sanctions detennination to the state
professional disciplinary authority, commencing a state disciplinary process. 137 While
counsel may introduce mitigating evidence bearing on appropriate punishment at the state
hearing, either applicable state rules or the doctrine of offensive non-mutual collateral
estoppel may prevent the lawyer from re-litigating the facts or law relating to sanctioned

133 In re Moix-McNutt, 220 B.R. 631, 637 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (citing cases); In re MPM
Enterprises, Inc., 231 B.R. 500, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing cases); See In re Smith, 257 B.R.
344, 353 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001)(any further sanctionable conduct will result in suspension of
practice before the bankruptcy court); In re Brantley, 84 B.R. 508, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988)
(same, from repeated defects in schedules); see Landscape Properties,Inc. v. Whisenhunt, 127
F.3d 678, 685 (8 th Cir. 1997) (district court considering bankruptcy sanctions appeal referred
matter to other district judges to determine whether disciplinary actions should be taken against
appellantattomey).
th
134 In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7 Cir. 2000); D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Robson,
th
750 F.2d 31, 33 (6 Cir. 1984).
th
135 In re Maurice, 73 F.3d 124, 126 (7 Cir. 1995)(suspension from all federal courts in circuit
pending compliance with sanctions payment); In re 60 East 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 B.3d 109,
120 (2d Cir. 2000)(suspension until sanctions paid); In re Hancock, 192 F.3d 1083, 1086 (7 th Cir.
1999) (same); Moix-McNutt, 220 B.R. at 637 (4 years); In re Heard, 106 B.R. 481, 484 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1989)(1 year); In re Nesom, 76 B.R. 101, 102 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (60 days); In re
Assaf, 119 B.R. 465, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1990)(until fees paid); In re Woodward, 229 B.R. 468,476-77
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999)(OSC to consider suspension, plus immediate suspension if
disgorgement order not met); In re Carlton House of Brockton, Inc., 28 BCD 777 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1996) (1 year).
136 In re Statmore, 176 B.R. 512, 515 (D. Neb. 1984)(court will consider lifting suspension
upon proof of payments); In re Lowe, 18 B.R. 26, 27 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (permanent
suspension pending further order of the court).
th
137 In re Maurice, 167 B.R. 114 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 1994); In re 60 East 80 St. Equities, Inc., 218
th
F.3d 109, 121 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Clark, 223 F.3d 85~, 865 (8 Cir. 2000);In re Davila, 210 B.R.
727 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996).
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conduct. 138 A state supreme court's suspension or disbannent typically results in the
same discipline being imposed in the federal courts where the attorney practices. 139
Worse still, sanctionable activity may warrant a criminal conviction. The lawyer
enabling false and misleading schedules to be filed may be convicted of aiding and
abetting the fraudulent concealment of property from the bankruptcy trustee. 140 If so,
status as an attorney may warrant a sentence enhancement. 141 Filing a false and
misleading Rule 2014/2016 statement of disinterestedness, and confinning it in court,
may result in conviction on counts of bankruptcy fraud and perjury. 142 Failing to obey a
court sanctions order may be deemed criminal contempt. 143 The bankruptcy court or
district or circuit court on appeal of a bankruptcy order may refer its disciplinary decision
to the United States Attorney to consider prosecution. 144

138

E.g. Mississippi Bar v. Shah, 749 So.2d 1047, 1048-50 (Miss. 1999); In re Caranchini, 160

F.3d 420, 422 (8 th Cir. 1998).
139 Caranchini, 160 F.3d at 424.
th
140 United States v. Webster, 125 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7 Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1051
th
(1998); United States v. Dolan, 120 F.3d 856 (8 Cir. 1997); United States v. Cherek, 734 F.2d
1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985); United States v. Franklin, 837
F.Supp. 916 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (plea to obstructing justice).
141 Webster, 125 F.3d at 1036
th
142 United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7 Cir. 1998)
th
143 In re Maurice, 69 F.3d 830, 834 (7 Cir. 1995).
144 Maurice, 69 F.3d at 834; In re Ludwick, 185 B.R. 238, 247 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995).

H,- 29

BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION

Materials Prepared By:
Hon. Eugene R. Wedoff
Chief u.s. Bankruptcy Judge
Northern District ofIllinois at Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

Discussion By:
Hon. Eugene R. Wedoff
Chief u.s. Bankruptcy Judge
Northern District ofIllinois at Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

and
Henry J. Sommer
Co-Editor, Collier on Bankruptcy
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Copyright 2003. Hon. Eugene R. WedofI All rights reserved.

SECTION I

BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
I.

MAJOR EFFECTS OF THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROVISIONS
OF THE 2002 BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
(H.R. 333 CONFERENCE REPORT) •...•••.••....•••........•..•....... 1-1
Chapter 7

1-1

Chapter 13

1-4

Chapter 14

1-6

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1-6

II.

2002 Bankruptcy Reform Legislation (H.R. 333 Conference Report)
Table Of Major Consumer Effects

1-11

A PROPOSAL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE BANKRUPTCY REFORM

1-13

Introduction

1-13

Proponents

1-13

The Proposal

1-14

Table Of Proposed Revisions To H.R. 333 Conference Report

1-34

SECTION I

8-6-02
Major effects of the consumer bankruptcy provisions of the 2002 Bankruptcy Legislation
(H.R. 333 Conference Report)
Prepared by
Eugene R. WedofJ, ChiefJudge
United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District ofIllinois
On July 25, 2002, the House and Senate conferees on H.R. 333 reached agreement on a
conference report, resolving differences between versions ofthe legislation as passed in the two
houses. The following summary sets out the major areas of consumer bankruptcy law impacted by
the conference report, with references to the sections of the report that effect the changes.

Chapter 7
1. New § 707(b)-means testing; Conference Report § 102(a)-(d)
Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is amended to provide for dismissal of Chapter 7
cases or (with the debtor's consent) conversion to Chapter 13, upon a finding of abuse. Abuse can
be found in one of two ways: first, through an unrebutted presumption of abuse, arising under a
new means test; and second, on general grounds, including bad faith, detennined under the totality
of the circumstances.

Standing. Any party in interest, including the U.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator, as
well as a judge, may invoke the means-test presumption, but only as to debtors whose income
exceeds a defmed state median. For debtors whose income does not exceed the defmed median,
abuse can only be found on general grounds, and only the judge, u.S. Trustee or bankruptcy
administrator may raise the issue. This standing scheme can be summarized in a table:

The means-test
presumption

Debtor's income at or below the
applicable median

Debtor's income above the
applicable median

No one has standing.

All parties in interest have standing.

General grounds Only judges, U.S. Trustees, and bankofabuse
ruptcy administrators have standing.

All parties in interest have standing.

Presumption ofabuse under the means test. The means test is designed to detennine the
extent of a debtor's ability to repay general unsecured claims. It has three elements: (a) a defmition
of "current monthly income," measuring the total income a debtor is presumed to have available;
(b) a list of allowed deductions from current monthly income, for purposes of support and
repayment of higher priority debt; and (c) defmed "trigger points," at which the income remaining
after the allowed deductions would result in the presumption of abuse.
(a) "Current monthly income" is a monthly average of all the income received by the
debtor (including regular contributions to household expenses made by other persons, but
excluding Social Security benefits) during a defmed six-month period. If the debtor files
schedules with the bankruptcy petition, the six-month period ends with the last day of the
calendar month preceding the filing. Thus, if schedules were filed with a bankruptcy
petition in March, current monthly income would be the average monthly income received
by the debtor during the preceding September through February. But if schedules are not
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filed with the petition, then the six-month period ends on the date that the court detennines
"current monthly income."
(b). The deductions from current monthly income allowed under the means test can be
categorized as follows: (1) allowances set by the Internal Revenue Service (in the context of
negotiating repayment of delinquent tax obligations)-on a national basis for food, clothing,
personal care, and entertainment (the "National Collection Standards") (with an increase of
up to 5% of the food and clothing allowance, if demonstrated to be reasonable and
necessary), and on a regional basis and for transportation and housing (the "Local
Collection Standards"), except that any portion of the allowances under National and Local
Standards reflecting repayment of debt is not to be counted; (2) the actual expenses of the
debtor in categories recognized by the IRS but as to which no specific allowance has been
set ("Other Necessary Expenses"); (3) expenses for protection from family violence; (4)
continued contributions to care of nondependent family members, including children and
grandchildren; (5) actual expenses of administering a Chapter 13 plan, as detennined by the
Executive Office for United States Trustees; (6) expenses for grade and high school (up to
$1500 annually, per minor child), if the debtor documents both the reasonableness and
necessity for such expenses, and that the expenses are not covered by the applicable IRS
standards; (7) additional home energy costs, documented as reasonable and necessary and
not covered by the IRS Local Standards; (8) 1/60th of all secured debt that will become due
in the five years after filing (and all past due debt secured by property necessary for support
of the debtor and the debtor's dependents); (9) 1/60th of all priority debt; and (10) (as
provided for under current § 707(b» continued contributions to tax-exempt charities, up to
15% of gross income.
(c) There are two distinct trigger points for the presumption of abuse: (1) if the debtor has at
least $166.67 in current monthly income available after the allowed deductions, abuse is
presumed regardless of the amount of the debtor's general unsecured debt, and (2) if the
debtor has at least $100 of such income, abuse is presumed if the income is sufficient to
pay at least 25% of the debtor's general unsecured debt over five years. Thus, a debtor with
less than $100 in monthly income after allowed deductions would never be subject to a
presumption of abuse; if the debtor had income after deduction in the amount of exactly
$100, there would be a presumption of abuse if the debtor's general unsecured debt was
$24,000 or less; a debtor with $150 in monthly income after deductions would be subject to
the presumption with general unsecured debt of $36,000 or less; and a debtor with income
of$166.67 or more after deductions would be subject to the presumption regardless of how
much unsecured debt was owed.
To rebut the presumption, a debtor would have to swear to and document "special circumstances"
that would decrease income or increase expenses so as to bring the debtor's income after expenses
below the trigger points.

General grounds for abuse. The other basis for a fmding of abuse, applicable where the
presumption does not apply or has been rebutted, is that the debtor filed the petition in bad faith or
that the totality of the debtor's fmancial circumstances indicates abuse. The U.S. trustee,
bankruptcy administrator or judge can assert this basis for fmding abuse in any case; creditors are
limited to asserting it in cases where the debtor's income is above the defmed state median.
Procedure. Debtors are required to file a statement as to the calculation under the means
test in all cases: the court is required to serve this statement on creditors; and, if the presumption
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applied, the U.S. trustee is required to file either a motion under § 707(b) or a statement explaining
why the motion was not being filed.

2. Sanctions imposed on debtor's counsel.
• Conference Report § 102(a)(2)
Section 707(b) is amended to add a new subparagraph (4)(A) allowing the court to award
costs and fees to a trustee who successfully pursues a § 707(b) motion, payable by debtor's
counsel, if it fmds that the Chapter 7 filing violated Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011; a new subparagraph
(4)(B) specifying that if the court fmds any violation of Rule 9011 by the debtor's attorney, it may
award a civil penalty against the attorney, payable to the trustee, U.S. trustee, or bankruptcy
administrator; and a new subparagraph (4)(C) providing that the signature ofa debtor's attorney on
a petition constitutes a certification that "the attorney has no knowledge after an inquiry that the
information in the schedules filed with [the] petition is incorrect."

• Conference Report § 227(a)
Debtors' counsel are subject to loss of fees, damages, injunctive remedies, and imposition
of costs for any failure to meet new disclosure and record-keeping requirements.

• Conference Report § 319
A sense of Congress is set out, stating that Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 should be amended to
include a requirement that all documents submitted by a debtor either to the court or a trustee,
specifically including schedules, be subject to a reasonable inquiry by the debtor or the debtor's
counsel to verify that the information contained in the document is well grounded in fact and
warranted by law.

3. Support priority.
• Conference Report § 212
Family support obligations of the debtor would have the fITst priority in distribution, subject
to the expenses of a trustee in administering assets that might otherwise be used to pay the support
obligations.

4. Reaffirmations.
• Conference Report § 203
In addition to the provisions of current law, (1) a reaffirmation agreement is not effective
unless the debtor received an extensive set of disclosures, and (2) the court may disapprove
reaffmnation agreements with creditors other than credit unions if a statement filed by the debtor
indicated that the debtor did not have sufficient funds to make the agreed upon payments. A hearing
on this issue is required to be concluded prior to the time a discharge is entered, and there is no
deadline for filing a reaffmnation agreement. Creditors are allowed to receive payments prior to the
filing of a reaffmnation agreement, and under agreements ''whichthe creditor believes in good faith
to be effective." The disclosure requirements are met if "given in good faith."
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5. Redemption.
• Conference Report § 304, 327
Redemption requires full payment of the amount of the allowed secured claim at the time of
the redemption, with the claim based on the retail replacement price of the collateral.

6. Ride-through.
• Conference Report §§ 304-05
A debtor's option to retain collateral without redemption or reaffmnation by making
contract payments, recognized by some courts, is eliminated. Failure to redeem or reaffmn results
in termination of the automatic stay without motion.

7. Trustee compensation.
• Conference Report § 407
Section 330 is amended to provide that the compensation to Chapter 7 trustees would not be
based on the factors applicable to other professionals, but would be a commission, based on § 326.

• Conference Report § 1224
If a Chapter 7 trustee is awarded compensation for services in connection with a § 707(b)
motion, and the debtor is later in a Chapter 13 case (due to conversion or refiling after dismissal),
any of the § 707(b) compensation remaining unpaid is to be paid during the Chapter 13 case,
according to a limiting fonnula.

8. Nonsubordination ofproperty tax liens to family support claims.
• Conference Report § 701
Section 724(b) of the Bankruptcy Code currently allows a Chapter 7 trustee to pay family
support obligations from funds that would otherwise be used to satisfy a property tax lien, with the
tax lien being subordinated to other liens on the affected property. This type of subordination is
eliminated, so that if the debtor owed both property taxes (secured by a lien on the debtor's
property) and support obligations, the proceeds of any sale of the property will be used to pay the
taxes before the support obligations.

Chapter 13
1. Secured claims: stripdown, adequate protection, valuation.

• § Conference Report 306, both bills.
Stripdown of secured claims to the value of the collateral under § 506(a) is limited.
Purchase money security interests in motor vehicles purchased within 910 days of the bankruptcy
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filing (two days less than 2-1/2 years), could not be stripped down, and stripdown is unavailable as
to all other secured debts incurred within one year of bankruptcy.

• Conference Report § 327
Where stripdown is available, the collateral must be valued at replacement (retail) cost.

• Conference Report § 309(c)
Chapter 13 plans would have to provide for payment of secured claims in equal installments,
at least sufficient to provide adequate protection, and, prior to confmnation, the debtor would have to
make the adequate protection payments directly to the secured creditor, deduct the adequate
payments from the preconfirmation plan payments made to the trustee, and give proof ofthe
adequate protection payments to the trustee. The amount required to be paid for preconfmnation
adequate protection is not clearly defmed, and might be either the amount called for by the plan or
the amount due under the contract. Preconfinnation payments on personal property leases
(primarily auto leases) would have to be paid directly to the lessor, with proof given to the trustee.

2. Disposable income
• Conference Report §102(h)
The best efforts test of § 1325(b) currently requires Chapter 13 plans (if objected to by the
trustee or an unsecured creditor) to either pay unsecured claims in full with interest or else provide
that all of the debtor's disposable income will be contributed to the plan for a minimum period of
three years. Under the new legislation, for Chapter 13 debtors whose income is more than the
defined median, "disposable income" for purposes of the best efforts test is to be calculated under
the means test for the presumption of abuse under § 707(b).

3. Plan length
• Conference Report § 318
For debtors whose income is equal to or greater than the applicable median, the "best
efforts" test, in the absence of full payment, requires a five-year plan.
4. Superdischarge

• Conference Report §§ 314, 707
The list of debts excepted from a Chapter 13 discharge under current § 1328(a) is expanded
to include debts defined by § 523(a)(I)(B) and (C) [unfiled, late-filed, and fraudulent tax returns],
(a)(2) [fraud, including credit card misuse], (a)(3) [failure to notify creditors ofthe bankruptcy in
time to allow assertion of claims], (a)(4) [embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duty], and-insofar as
personal injury or wrongful death is concerned-(a)(6). However, where § 523(a)(6) provides that
"willful and malicious" injury gives rise to nondischargeable debts in Chapter 7 and 11 cases, the
revised § 1328(a)(4) would except debts arising from "willful or malicious" injury.

1-5

5. Timing ofconfirmation hearing
• Conference Report § 317
Confmnation hearings may not take place until at least 20 days after the 341 meeting, unless
the court detennines that it would be in the best interests of creditors and the estate to hold an earlier
confinnation hearing and there is no objection. The confmnation hearing is required to be
conducted no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the 341 meeting.

Chapter 11
Individual Chapter 11 cases.
• Conference Report § 321
Individual Chapter 11 debtors will receive a discharge only after completion of their plans; a
best efforts test (5-year minimum contribution of disposable income) is applicable on the objection
of any unsecured creditor; and the post-petition earnings of the debtor are property of the estate.

General
1. Successive discharges.
• Conference Report § 312
A Chapter 7 debtor will be subject to denial of discharge under § 727 if the debtor received
a Chapter 7 or 11 discharge in a case filed within 8 years of the filing of the pending case. A
Chapter 13 debtor will be denied,discharge ifthe debtor received a discharge (a) in a case under
Chapter 7, 11, or 12, filed within four years of the pending case filing, or (b) in a prior Chapter 13
case filed within two years of the pending case filing.

2. Tax returns, other requiredfilings.
• Conference Report § 315(b)
Section 521 is amended to provide that, unless the court orders otherwise, individual debtors
must file, together with their schedules,"copies of all payment advices or other evidence ofpayment
received within 60 days before the filing ofthe petition, by the debtor from any employer of the
debtor," as well as "a statement of the amount of monthly net income, itemized to show how the
amount is calculated" and " a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in income
or expenditures over the 12-month period following the date of the filing of the petition."
Each debtor must also provide to the trustee, and to any creditor making a timely request, at
least seven days prior to the 341 meeting, a copy of the federal income tax return or transcript ofthe
return (the debtor's choice), for the period for which the return was most recently due. Each
individual debtor in a case under Chapter 7, 11, and 13, must also, on request of a party in interest
or the judge, file with the court copies of federal income tax returns (or transcripts of the returns)
that become due while the case is pending or were past due for the three-year period prior to filing.
The filed returns are to be available to any party in interest, with the debtor's privacy protected by
regulations to be adopted by the Director of the Administrative Office.
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At the request of any party in interest, the debtor in a Chapter 13 case must file a fmancial
statement annually, under penalty of perjury, showing "income and expenditures of the debtor
during the tax year ... most recently concluded ... and monthly income of the debtor." The
annual statement must also show "how income, expenditures, and monthly income are calculated."

• Conference Report § 716
A new § 1308 requires Chapter 13 debtors to file any tax returns past due for the four years
preceding the bankruptcy filing within specified times following the 341 meeting.

3. Audits
• Conference Report § 603
Audits are required (1) of all information provided by the debtors in at least 0.4% of
individual Chapter 7 and 13 cases, randomly selected, and (2) of any schedules of income and
expenses "which reflect greater than average variances from the statistical norm of the district in
which the schedules were filed if those variances occur by reason of higher income or higher
expenses than the statistical norm of the district in which the schedules were filed." The audits are
to be conducted by certified or licensed public accountants in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards, or under regulations adopted by the Attorney General (and the Judicial
Conference in areas served by bankruptcy administrators), within two years of enactment of the
legislation,

4. Credit counseling and debtor education.
• Conference Report § 106(a)
Individuals will be ineligible for reliefunder any chapter of the Code unless, within 180
days of their bankruptcy filing, they received credit counseling-through a service approved by the
United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator-that includes, at a minimum, a briefmg on the
opportunities for credit counseling and assistance in perfonning an initial budget analysis. The
required counseling may be provided by telephone or the internet. Exceptions would be made (1)
for districts in which adequate services were unavailable and (2) for debtors with exigent
circumstances requiring filing before the counseling could be obtained within five days after the
debtor requested it (in which case the debtor would be required to complete the counseling within
30 days after the bankruptcy filing). The debtor is required to file a certificate from the creditor
counselor describing the services provided, and file any debt repayment plan developed with the
counselor.

• Conference Report §§105, 106(b)
Pilot educational programs for debtor fmancial management would be tested in six judicial
districts over an 18-month period, and thereafter evaluated for effectiveness and cost. At the same
time, all Chapter 7 debtors would be subject to denial of discharge under § 727, and Chapter 13
debtors would not be granted a discharge, if they failed to complete an instructional course
concerning personal management, unless the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator
determined that approved courses were inadequate. Telephone and internet courses would be
permissible "if effective".
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5. Automatic stay.
• Conference Report § 302
If a Chapter 7, 11, or 13 case is filed within one year ofthe dismissal of an earlier case
(other than a Chapter 11 or 13 case filed after a § 707(b) dismissal), the automatic stay in the
second case terminates 30 days after the filing, unless a party in interest demonstrates that the
second case was filed in good faith with respect to the creditor sought to be stayed. And if a second
repeat filing takes place within the one-year period, the automatic stay does not go into effect,
although a party in interest may obtain imposition of the stay by demonstrating that the third filing
is in good faith with respect to the creditor sought to be stayed.

• Conference Report § 303
"In rem" relief from the automatic stay is authorized-in cases of multiple bankruptcy
filings involving the same property, the court may issue an order of relief from the automatic stay as
to the property, which order, ifproperly recorded, is binding on all owners of the property for two
years from the date of entry. A party in interest may file a request for imposition of the stay within
30 days of a subsequent case filing, and the court may impose the stay only if the party
demonstrates that the case was filed in good faith as to the creditors sought to be stayed.

• Conference Report § 311
Two new exceptions from the automatic stay are established for landlords seeking to evict
tenants. The frrst, § 362(b)(22) allows the continuance of any eviction proceeding in which the
landlord obtained a judgment of possession prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The
second, § 362(b)(23) deals with evictions based on "endangerment" of the rented property or
"illegal use of controlled substances" on the property. Paragraph (b)(23) would except the
eviction proceeding from the stay if (a) it was commenced before the filing of the bankruptcy case,
or (b) if the endangerment or illegal use occurred within the 30 days before the bankruptcy filing.
In either situation, the landlord would be required to file with the court and serve on the debtor a
certificate setting out the facts giving rise to the exception. The debtor would be able to contest the
applicability ofthe new exceptions. As to (b)(22), the debtor would be able to keep the stay in
effect by showing that applicable nonbankruptcy law allowed the lease to remain in effect upon the
debtor's cure of the default that was the basis of the eviction order, and by paying the cure amount
within 30 days of the bankruptcy filing. As to (b)(23), the debtor may contest the assertions in the
landlord's certificate, and the court is required to conduct a hearing within 10 days "to determine if
the situation giving rise to the lessor's certification ... existed or has been remedied."

6. Notice to creditors.
• Conference Report § 315(a)
Notice to a creditor will not be effective (for purposes of enforcing the automatic stay)
unless served at an address filed by the creditor with the court or at an address stated in two
communications from the creditor to the debtor within 90 days of the filing of the bankruptcy case,
unless the notice was "brought to the attention of the creditor," which is defined as meaning receipt
by a person designated to receive bankruptcy notices.
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7. Exemptions.
• Conference Report § 307
Debtors must have had a domicile in the state of their bankruptcy filing for 730 days before
filing in order to claim the exemption law of that state. Otherwise, the applicable exemption law is
that of the place of domicile for the majority of the 180-day period preceding the 730 days before
filing (that is, between 2 and 2-1/2 years before the filing).

• Conference Report § 308
The value of a debtor's homestead, for purposes of a homestead exemption, is reduced to
the extent of any addition to the value of the homestead on account of a disposition ofnonexempt
property made by the debtor-with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors-during the 10
years prior to the bankruptcy filing.

• Conference Report § 322
Value in excess of$125,000 added to the homestead during the 1215-days (about 3 years, 4
months) preceding the bankruptcy filing is deducted from the exemption unless it was transferred
from another homestead in the same state. An absolute $125,000 homestead cap applies if either (a)
the court detennines that the debtor has been convicted of a felony demonstrating that the filing of
the case was an abuse of the provision of the Bankruptcy Code, or (b) the debtor owes a debt
arising from a violation of federal or state securities laws, fiduciary fraud, racketeering, or crimes or
intentional torts that caused serious bodily injury or death "in the preceding 5 years."

• Conference Report § 323
Employee contributions to ERISA-qualified plans are exempted from the estate.

• Conference Report § 224
All tax-exempt retirement accounts are deductible, with a $1 million cap for IRAs.

8. Bankruptcy appeals.
• Conference Report § 1233.
The circuit courts of appeal are given discretion to accept bankruptcy appeals without an
intennediate appellate decision if the bankruptcy court, the district court, the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel, or the parties to the appeal acting jointly certify that direct appeal is necessary to resolve a
matter or issue of importance.

9. Effective date.
• Conference Report § 1401
The changes made by the legislation are generally effective only with respect to cases filed
after its effective date, 180 days after the date of enactment, except that the limitations on homestead
exemptions set out in §§ 308 and 322 become effective upon enactment.
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2002 Bankruptcy Reform Legislation (H.R. 333 Conference Report)
Table of Major Consumer Effects

Impact Area

Issue

Section

Details

Chapter 7

Means testing

102

T est uses average monthly income (over 6 months) less (1) IRS collection
standards, with up to 5% increase in food and clothing, but without debt
repayment; (2) expenses for protection from family violence; (3) continued
contributions to care of nondependent family members; (4) actual expenses
of administering a Chapter 13 plan, as determined by the EOUST; (5)
expenses for grade and high school (up to $1500 annually, per minor child),
with documentation of need; (6) additional documented home energy costs;
(7) 1/60th of all secured debt due in the five years after filing (and past due
on property necessary for support); (8) 1/60th of all priority debt; and (9)
[current law] continued charitable contributions, up to 15% of gross
income. Presumes abuse (1) if at least $100, but less than $166.67, and
enough to pay at least 25% of general unsecured debt over 5 years or (2) if
greater than or equal to $166.67. Presumption overcome only by a showing
of unavoidable special circumstances, detailed and',sworn to by debtor.
Debtor must file calculations as to presumption. UST must file a statement
regarding presumption; court must serve on creditors. UST must file a
motion or statement in all presumption cases where income exceeds a
defined median. Median income limits all invocation of the presumption
and limits general standing (for bad faith).

Sanctions on
debtors' counsel

102,319

Fees for trustee's § 707(b) motion may shift to debtor's counsel if
bankruptcy filing found to violate Rule 9011. Rule 9011 to include schedules: requires certification of no knowledge, after inquiry, of inaccuracy in
schedules; violation by counsel allows payment of civil penalty.

Support priority

212

Claims for support made first priority, subject to the expenses of a trustee
administering assets "otherwise available to pay such claims.

Reaffirmation

203

Extensive disclosure statement (with broad safe harbors for creditors); hardship hearings required in certain cases, must conclude before discharge.

Redemption

304,327

Requires full payment of secured claim, valued at retail, at the time of
redemption, within 45 days "after the first meeting of creditors.

"Ride-through"

304,305

"Ride-through" alternative to reaffirmation under 521 (2) is eliminatedfailure to redeem or reaffirm terminates the stay without creditor motion.

Secured claims:
stripdown, adequate protection;
valuation

306,
309 (c) ,
327

No § 506 (a) stripdown for motor vehicle loans incurred within 2-1/2 years
of bankruptcy or for other secured debts incurred within 1 year. Preconfirmation adequate protection payments must be made directly by debtor to
creditor, with proof to the trustee. Plan payments must be in equal amounts
sufficient for adequate protection. Retail value must be used in all
individual Chapter 7 and 13 cases in determining § 506 (a) valuations.

Disposable
income

102 (h)

"Disposable income" is generally defined, and for debtors with more than
median income, is determined according to the § 707(b) means test.

Length of plan

318

For debtors with more than median income, a 5-year minimum plan is
required unless full payment is made in less time.

Superdischarge

314, 707

No superdischarge for § 523(a) (1) (B) (C), (2), (3), (4), or debts arising from
"willful or malicious" personal injury or wrongful death.

Chapter 13
(see also Tax
returns,
infra)
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Chapter 11

Individuals

321

If any unsecured creditor objects, a 5-year best efforts test applies; estate
definition, plan modification, and discharge treated as in Chapter 13.

General

Successive
discharge

312

No discharge is allowed in Chapter 13 if a prior discharge was entered in
(a) any Chapter 7, 11, or 12 case filed within 4 years of the pending filing
or (b) any Chapter 13 case filed within 2 years of the pending filing.
Section 727 (a) (8), giving grounds for an objection to discharge in Chapter 7
or 11 after the filing of a prior Chapter 7/11 in which a discharge was
entered, is extended to 8 years .

Tax returns and
other required
filings

315(b)

A copy of the debtor's federal tax return or transcript for the tax year
before bankruptcy must be given to the trustee and any requesting creditor
within 7 days of the § 341 meeting; otherwise the case must be dismissed
unless debtor shows circumstances beyond the debtor's control. Section
521 filings must include a "net income" calculation and pay stubs for 60
days before bankruptcy. On request of any party in interest, the debtor
must file current tax returns and (in Chapter 13) an annual budget.

Audits

603

Audits must be conducted of a random minimum 0.4% of all consumer
filings and of all schedules "reflecting greater than average variance" from
district norms, under GAAS by independent certified or licensed public
accountants or under regulations of the Attorney General (adopted within 2
years of enactment of the legislation).

Credit counseling;
debtor education

105, 106

Credit counseling (approved by the U.S. trustee) is a § 109 eligibility requirement; there is 5-day eXigency exception; phone or internet counseling may
be approved. Completion of a debtor education program approved by the
U.S. trustee is a condition for discharge in Chapter 13; failure to complete
such a program is grounds for denying discharge in Chapter 7; pilot
programs concurrent with mandatory.

Automatic stay

302,
303,
305,311

The automatic stay terminates after 30 days in a first repeat filing within
one year; no automatic stay comes into effect in a second repeat filing in a
year (but the court may order otherwise on a shOWing of good faith). 2-year
in rem stay relief is available. New stay exceptions are added for cases
filed by ineligible debtors, and for certain residential lease evictions
(subject to rebuttal by debtors).

Notice to creditors

315 (a)

Creditors must be served at addresses filed with the court or listed on two
communications to debtor within 90 days before case filing.

Exemptions

307,
308,
322,
323,
224

730-day residency is reqUired for state exemptions; homestead exemption
reduced by a 10-year exclusion of value fraudulently added to the homestead; $125,000 cap is placed on value added to the homestead during the
1215 days (3 yrs, 4 mos.) preceding bankruptcy, unless from a prior homestead in the same state; an absolute $125,000 homestead cap is imposed if
the debtor has been convicted of a felony shOWing abuse or if the debtor
owes a debt arising from securities law violations, fiduciary fraud,
racketeering, or intentional or reckless physical harm. ERISA contributions are excluded from the estate., and a new general exemption is created
for tax-exempt retirement funds, with a $1 million cap for IRAs.

Bankruptcy
appeals

1233

Bankruptcy court decisions may be directly appealed to the circuit court if
authorized by the circuit on certification by any lower court or all parties.

Effective date

1401

The legislative is generally effective 180 days after enactment and
inapplicable to cases filed before the effective date-with an exception for
the new homestead limits, which are effective upon enactment.
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A PROPOSAL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE BANKRUPTCY REFORM
By A. Thomas Small and Eugene R. Wedoff
Introduction
This Proposal addresses the goals of bankruptcy refonn advanced in the last several
sessions of Congress and most recently incorporated in the Conference Report on H.R. 333 in the
1o7th Congress. The Proposal furthers the principal objective of the refonn legislation-to curb
bankruptcy abuse-by expanding the scope of the legislation, by making bankruptcy relief more
difficult for the most likely abusers, and by eliminating unproductive and costly administrative
procedures so that judicial resources may be better focused on cases involving real abuses.
The Proposal is set out in 15 separate recommendations, followed by a summary table.
The recommendations for individual bankruptcy cases (1) make the refonn provisions applicable
to all debtors, rather than limiting them to debtors with primarily consumer debts, (2) expand the
criteria for detennining abuse to include both ability to pay and the amount of property exempted,
(3) expose the most likely abusers to increased scrutiny, and (4) maintain incentives for debtors to
choose repayment of their debts through a Chapter 13 plan. The recommendations for business
bankruptcy are consistent with the objective of expediting the confinnation process, reducing
costs for both debtors and creditors, and providing increased oversight.
The Proposal is limited to those areas with the greatest impact on the bankruptcy system,
and does not address all of the provisions of the Conference Report. The failure to comment on a
particular section of the Conference Report reflects neither support of nor disagreement with that
section.

Proponents
A. Thomas Small has been a United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of
North Carolina for 20 years and served a 7-year tenn as Chief Judge from 1992 to 1999. His
involvement with bankruptcy refonn began in the early 1980s. As an attorney in the Legal
Division of First Union National Bank and as a representative of the American Bankers
Association and the National Coalition for Bankruptcy Refonn, Judge Small participated in
hearings on bankruptcy abuse conducted by Senator Robert Dole, Chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, and by Representative Peter Rodino, Chair of the House
Judiciary Committee. These refonn efforts led to significant amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code, including the addition of § 707(b) and amendments to § 523 to discourage the "loading up"
of pre-bankruptcy debt. In 1985, Judge Small, along with Judge Thomas M. Moore (B.J.,
E.D.N.C.) testified before a joint Senate committee chaired by Senators Charles Grassley and
John East regarding agricultural bankruptcies. Together with Judge Keith Lundin (B.J., M.D.
Tenn.), Sam Gerdano (majority counsel for the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee), and Vince
Lavoi (legislative aid to Rep. Mike Synar), Judges Small and Moore drafted Chapter 12, which
became part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1986. In 1987, Judge Small developed a fast track
procedure for handling small business Chapter 11 cases. These procedures have been adopted in
many districts and are the basis of many of the present small business provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code and in the Conference Report.
Judge Small is chair of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the United
States Judicial Conference, was a member of the Long Range Planning Committee of the United
States Judicial Conference from 1991 to 1996, and was a member of the Board of the Federal
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Judicial Center from 1997 to 2001. He was president of the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges (2000-2001), served on the Board of the American Bankruptcy Institute from 1989 to
1995, and currently is on the Board of the American College of Bankruptcy.
Eugene R. Wedoffis the Chief Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, in
Chicago. He has been serving as a bankruptcy judge in that district for 15 years. After graduating
from the College and Law School of the University of Chicago, Judge Wedoffbecame a partner
and member of the Executive Committee at the Chicago law fmn of Jenner & Block, specializing
in the defense of businesses and individuals in complex civil litigation. Judge Wedoffis
presently presiding over the bankruptcy of United Airlines and its related entities.
In 1997, Judge Wedoffbecame co-chair of the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee of the
American Bankruptcy Institute. In that capacity, he has prepared analyses of the bankruptcy
reform legislation presented in the last several terms of Congress, and testified concerning the
legislation before the House Subcommittee on Commercial & Administrative Law. For his work
in this area, Judge Wedoff received a special award from the ABI in 1998. Judge Wedoff also
has engaged in discussions regarding bankruptcy reform as a participant in the Annual
Bankruptcy Conferences sponsored by Visa USA, and has been a member of the Visa Bankruptcy
Roundtable. An advocate of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy system, Judge Wedoff drafted the model
Chapter 13 plan now used in the Northern District of Illinois and introduced that District's model
retention agreement, which sets out the duties owed by debtors' attorneys to their clients.
Judge Wedoffis the author of the chapter on professional employment in Queenan,
Hendel and Hillinger, Chapter 11 Theory and Practice (LRP Publications, 1994), and has served
as an associate editor of The American Bankruptcy Law Journal. He is a director of the
American Bankruptcy Institute, a member of the Board of Governors of the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges, and a Fellow of the American College of Bankruptcy.

The Proposal

1. Section 707(b), abuse, means testing
Proposal
1) Change "substantial abuse" to "abuse" in § 707(b) [same as Conference Report ("CR")
§ 102(a)(2)].
2) Remove the presumption in favor of the debtor's choice of relief in § 707(b) [same as CR
§ 102(a)(2)].
3) Expand the scope of § 707(b) to include all individual debtors, not just those with
"primarily consumer debts" [new, modifies CR § 102(a)(2)].
4) Expand the criteria for § 707(b) "abuse" to include (1) the ability to repay general
unsecured debt at a rate of at least $150 monthly, and (2) the totality of the debtor's
circumstances, with specific reference to the extent of exemptions claimed by the debtor
and to the intent of the debtor to reject a personal services contract [new, modifies CR
§ 102(a)(2)].
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5) Clarify income measurement for purposes of § 707(b) to require that the determination of
abuse be based on the debtor's earning capacity, considering both the debtor's income at
the time of filing and the debtor's income for the preceding calendar year [continues
approach ofCR § 102(a)(2) by considering past earning history, but eliminates
difficulties caused by 6-month averaging].
6) Permit creditors to file motions to dismiss under § 707(b) if the debtor's current or prior
year income exceeds the applicable state median [expands CR approach in § 102(a)(2)].
7) Determine debtor's expenses on an actual and necessary basis, without application of IRS
standards [new, modifies CR § 102(a)(2)].
8) Provide for a study of the effect of employing IRS standards or other measures of
appropriate living expenses in determining abuse under § 707(b) [same as CR § 103(b),
but with the study preceding the use of IRS standards].
9) In cases where the debtor's gross income exceeds 150% of the applicable state median,
a.

require debtors to file schedules detailing each item of personal property with a
fair market value exceeding $500, and to provide copies of the prior three years'
income tax returns or transcripts to the trustee within 7 days of the § 341
creditors' meeting;

b.

require that the U.S. trustee (or bankruptcy administrator) file either a motion to
dismiss under § 707(b) or a statement explaining why no motion was filed;

c.

if no motion under § 707(b) is filed by the U.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator, require the clerk (i) to provide creditors with a copy of the statement
explaining why no motion was filed and (ii) to notify creditors of their right to
file such a motion;

d.

authorize the court--on a showing by the trustee, U.S. trustee or bankruptcy
administrator of cause to question the accuracy of the debtor's schedules-to
order an audit of the debtor's schedules by an auditor approved by the U.s.
trustee or bankruptcy administrator, with the costs of the audit paid by the debtor

[modifies procedures ofCR § 102(a)(2) to apply in most cases in which abuse is likely].
Comment
Perhaps the most important change proposed in the Conference Report is its "needsbased" approach to Chapter 7 relief. This approach is designed to limit Chapter 7 relief to debtors
who genuinely need it, because their income is not sufficient to pay both their living expenses and
their debts. The Conference Report effectuates needs-based Chapter 7 relief through amendments
to § 707(b) of the Code. Section 707(b) currently allows dismissal of Chapter 7 cases for
"substantial abuse," with the understanding that it would be a substantial abuse for a debtor to
seek an immediate discharge in Chapter 7 if the debtor could repay debts from current income,
under Chapter 13 if necessary. However, § 707(b) has had limited impact-for several reasons:
(1) only judges and the U.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator have standing to bring a § 707(b)
motion; (2) the provision is limited to debtors with primarily consumer debts; (3) it contains no
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definition or description of "substantial abuse"; and (4) it includes a presumption that the debtor
has properly chosen to proceed in Chapter 7.
The Conference Report amends § 707(b) to accord standing to all parties in interest if the
debtor's average monthly income over a six-month period exceeds a defined state median; it
allows dismissal for simple "abuse" rather than "substantial abuse"; it describes abuse as
involving the totality of the debtor's fmancial situation; it eliminates the presumption in favor of
the debtor's choice of Chapter 7; and it creates a new presumption: that abuse exists in any case
where the debtor's average monthly income over six months-less deductions for living expenses
and payment of secured and priority debt-exceeds defined "trigger points." For purposes of this
presumption, the debtor's expenses are based, in part, on standards developed by the IRS for
negotiating payment of tax liabilities from delinquent taxpayers.
The Conference Report's approach is problematic in two respects. First, it continues the
current limitation of § 707(b) to debtors with primarily consumer debts, with the effect of
excluding from its scope wealthy debtors with substantial business liabilities. Second, its
presumption of abuse is complex, and creates substantial difficulties in calculating both income
and allowable expenses. Six-month income averaging produces skewed results for debtors with
seasonal employment, and fails to take into consideration recent changes in employment.
Moreover, the IRS collection standards for expense allowance, which are complex in their own
right, were not created for use in bankruptcy, and so the Conference Report contains numerous
provisions modifying or supplementing them (for example, one provision requires that the IRS
standards be adjusted to eliminate any expense attributable to secured debt repayment, since such
payments are allowed as a separate deduction). As a result, the presumption is difficult to apply
and subject to manipulation. It also imposes substantial costs on all debtors, regardless of their
ability to pay debts, as well as on trustees and the court in administering the presumption.
To achieve the goal of needs-based Chapter 7 more effectively, the Proposal suggests
retaining the overall modifications to § 707(b) set out in the Conference Report as follows: (I)
changing "substantial abuse" to simple "abuse"; (2) removing the presumption in favor of the
debtor's choice of Chapter 7 relief; (3) defining "abuse" to include consideration of the debtor's.
ability to pay general unsecured debt at a defined level; (4) considering the debtor's past ear:nings
in determining ability to pay; and (5) extending standing to creditors and case trustees where the
debtor's income exceeds the applicable state median. However, the Proposal would delay
application of a presumption of abuse until the completion of a study of the potential use of IRS
collection standards for this purpose, as directed by § 103(b) of the Conference Report.
At the same time, the Proposal suggests the following additional provisions to make
§ 707(b), as amended, more effective:
• Remove the "primarily consumer debt" limitation, so that § 707(b) is applicable to all
individual Chapter 7 debtors.
• Allow the expanded standing for parties in interest to be based on the debtor's prior
year's gross income, as well as on current income.
• Create a single, clear "trigger point" of $150 (adjusted for inflation), at which available
monthly income to pay general unsecured debts will constitute abuse of Chapter 7. The trigger
points for the presumption of the Conference Report range from $100 per month to $166.67 per
month, depending on the total amount of general unsecured debt. This range creates complexity,
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and provides incentive for debtors to increase their debt prior to bankruptcy so as to avoid a
finding of abuse.
• Specify that, in calculating the amount of income the debtor has available to pay general
unsecured debt, the debtor's actual earning capacity be used, determined by the debtor's earnings
history as well as the debtor's current earnings. Specify further that the expenses claimed by the
debtor must be the debtor's actual expenses, in amounts reasonably necessary to provide for the
maintenance or support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents.
• Clarify that the "totality of the circumstances" may lead to a fmding of abuse even
where the debtor has not been shown to have ability to repay debt above the trigger point, and
that, in this regard, the court may consider the extent of the exemptions claimed by the debtor as
well as bad faith and the intent by the debtor to reject a personal services contract.
• Create a set of procedures for the filings most likely to be found abusive: namely, those
of debtors with income exceeding 150% of the applicable state median. These procedures would
require the debtor to provide more detailed schedules, would require specific consideration of
§ 707(b) by the u.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator, and would provide additional notice to
creditors, allowing them to file a § 707(b) motion if the u.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator
declines to do so. Additionally, where there are grounds for believing that there are material
misstatements in schedules filed by a debtor with income exceeding 150% of the applicable
median, the court would be authorized to order an audit of the schedules, at the debtor's expense.

2. Random audits; attorney liability for accuracy of schedules
Proposal
1) Provide for random audits of all individual debtors, conducted by auditors approved by
the u.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator; provide for the cost of such audits to be
borne by the u.S. trustee system unless a willful, material misstatement is established; in
case of such a misstatement, provide for the audit cost to be assessed against the debtor
[consistent with, but expanding on CR § 603].
2) Eliminate increased liability for debtor's counsel beyond that currently required by Rule
9011, FRBP [omits additional liability provided in CR §§ 102(a), 319].
Comment
Random audits. In order for the bankruptcy system to operate fairly, it is essential that
the information provided by debtors in their schedules be accurate. To achieve greater accuracy
the Conference Report provides for random audits of not less than one in every 250 cases of
individual debtors (0.4%). If the cost is $1500 for each audit, and individual bankruptcy cases
continue to be filed at the current rate (1.5 million annually), the total annual cost to audit 0.4% of
the cases would be $9 million. The Conference Report does not address payment of the costs of
these audits.
Random audits have the potential to be very effective in encouraging accuracy by
debtors. At the same time, the question of payment for the audits must be addressed. Most
Chapter 7 debtors have no assets available to pay the costs of an audit. Chapter 13 debtors often
are required to devote nearly all of their debt repayment to priority and secured indebtedness,
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which must be paid in full, leaving little for payment of general unsecured claims. A requirement
that such debtors bear the cost of an audit would be very difficult to enforce, and likely cause the
failure of many Chapter 13 plans. Thus, as a general rule, the costs of the audits should be borne
by the u.s. trustee system, with funding provided to that system for this purpose. On the other
hand, where a random audit reveals a willful, material misstatement by the debtor, it is
appropriate for the audit costs to be assessed against the debtor; the imposition of such costs will
serve as an additional incentive for accuracy.
Attorney liability. The burden of full and accurate disclosure in bankruptcy schedules is
properly placed on the debtor. With the addition of random audits, there should be no need for the
enhanced liability that the Conference Report would impose on debtors' attorneys to investigate
the accuracy of schedules. Requiring such investigation would increase the cost of legal
representation and interfere with the attorney-client relationship.

3. Conditions precedent for relief (credit counseling, financial documentation, education)
1) Require credit counseling as a condition of eligibility for individual Chapter 7 debtors
[same as CR § 106(a), but limited to Chapter 7].
2) Require debtors to produce proof of earnings to the trustee, prior to the § 341 creditors
meeting, rather than filing the documentation with the court; provide that if the debtor
fails to produce information required under § 521 of the Code, the court must dismiss the
case on motion ofa party in interest, unless (a) the debtor demonstrates that the failure
was due to circumstances beyond the debtor's control or (b) the trustee establishes
grounds for seeking a denial of discharge or administering the estate for the benefit of
creditors [modifies CR §§ 315(b) and 316].
3) Commence a program of mandatory debtor education only after consideration of a study
of the effectiveness of various educational methods [retains CR § 105; defers CR
§ 106(b)].
Comment
Credit counseling. Section 106(a) of the Conference Report requires that each individual
debtor obtain a briefmg from a credit counseling agency as a condition of eligibility for bankruptcy filing. The briefmg would inform the debtor of the opportunities for credit counseling and
assist the debtor in performing a budget analysis. Such a briefmg could be helpful to Chapter 7
debtors. A Chapter 7 debtor may not have carefully considered the possibility of paying creditors
over time through available income, and a limited delay in filing the case to allow for a credit
counseling briefing is unlikely to cause significant difficulties, since Chapter 7 is not generally
used to prevent foreclosures or repossessions.
In contrast, credit counseling briefings are not likely to be helpful in Chapter 13. A
Chapter 13 debtor must propose a budgeted repayment plan as part of the bankruptcy process, and
so any budgeting work done with a credit counselor would be duplicative, adding unnecessary
expense. Moreover, Chapter 13 debtors frequently approach their attorneys shortly before a
foreclosure sale or repossession, with a need to file the bankruptcy immediately if the threatened
action is to be avoided. Any delay required to obtain counseling could cause the loss of property
essential to the debtor's success in reorganizing under Chapter 13. (While the Conference Report
does provide an exception for filing in emergencies, it requires the debtor to establish that credit
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counseling services were unavailable for five days, and so the exception would not apply in
situations where the attorney is contacted within five days of a threatened foreclosure or
repossession.) Limiting the credit counseling requirement to Chapter 7 debtors would provide
maximum value, limit unnecessary expense, and provide a valuable incentive for debtors to file
under Chapter 13.

Financial documentation/dismissalforfailure to produce. Section 521 of the Code sets
out the duties of debtors, including the duty to file schedules. Section 315(b) of the Conference
Report imposes several additional duties on individual debtors, including a duty to file with the
court "copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment received within 60 days before
the filing." Such payment advices are likely to include identifying infonnation of a personal
nature (including social security numbers) that would be difficult for the court to protect from
disclosure. For tax returns filed prior to the bankruptcy, § 315(b) provides that the debtor is not
required to file the information with the court, but to provide it to the trustee at least seven days
before the creditors' meeting. By treating payment advices in the same way, the problems of
protecting privacy can be avoided.
Sections 315(b) and 316 of the Conference Report set out a complex set of rules for
dismissal of individual bankruptcy cases in situations where the debtor fails to submit required
financial information. In some situations, dismissal is required automatically, without notice to
the debtor. In others, dismissal is required unless there is a showing of good faith on the debtor's
part, or a showing that circumstances beyond the debtor's control prevented timely production of
the documents. Automatic dismissal is problematic, in that neither the debtor nor the trustee may
be aware of any deficiency in providing required information; and, dismissal in the absence of a
showing of good faith by the debtor may prevent a trustee from seeking a denial of the debtor's
discharge or the recovery of avoidable transfers. It is preferable to require a motion for dismissal
based on the debtor's failure to provide required infonnation, and to allow denial of the motion if
the debtor shows the existence of circumstances beyond the debtor's control, or the trustee shows
good cause to continue administering the case for the benefit of creditors.

Debtor education. Section 105 of the Conference Report establishes a pilot educational
program, in six judicial districts, designed to help individuals better manage their fmances. The
program would be studied by the Executive Office for United States Trustees, and would be
followed by a report to Congress by the director of that office. The program, study, and report
would be of great value. A number of educational programs already have been developed,
primarily in the context of Chapter 13, and knowledge of their effectiveness would be very
helpful to Congress in determining what type of educational program would be most effective in
bankruptcy. For example, it might be detennined that educational programs are much more
effective in Chapter 13, where debtors are in contact with the bankruptcy process for an extended
period of time, than they are in Chapter 7, where the debtor is generally involved in bankruptcy
for only a few weeks.
In contrast to § 105, § 106(b) of the Conference Report mandates debtor education in
both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases, on penalty ofa loss of the bankruptcy discharge. It is
premature to require completion of the educational programs before the results of the study. Ifit
is determined, for example, that educational programs are not effective in Chapter 7, requiring
completion of such programs will unnecessarily expend both the time and financial resources of
debtors with limited income. Moreover, allowing completion of the study before mandating
education will allow any mandated course of study to be based on the best available curriculum.
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4. Reaffirmation agreements
Proposal
1) Conduct a study to determine extent of any abuse and need for legislation [same as CR §
205].
2) Defer modifying reaffrrmation procedures until completion of the study [defers extensive
and confusing reaffirmation requirements in CR § 203].
Comment
Under present law counsel must certify that reaffirmation agreements (other than
agreements involving a consumer debt secured by real property) do not impose an undue hardship
on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and that the agreement is in the debtor's best interest.
11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6). If the debtor is not represented by an attorney in connection with the
reaffirmation agreement, the court must hold a hearing at which it informs the debtor of the effect
of the agreement and finds that the agreement (other than an agreement involving a debt secured
by real property) does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent and is in the
debtor's best interest. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d). These requirements-attorney certification and court
approval for agreements involving pro se debtors-may be adequate to protect the interests of
debtors. The protections provided by the Conference Report are cumbersome and should not be
enacted until the study has been completed and a need for the additional protections has been
established.

5. Serial filers; relief from stay
Proposal
1) Provide that, in a second bankruptcy case filed by a debtor within a one year period, the
court shall enter an order terminating the automatic stay 30 days after the second petition
is filed, without the need for a motion, unless prior to the expiration of 30 days the debtor
demonstrates that the second case was filed in good faith or unless a trustee demonstrates
the potential to administer particular assets for the benefit of the estate [consistent with
CR § 302 except that an order is required].
2) Provide that, upon a third bankruptcy filing by a debtor within a one year period, the
court shall immediately enter an order terminating the automatic stay, without the need
for a motion, except that the stay may be reinstated by the court if the debtor
demonstrates that the third case was filed in good faith or if a trustee demonstrates the
potential to administer particular assets for the benefit of the estate [consistent with CR
§ 302 except that an order is required].
3) Provide in § 362(d) of the Code that, with respect to all personal property securing
consumer debts in Chapter 7 cases, the court shall enter an order terminating the stay,
upon motion, if there has been no redemption or reaffrrmation with respect to the
property within 45 days of the date frrst set for the frrst meeting of creditors, unless the
trustee establishes that the property at issue is of consequential value or benefit to the
estate, in which case the court shall order appropriate adequate protection of the moving
party's interest [consistent with CR § 304-05 except that an order on motion is required].
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4) Provide in § 362(d) of the Code that, with respect to all personal property subject to an
unexpired lease in an individual Chapter 7 case, the court shall enter an order terminating
the stay, upon motion, if there has been no assumption of the lease within 45 days of the
date fIrst set for the fIrst meeting of creditors, unless the trustee establishes that the lease
at issue is of consequential value or benefit to the estate, in which case the court shall
order appropriate adequate protection of the moving party's interest [consistent with CR
§ 305 except that an order on motion is required].
5) Provide in § 362(d) of the Code that, in Chapter 11 cases of small business debtors, the
court shall enter an order terminating the stay, upon motion, if in a prior small business
case of the debtor (or of an entity that the debtor acquired) an order of dismissal or an
order confmning a plan was entered less than two years prior to the order of relief in the
pending case, unless the debtor shows (a) that the pending case was an involuntary one,
filed without collusion with the debtor, or (b) that the need for filing the pending case
arose from unforeseeable circumstances beyond the control of the debtor, and that a nonliquidating plan is probable [consistent with CR § 441 (2) except that an order on motion
is required].
Comment
It is not uncommon for debtors to frustrate collection efforts of secured creditors by filing
bad faith bankruptcy cases. That is unfair to the creditors and relief from the stay should be
promptly granted in these cases, without unnecessary cost to the creditors, unless good grounds
are shown for the stay remaining in effect. The Conference Report provides in several sections
for automatic non-application of the stay (with the stay either not going into effect, or terminating
automatically, without motion) in situations deemed to be potentially abusive. In each of these
situations, the stay would be effective if the debtor or a trustee makes a specified showing of good
faith. The problem with this approach is the uncertainty of whether or not the stay is
applicable-that is, whether the predicates for non-application of the stay have occurred-and
there is potential for confusion if the applicability of the automatic stay is required to be
adjudicated in state court. Accordingly, it would be preferable for the circumstances set out in the
Conference Report to be additional grounds mandating relief from the stay through an order of
the bankruptcy court. This will ensure that questions regarding the grounds for relief are
adjudicated in a forum with experience in the application of the laws in question, and that any
dispute over the application of the law is addressed in the federal appellate process. Specifically:

Repeatfilings by individual debtors. Section 302 of the Conference Report provides that
the stay should automatically terminate after 30 days if there is a second filing by an individual
debtor within one year, and not be applicable at all if there are more than two filings, unless the
debtor takes action to show good faith. In addition to the problem of requiring state courts to
determine any dispute as to whether these provisions are effective, § 302 does not provide an
opportunity for a trustee to show that property in the estate has equity that could be used to pay
debts other than that of the secured creditor seeking to proceed against the property outside of the
bankruptcy. The recommendation would require the bankruptcy court to enter an order
terminating the stay without motion or request of the creditor if the debtor or trustee does not
make the appropriate showing; state courts could then rely on an order of the bankruptcy court in
allowing actions against the debtor's property to proceed.
Redemption or reaffirmation. With respect to personal property that is collateral or
subject to a lease, §§ 304 and 305 of the Conference Report provide for automatic termination of
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the stay if the property is not subject to redemption or reaffirmation by an individual debtor
within a specified 45-day period. The recommendation is for the court to enter an order
terminating the stay if the debtor does not redeem or reaffirm a secured debt, or assume a lease,
within the 45-day period. A motion would be required in these situations, since a reaffirmation
agreement may not be of record. The motion would allow the trustee to present evidence of
equity to the court, so as to allow the trustee to sell the property or assume the lease in question
for the benefit of the estate.
Repeatfilings by small business debtors. Section 441 (2) of the Conference Report
provides for non-application of the automatic stay in situations of repeat filings of small business
Chapter 11 cases. Here, especially, there are likely to be questions as to whether the grounds for
non-application apply. For example, § 441(2) provides that an entity that acquires "substantially
all of the assets or business" of a small business debtor under a confmned plan would not get the
benefit of the automatic stay in its own small business bankruptcy for a two-year period after the
order of confmnation in the original case, unless it showed that the acquisition was ~n good faith
and not for the purposes of avoiding application of the automatic stay limitation. This provision
is subject to considerable potential dispute-both as to the question of whether "all or
substantially all" of the business was acquired, and whether the acquisition was in good faith. It
is better to allow these matters to be resolved in the bankruptcy court, with appeal through the
federal courts, rather than in state court. This, again, can be accomplished by mandating that
relief from the stay shall be granted on motion on the grounds set forth in § 441 (2).

6. Notice to creditors
Proposal
Continue current law pending adoption of procedures for electronic filing and notice
[omits CR § 315(a)].
Comment
Section 315(a) of the Conference Report sets out a new program for providing notice to
creditors, requiring that they be served at a preferred address, which may be on file with the court
generally, on file with the court in a particular case, or listed in the two most recent pieces of
correspondence sent to the debtor within the 90 days preceding the bankruptcy filing, unless the
creditor was prohibited from communicating with the debtor during that period, in which case the
required address would be the one used on correspondence sent to the debtor prior to the 90-day
period. If the preferred address is not used, the debtor or trustee would have the burden of
showing that notice was actually received by the creditor's designated office in order for certain
enforcement actions to be taken against the creditor.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts is currently in the midst of a
transition to electronic filing for the federal judiciary, in which bankruptcy courts are taking the
lead. Participants in the electronic filing program will be able to receive electronic notice of
filings, via the Internet, almost as soon as the filing takes place. This system offers possibilities
for effective notice, on a nationwide basis, that can avoid the uncertainty and potential for
litigation involved in the program set out in § 315(a). Accordingly, it is proposed that the current
law on noticing be continued pending the adoption and implementation of electronic filing.
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7. Time between discharges
Proposal
Retain current law regarding the effect of prior bankruptcy discharges on the ability of the
debtor to obtain a discharge in Chapter 13 [modifies CR § 312].
Comment
Section 312 of the Conference Report changes current law regarding the effect of prior
bankruptcy cases on the ability of an individual to obtain a discharge in a pending case. Under
current law (§ 727(a)(8», a Chapter 7 debtor is subject to denial of discharge if the debtor
obtained a discharge in a Chapter 7 or 11 case filed within six years of the pending case. The
Conference Report extends this time to eight years-a change not affected by this Proposal.
However, § 312 also creates, for the first time, a limitation on the ability of a Chapter 13
debtor to obtain a discharge, by providing that a discharge will not be granted in Chapter 13 if the
debtor obtained a discharge in a Chapter 7, 11, or 12 case filed within four years of the pending
case, or in a Chapter 13 case filed within two years of the pending case. This provision has the
effect of denying any possibility of a bankruptcy discharge, for four years, to an individual who
has obtained a Chapter 7 discharge.
For an individual who is again in fmancial distress after obtaining a Chapter 7 discharge,
Chapter 13 may be the most effective means for financial restructuring. Since the discharge
could only be granted if the debtor devotes all disposable income to plan payments for a
minimum of three years (or pays 100% of all claims), Chapter 13 may well create a framework of
financial responsibility that will prevent further difficulties.
The principal problem of allowing a debtor to file Chapter 13 shortly after a Chapter 7
case is concluded has to do with the so-called "Chapter 20" abuse-in which debtors who could
have addressed all of their debt in Chapter 13 instead file Chapter 7 cases, obtain a discharge of
their unsecured debt, and then pursue Chapter 13 only to deal with the remaining secured debt.
This type of abuse is dealt with by current law requiring that Chapter 13 cases be filed in good
faith (a requirement confmned by CR § I02(g», and by new limitations on the effect of the
automatic stay included in the Conference Report, as discussed above in Recommendation 5.
Denying a discharge to a debtor in the "Chapter 20" situation would have no impact in any event,
because the Chapter 13 debtor would already have received a discharge in the prior Chapter 7
case, and would be using the Chapter 13 only to restructure nondischargeable secured debt.

8. Dischargeability
Proposal
1) Create a new ground for nondischargeability under § 523(a) dealing specifically with
misuse of credit card obligations, and provide that the new ground for
nondischargeability is not applicable to a discharge under § I328(a) of the Code
[modifies CR § 3I4(b)].
2) Remove § 523(a)(I)(B) from the categories of nondischargeable tax debt as to which a
discharge under § I328(a) does not apply [modifies CR § 707].
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Comment
In the area of the dischargeability of debt, the Conference Report makes a substantial
change in current law, largely eliminating the "superdischarge" feature of Chapter 13. Under
current law, a full Chapter 13 discharge, as provided for by § 1328(a), applies to a number of
debts that are nondischargeable under other chapters of the Code, including the following:

• § 523(a)(I)(B) and (C) (debts arising from late-filed and fraudulent tax returns),
• § 523 (a)(2) (debts incurred through fraud),
• § 523 (a)(3) (debts held by creditors who received inadequate notice of the bankruptcy
filing),
• (a)(4) (debts for embezzlement and breach of fiduciary duty), and
• (a)(6) (debts from willful and malicious personal injuries or wrongful death).
Except for willful injuries to property, all of these debts would no longer be dischargeable in
Chapter 13. While most of these changes in the law would have a relatively small impact on the
overall operation of the Chapter 13 process, two of the changes would make Chapter 13 much
less effective, and so are proposed to be modified here. Specifically, the Proposal recommends
retaining the superdischarge as to credit card misuse and tax debt arising from late-filed returns.

Credit card misuse. Credit card misuse is the most commonly encountered form of
nondischargeable debt in Chapter 7. Debts arising from credit card misuse are currently excepted
from discharge under the fraud exception of § 523(a)(2). However, the application of this
provision to credit card misuse has been problematic, since there is no actual contact between the
debtor and the credit issuer at the time the credit card is used. For that reason, the traditional
fraud elements of misrepresentation by the debtor and reasonable reliance by the creditor have
been difficult to defme. Creation of a new ground for nondischargeability, dealing specifically
with credit card misuse, would resolve a number of conflicting approaches under the current law.
Debts incurred with a credit card would be nondischargeable if, at the time of the transaction in
question, the debtor intended to file a bankruptcy case or otherwise did not intend to repay the
debt. Misrepresentation and reliance would not be relevant, and the presumption of
§ 523(a)(2)(C) (as amended by § 310 of the Conference Report) would be fully applicable.
The discharge under § 1328(a) should continue to apply to credit card misuse. This
element of the Chapter 13 superdischarge is significant in any situation where a debtor has
incurred questionable credit card debt. Under current law, such a debtor has a significant
incentive to file under Chapter 13. Even though the debtor may have a colorable defense to a
dischargeability complaint in Chapter 7, and even though Chapter 13 would require the debtor to
complete a minimum three-year plan (or pay all debts in full) in order to obtain the discharge, the
debtor would still likely choose Chapter 13, since that choice would avoid the expense of
litigating the question of dischargeability, and offer the debtor a certain discharge if the plan is
completed. If debts from misuse of credit cards are not dischargeable in Chapter 13, the incentive
is reversed, with the debtor better off filing under Chapter 7. Chapter 7 would provide an
immediate discharge' of all other obligations and allow the debtor to use post-filing earnings to
pay only the questionable credit card debt, while Chapter 13 would require the debtor to make
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partial payment of all unsecured debts, only to have the balance of the credit card debt still owing
at the end of the plan.
Tax debt. The superdischarge should also continue to apply to tax debt arising from latefiled returns. Virtually all such debt is within the priority established by current § 507(a)(8), and
so would have to be paid in full in any Chapter 13 plan under current § 1322(a)(2). However,
making a debt nondischargeable, in addition to its status as a priority debt, has the effect of
continuing interest and penalties. For late tax obligations, interest and penalties can be
significant. Since the debt must be paid in full, the continuation of interest and penalties may
make completion of a Chapter 13 plan impossible for many debtors with late filed claims, and
again, give these debtors a substantial incentive to file under Chapter 7 rather than Chapter 13.
This recommendation would not affect the provision of the Conference Report denying a
discharge under § 1328(a) to fraudulently incurred tax debt.

9. Treatment of secured debt in Chapter 13
Proposal
I) Continue current law allowing a Chapter 13 plan to bifurcate a claim secured by property
other than residential real estate, with the secured portion of the claim accorded the
replacement value of the collateral under § 506(a) of the Code, but provide in addition
that the holder of a purchase money security interest in personal property acquired by the
debtor within one year prior to the bankruptcy filing may elect to require the debtor to
surrender the collateral [modifying CR § 306].
2) Continue current law allowing § 506(a) valuation to vary according to the purpose for
which the valuation is made [omits CR § 327].
3) Clarify that holders of secured claims treated by a Chapter 13 plan must credit payments
made under the plan consistent with the plan provisions [redrafting CR § 202].
4) Require preconfinnation adequate protection payments (in the amounts proposed by the
plan) to be made by the Chapter 13 trustee from payments made by the debtor to the
trustee [modifying CR § 309].
Comment
Bifurcation. Section 306 of the Conference Report changes the current treatment of
secured debt in Chapter 13. Under current law, all claims secured by property other than the
debtor's homestead are subject to bifurcation (or "strip down") under § 506(a) of the Code. That
is, the "secured" portion of the claim, required to be paid in full unless the debtor chooses to
surrender the collateral, is measured by the value of the collateral; to the extent that this value is
less than the full amount of the claim, the debtor is allowed to treat the balance of the claim as
unsecured. Section 309 would eliminate such bifurcation for any motor vehicle loan incurred
within two and a half years of the bankruptcy filing, and any secured debt incurred within one
year of the filing. Thus, if a Chapter 13 debtor wished to keep the collateral securing such a loan,
the debtor would be required to pay the full amount of the outstanding debt, even though the
collateral might be worth much less than that amount. There is no apparent reason for favoring
secured debt in this way. The diversion of funds from unsecured debt would be in excess of the
actual value of the collateral and thus would compensate the secured creditor in excess of what
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that creditor would receive if it repossessed and sold its collateral. The goal of discouraging
debtors from purchasing items on credit shortly before filing bankruptcy can be advanced more
effectively by the recommended alternative of allowing the creditor to ,require surrender of such
items.
Valuation. Under current § 506(a), the value of a secured claim, for purposes of the bifurcation discussed above is determined "in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property." Section 327 of the Conference Report would change
this flexible approach to valuation so as require that, in cases of individual debtors in Chapter 7
and Chapter 13, valuation of secured claims would always be determined "on the replacement
value of such property as of the date of filing the petition, without deduction for costs of sale or
marketing." Secured claims must be valued in many different contexts in individual bankruptcy
cases-from determining how much a Chapter 13 debtor must pay in installments to retain
collateral throughout a plan, to how much a Chapter 7 debtor must pay in a lump sum to redeem
collateral, to how much a creditor must reduce its claim when collateral is surrendered. The
current law, allowing for accommodation of these different circumstances, should be retained.
Allocation ofpayments. Section 202 of the Conference Report adds a new subsection (i)
to § 524 of the Code, which provides that a mortgage holder (or other creditor) whose claim is
treated by a Chapter 13 plan must credit payments received under the plan in the manner that the
plan requires; so that allocating plan payments to prepetition debt or late charges (and then
attempting to collect additional sums from the debtor after the plan concludes) would be a
violation of the discharge injunction. However, the language of section 202 is confusing and may
unduly limit the impact of the provision:
The willful failure of a creditor to credit payments received under a plan
confmned under this title, unless the order confmning the plan is revoked, the
plan is in default, or the creditor has not received payments required to be made
under the plan in the manner required by the plan (including crediting the
amounts required under the plan), shall constitute a violation of an injunction
under subsection (a)(2) if the act of the creditor to collect and failure to credit
payments in the manner required by the plan caused material injury to the debtor.
The following language would more clearly and generally require crediting of plan payments
according to the plan:
Unless the order confirming a plan under this title is revoked, or the case in
which the plan was filed is dismissed, or payments are not transmitted to the
creditor in the manner required by the plan, the failure of a creditor to credit
payments made pursuant to the plan in the manner required by the plan, and any
act of the creditor to collect payments inconsistent with the treatment of the
creditor's claim under the plan, shall constitute a violation of an injunction under
subsection (a)(2).
Preconjirmation adequate protection. Under current law, a Chapter 13 debtor is required
to make full plan payments to the trustee prior to confirmation, but the trustee is directed not to
distribute payments to creditors until the plan is confmned. This situation makes it difficult for
preconfmnation adequate protection payments to be made to secured creditors, and for
preconfmnation lease payments to be made to lessors, whenever the Chapter 13 plan calls for
these payments to be made by the trustee. Section 309(c) of the Conference Report deals with the
need for preconfirmation payments, by requiring the debtor to deduct adequate protection and
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lease payments from the amounts otherwise payable to the trustee prior to confrrmation, and send
the deducted funds directly to the creditor. This approach will cause confusion: debtors will be
unsure of the amounts required to be sent to the trustee, questions will arise as to whether the
payments required to be sent to creditors were in fact sent by the debtor, and confrrmation will
likely be delayed. These problems can be avoided by retaining the requirement that the debtor
submit full preconfrrmation plan payments to the trustee, while directing the trustee to make
adequate protection and lease payments prior to confrrmation.

10. Miscellaneous Chapter 13 matters
Proposal
1) The minimum term of a Chapter 13 plan, in the absence of full payment, should be
extended to five years only for (a) those debtors whose income exceeds 150% of the
applicable state median, and (b) those debtors who have converted their cases to Chapter
13 from Chapter 7 after the filing a motion under § 707(b) [modifies CR § 318].
2)

A Chapter 13 debtor should be required to file post-petition tax returns and amended
budgets only if ordered by the court, either on its own motion or on the motion of any
party in interest, based on a likelihood that the debtor's income or expenses will
materially change [modifies CR § 315(b)].

3) Chapter 13 trustees should be allowed to charge a separate, lower percentage fee for
payment of current mortgage obligations and other large debt payments [new, amends
current 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(I)(B)].
Comment
Minimum plan term. Under current law, the minimum term for a Chapter 13 plan that
does not pay all claims in full is three years. Section 318 of the Conference Report would extend
this term to five years for all debtors with income over the applicable state median. For many
debtors with more than median income, there will remain a choice between filing under Chapter 7
and Chapter 13, and the five-year minimum plan term will be a significant incentive to choose
Chapter 7, with its immediate discharge, rather than Chapter 13. The extended plan term should
be reserved for those debtors who are most likely to be able to address their financial difficulties
outside of bankruptcy (those earning more than 150% of the applicable median), and those whose
Chapter 7 filings are subject to a fmding of abuse under § 707(b). The latter provision would
create an incentive for debtors with a potential ability to repay to file under Chapter 13 in the first
instance.
Tax returns and budgets. Section 315(b) of the Conference Report imposes on Chapter
13 debtors the obligation to file with the court, if requested by the court or any party in interest,
copies of all post-petition tax returns and annual budgets for the duration of the debtor's case.
The tax returns are to be subject to regulations that will allow creditor access to the filings while
protecting the privacy of the debtors. This provision is likely to impose substantial administrative
burdens on the courts, both in connection with maintaining files in a semi-restricted form, and in
enforcing the debtors' obligations. It can be anticipated that many Chapter 13 debtors who are
current in plan payments will fail to file requested tax returns or budgets, leading to enforcement
motions that generate expense for all parties involved and for the court. Chapter 13 plans that
would otherwise have successfully completed payments to creditors may fail because of the
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debtor's delay in responding to such motions. Rather than create an absolute right to the filing of
post-petition tax returns and budgets, it would be preferable to require these filings only in cases
where it appears likely that the debtor's financial condition will change materially (for example,
debtors with a temporary medical condition, or temporarily depressed employment). In this way,
the resources of the court and the parties can be devoted to enforcing disclosure requirements in
cases where they are likely to be significant.
Trustees fees. In many Chapter 13 cases, the most effective way to ensure that the debtor
completes the plan is by deducting plan payments from the debtor's wages, pursuant to § 1325(c)
of the Code. If all of the payments required by the plan are deducted, the debtor is no longer
tempted to divert resources that should be used for debt payment to current consumption. However, the effectiveness of a wage deduction is lost if the debtor is responsible for making certain
debt payments under the plan. Since those payments cannot be deducted from the wages, the
debtor may still choose not to make the debt payment.

Frequently, Chapter 13 plans provide that the debtor, rather than the Chapter 13 trustee,
will make current mortgage payments The principle reason for this provision is that the current
mortgage payment is generally the largest debt payment made, and Chapter 13 trustees are
required to charge a percentage fee on every payment they make, up to 10%, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 586(e)(I)(B). The Attorney General has interpreted § 586(e)(I)(B) as requiring that a
uniform percentage fee be charged on all payments. Thus, if a particular Chapter 13 trustee
charges a fee of 8% on payments made by the trustee, that fee would be added to mortgage
payments made by the trustee, while payments made directly by the debtor would incur no
additional fee. It would greatly benefit the Chapter 13 system if trustees were allowed to charge
lower percentage fees for current mortgage payments or other large monthly payments, so as to
encourage debtors to allow all debt payments to be made through the trustee and to allow for fully
effective wage deduction orders.

11. Bankruptcy administrator
Proposal
Give the bankruptcy administrators in North Carolina and Alabama the same rights, duties
and obligations as u.S. trustees [§§ 232, 405, 416, 439, 1104].
Comment
In North Carolina and Alabama, bankruptcy administrators perfonn the administrative
functions that are perfonned in other jurisdictions by u.S. trustees. Some provisions of the
Conference Report affecting bankruptcy administration refer only to U.S. trustees. These
provisions should be amended to apply to bankruptcy administrators as well.

12. Individual Chapter 11 debtors
Proposal
Omit Conference Report § 321, which would impose Chapter 13-type requirements on
individual debtors in Chapter 11.
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Comment
Under Conference Report § 321, individuals in Chapter 11 are to be treated more like
individuals in Chapter 13. Property of the estate would include postpetition earnings. If an
unsecured creditor objects to confinnation, the debtor must pay all disposable income as defined
in § 1325(b)(2) for five years, or pay the claim in full. The debtor does not receive a discharge
until all payments have been made under the plan. A creditor may request modification of a plan
at any time before completion of the plan. These proposed changes, which apply to all
individuals in Chapter 11 cases, are substantial changes that have not been exposed to public
debate.
The provisions are based on Chapter 13 provisions that do not fit well with Chapter 11
concepts. In Chapter 13 an unsecured creditor can insist that a debtor commit all disposable
income to a plan for three years. That makes sense in Chapter 13 where creditors do not vote.
But in Chapter 11 creditors do vote, and a single creditor should not be able to defeat a plan by
objecting. Also, a single creditor could request modification of a plan. The ramifications of
delaying a discharge in a Chapter 11 case have not been sufficiently studied.
All of these proposed changes should be omitted until they have been studied and
exposed to public debate. If the Chapter 13-type requirements are included at all, they should be
placed in § 1129(b).

13. Small business provisions
Proposal
1) Change the defmition of small business debtor to be consistent with present § 101(51 C)
of the Bankruptcy Code [retains the $2 million aggregate debt limit ofCR § 432, but
eliminates unworkable provisions of the defmition].
2) Pennit flexibility with respect to disclosure statements [same as CR §§ 431,433].
3) Pennit conditional approval of disclosure statements [same as CR § 431].
4) Pennit combined disclosure statement and confinnation hearings [same as CR § 431].
5) Establish unifonn reporting requirements for small businesses, with unifonn fonns
proposed by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules [same as CR §§ 434 and
435].
6) Provide that the debtor must file (rather than "append") a balance sheet and statement of
operations together with its petition; delete tax returns from the filing requirement
[modifies CR § 436].
7) Require status conferences "necessary to further the expeditious and economical
resolution of the case"; change section title to "status conference" [modifies CR § 440
only to make its title consistent with the substantive provision].
8) Retain the 120-day exclusivity period for plan filing by the debtor [modifies the 180-day
period ofCR § 437].

1-29

9) Require the debtor to file a plan and disclosure statement within 120 days of the order for
relief, with extensions for cause possible up to 300 days after the order for relief; allow
further extensions of the filing deadline only upon a showing by the debtor of
extraordinary circumstances and a strong likelihood that a confmnable plan will be
proposed within the further extension [modifies CR § 437].
10) Omit the requirement that a plan be confmned within 45 days of filing [modifies CR
§ 438].
11) Require termination of the automatic stay in defined situations of repeat filings, as set out
in Recommendation 5 [consistent with CR § 441 (2) except that an order on motion is
required].
12) Conduct a study to determine why small businesses become debtors and the best way for
these small businesses to reorganize [same as CR § 443].
Comment
Under current law, special, optional treatment is provided under Chapter 11 for a "small
business." The Conference Report alters the defmition of small business and makes the special
treatment mandatory. As a whole, the changes are helpful, but several present difficulties.
Definition. Consistent with current law, Section 432 of the Conference Report defines a
"small business debtor" as a business with not more than $2 million in aggregate debt, but then
adds qualifications (1) that affiliates of the debtor, also involved in bankruptcy proceedings, are to
be included with the debtor in calculating the amount of debt, and (2) that cases in which the U.S.
trustee has appointed a creditor's committee are excluded from the defmition unless the court
determines that the committee is "not sufficiently active and representative to provide effective
oversight of the debtor." The $2 million limit properly includes most Chapter 11 debtors;
however, the language regarding affiliates of the debtor is awkward and may exclude affiliated
entities that are truly separate businesses from being small business debtors. Also, the presence
of an active creditor's committee should not preclude small business treatment (and, in any event,
there would be considerable uncertainty as to whether the small business provisions applied, since
the court could make a determination that a committee was insufficiently active at any time). The
references to affiliates and to committees should be eliminated, retaining the substance of the
current definition of small business.
Flexible'disclosure statement requirements. Conference Report § 431 amends
Bankruptcy Code § 1125(a)(I) to list factors that the court should consider when approving a
disclosure statement and amends Bankruptcy Code § 1125(f) to give the court, in small business
cases, the flexibility to dispense with a disclosure statement and to approve form disclosure
statements. Both amendments improve the operation of Chapter 11 in small business cases.
Conditional approval ofdisclosure statement; combined hearing on disclosure statement
and confirmation. Conference Report § 431 amends § 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code to give the
court in small business cases the flexibility (1) to approve disclosure statements conditionally and
(2) to combine the hearing on adequacy of the disclosure statement with the confmnation hearing.
For many years, a number of bankruptcy courts have successfully utilized these practices, and the
Code is improved by express statutory provision allowing it.

1-30

Uniform reporting requirements; reporting rules andforms. Conference Report § 434
requires small business debtors to file specific reports, to match projections with actual cash
disbursements, to certify compliance with their reports and with the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, and to explain how noncompliance will be cured. Conference Report § 435 directs the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to propose rules and forms and provides that the
reporting requirements shall take effect 60 days after the rules are prescribed. These reports are
already required in most jurisdictions by U. S. trustees or bankruptcy administrators. Some of the
terms used in the Conference Report are somewhat vague (e.g., "such other matters as are in the
best interest of the debtor and creditors"), but these requirements can be made specific through
the Rules process.
Duties ofthe small business debtor. Conference Report § 436 requires small business
debtors to "append" to their bankruptcy petitions their most recent balance sheet, statement of
operations, cash-flow statement, and Federal income tax return. Senior management must attend
meetings, scheduling conferences, and meetings of creditors unless the court, upon a finding of
extraordinary and compelling circumstances, waives attendance. The debtor must timely file all
schedules (subject to a maximum extension of 30 days absent extraordinary and compelling
circumstances), maintain customary insurance, timely file tax returns, and pay current taxes.
Most courts already impose most of these duties and require these documents. However, not all
of these documents, especially the tax return, should be made part of the public record. The term
"append" is not applicable to electronic filing and should be deleted.
Duties ofthe U.S. trustee. Conference Report § 439 expands the duties of the U.S.
trustee in small business cases to include conducting an initial interview, investigating viability,
asking about the debtor's plan, developing a scheduling order, verifying the filing of tax returns,
and monitoring activities to ascertain inability to confirm a plan. If the trustee finds material
grounds for relief under § 1112, the trustee shall apply promptly after making that fmding to the
court for relief. U. S. trustees and bankruptcy administrators are already performing many of
these functions. It should be noted that the provision requiring the U.S. trustee to move for
dismissal or conversion applies to all Chapter 11 cases, not just to small business cases.
Scheduling conferences. Conference Report § 440 amends § 105(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code to make status conferences mandatory, providing that the court "shall hold such status
conferences as are necessary to further the expeditious and economical resolution of the case."
This provision applies to all Chapter 11 cases. Many courts now hold status conferences. There
are no guidelines as to who should attend, but this would be left to the Bankruptcy Rules. Courts
should have flexibility in designing the type of status conference that works best in the district
and in the particular case. The title of this Conference Report section is "Scheduling
Conferences" and should be changed to "Status Conferences."
Exclusivity in small business cases. Conference Report § 437 provides that in a small
business case the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan for 180 days after the order for
relief, unless the time is extended or reduced for cause. Obtaining an extension of the 180-day
period is appropriately difficult, with the debtor required to "demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that it is more likely than not that the court will confirm a plan within a reasonable
period of time." Furthermore, in situations where exclusivity is to be extended, a new deadline
must be imposed, and the order must be signed before expiration of the fIrst deadline. Presently
all Chapter 11 debtors have a 120-day period of exclusivity that may be extended "for cause."
Small business cases should move quickly, and the exclusivity period should not be longer than in
regular Chapter 11 cases. However, requiring an extension order to be signed prior to the expiration of the deadline penalizes a debtor for delays caused by a court. The period of exclusivity
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should remain at 120 days, and the requirement that the order must be signed prior to expiration
of the deadline should be omitted.
Deadline for plan filing. Conference Report § 437 provides that a small business debtor
must file a plan not later than 300 days after the order for relief. There is no provision for reducing the 300-day period and it may only be extended in the same manner as extending the 180-day
period of exclusivity. In most small business chapter 11 cases a plan should be filed well before
300 days. If300 days is the limit, it may become the standard. The limit should be 120 days with
extensions for "cause" up to a 300-day maximum. In order for an extension beyond 300 days to
be granted, the debtor would be required to "demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
it is more likely than not that the court will confmn a plan within a reasonable period of time."
Confirmation deadline. Conference Report § 438 provides that in a small business case
the court shall confmn a plan that meets the confinnation requirements "not later than 45 days"
after the plan is filed, unless the time for confinnation is extended in the same manner for
extending the 120-day period of exclusivity and the 300-day period to file a plan. The 45-day
time limit for confmning a plan is not realistic and should be omitted. A 45-day limit works well
in Chapter 12 where there is no disclosure statement requirement, no voting" and the confinnation hearing is held on expedited notice. Rule 3017 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure requires 25 days notice for the disclosure statement hearing and 25 days notice for the
confmnation hearing. Combining the two hearings is discretionary, and if the two hearings are
not combined it would be impossible to meet the 45-day limit. The experience in the Eastern
District of North Carolina, where the hearings are almost always combined, is that the hearings
are held about 50 days after the plan is filed.
Small business serialfilers. See Recommendation 5, above.
Small business study. Conference Report § 443 provides that the Small Business
Administration is to conduct a 2-year study to learn why small businesses become debtors and the
best way for these small businesses to reorganize. This is an excellent idea.

14. Expanded grounds for dismissal
Proposal
1) Give the court discretion with respect to dismissal in Bankruptcy Code § 1112, by
retaining the "may" dismiss in the Code and omitting the "shall" dismiss in the
Conference Report [modifies CR § 442].
2) Expand the "for cause" list in Bankruptcy Code § 1112 [same as CR § 442].
3) Omit the 30-day time limit for commencing a hearing on a motion to dismiss and omit
the 15-day limit on deciding such a motion [modifies CR § 442].
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Comment
Conference Report § 442 amends § 1112 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that the
court "shall" convert or dismiss a Chapter 11 case if the movant establishes cause "absent unusual
circumstances specifically identified by the court that establish that the requested conversion or
dismissal is not in the best interests of creditors and the estate." "Cause" is defmed to include
matters such as gross mismanagement, failure to maintain insurance, unauthorized use of cash
collateral, failure to file a report, failure to appear for examination, failure to pay taxes or file tax
returns, failure to file a plan on time, failure to effectuate substantial consummation of a plan,
material default under a plan and failure to pay domestic support obligations. The court can
excuse such conduct if the debtor establishes that "there is a reasonable likelihood that a plan will
be confmned within the applicable time frames" and 1) there is a "reasonable justification" for
the act or omission and 2) there will be a cure of the act or omission within "a reasonable period
fixed by the court." As an alternative to conversion or dismissal, the court may appoint a trustee
or examiner. Conference Report § 442 further requires the court to commence a hearing under
§ 1112 not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion and to decide the motion not later than
15 days after commencement of the hearing. These time limits may be extended for "compelling
circumstances."
These provisions, although contained in the small business section of the Conference
Report, apply to all Chapter 11 cases. The Conference Report makes conversion or dismissal
mandatory by changing "may" to "shall." Conversion or dismissal may be avoided in "unusual
circumstances specifically identified by the court," but it would be better to leave conversion or
dismissal to the court's discretion and to retain the word "may" rather than "shall." Conversion
or dismissal may also be avoided by having a confmnation-type hearing at which the debtor must
show "reasonable justification" for the act or omission (frequently there is no justification) and a
cure within a reasonable period of time (sometimes there is no cure), and must also show a
reasonable likelihood that a plan will be confirmed within the established time limit. It is
important to make the debtor accountable for improper activities and omissions. However, every
case is different, and the court should have the discretion to convert or dismiss without having to
conduct an elaborate and expensive hearing. The 30-day time period for holding a hearing and
the 15-day time limit for deciding the issue are too restrictive and should be omitted.
15. Requirement to describe tax consequences
Proposal
Omit the requirement in Conference Report § 717 that Chapter 11 debtors include in the
disclosure statement a description of the tax consequences of the plan [modifies CR § 717].
Comment
Conference Report § 717 amends § 1125(a)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code to require that a
disclosure statement include "a discussion of the potential material Federal tax consequences of
the plan to the debtor, any successor to the debtor, and a hypothetical investor typical of the
holders of claims or interests in the case." This requirement· is not realistic. A debtor will not
know the tax consequences to its creditors, and any tax opinion would be costly and speculative
at best.
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Table of Proposed Revisions to H.R. 333 Conference Report
Sec. No.

Issue

Present Content

Proposed Treatment

101

Consent to conversion in 707(b)

Retain

102

Means testing

Allows consensual conversion to Ch.
12 or 13 as an alternative to dismissal
Complex presumption of abuse based
on IRS collection standards; enhanced
scheduling and noticing requirements
for all debtors; enhanced liability for
debtors' counsel

103

IRS standards amendment and
study

Sense of Congress that standards may
be altered; EOUST study ordered

105

Pilot educational program

106

Credit counseling; mandatory
debtor education

18-month test of educational programs
in six districts, followed by report of
Director of EOUST to Congress
Credit counseling an eligibility
requirement, education required for all
consumer debtors.

107
202

Schedules for Chapter 13
expenses
Failure'to credit plan payments;
ride-through contacts for home
mortgages

203

Reaffrrmation

302

Stay exceptions for serial filings

304

Stay for personal property
collateral

305
306

Stay for personal property and
leases
Secured debt in Chapter 13

309

Chapter 13 secured claims

312

Extended time between
discharges

Part of the formula for calculating
means-test deductions
Some failures to credit plan payments
made a violation of discharge injunction; request for payment in lieu of
foreclosure not a violation
Extensive disclosure requirement with
broad safe harbors for creditors);
30-day termination of stay in first refiling within a year; no stay in second
refiling unless required showings made
Stay terminated if no redemption or
reaffrrmation in 45 days after first
meeting; no installment redemption
Similar to 304 of the Act, as above, but
with conflicting terms
(1) Requires lien retention until debt
paid in full or discharge granted; (2) 21/2 year anti-stripdown for car loans;
(3) 1 year anti-stripdown for all other
secured debt; (4) principal residence
defined.
(1) secured claim not reduced on
conversion to Ch 7; (2) procedures for
debtors to assume personal property
leases; (3) adequate protection
payments, including preconfirmation
payments directly by the debtor; (4)
proof of insurance required from
debtor
727(a) extended to 8 years; no
discharge in 13 if prior discharge in a
7, 11, or 12 filed within 4 years or a 13
filed within 2 years

Amend: Means test based on
gross income; safe harbor under
median; creditor standing to file
§ 707(b) motions above median;
enhanced scrutiny above defined
level (150% of median); omit
enhanced attorney liability
Retain study; omit sense of
Congress pending study on use
of IRS standards
Retain

Amend to make credit counseling required only in chapter 7;
defer mandatory education
pending results of pilot program
Omit pending results of study on
use of IRS standards
Amend to clarify provision
regarding failure to credit plan
payments
Omit subject to completion of
study
Amend to provide for order
terminating stay
Amend to provide for order
terminating stay
Amend to add leases to
procedure under § 304
Amend to provide that a creditor
with a pmsi not more than one
year old may require return of
collateral

Amend to provide for
preconfirmation adequate
protection payments to be made
by the Chapter 13 trustee from
payments made to the trustee by
the debtor

Amend to retain current law
regarding Chapter 13 discharge

(a) Debts incurred to pay non-federal
taxes excepted from discharge; (b)
superdischarge eliminated for
523(a)(2) and (4) and for personal
injuries
(a) Complex notice system with
burden on debtor to show effective
notice; (b) new document production
requirements for debtors, including
pay stubs, tax returns, and annual
budgets
Failure to file results in dismissal
without motion, deadline only
extended once

314

New ground for nondischargeability; superdischarge

315

Notice to creditors

316

Automatic dismissal for
inadequate filings

318

Term of Chapter 13 plan

5 yrs for debtors over the median
income level

321
327

Individual Chapter 11 cases
§ 506(a) valuation

431

Flexible Rules for disclosure
statement and plan

432

Defmition

433

Standard form disclosure
statement and plan

434

Uniform reporting requirements

435

Uniform rules and forms

436

Debtor duties in small business
cases

Generally imposes Chapter 13 rules
Requires retail value in Ch 7/13
individual cases
List of factors when considering
disclosure statement; flexibility in
approving disclosure statement;
approval of form disclosure
statements; conditional approval of
disclosure statements; combining
hearings on disclosure statement and
confirmation of plan
$2 million in aggregate debt (includes
debtor affiliates but excludes debtor
affiliates with more than $2 million in
debt) where creditors' committee has
not been appointed or committee is not
sufficiently active
Bankruptcy Rules Committee to
propose standard forms for disclosure
statements and plans
Small business debtors must file
reports and certify compliance with
reports and Bankruptcy Rules
Bankruptcy Rules Committee to
propose forms for reports
Small business debtors must "append"
most recent balance sheet, statement of
operations, cash flow, and income tax
statement to petition; senior
management must attend meetings and
conferences; must file schedules on
time, maintain insurance. file tax
returns and pay current taxes
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Amend to create new ground for
credit card nondischargeability,
subject to Chapter 13
superdischarge
Omit notice provisions pending
adoption of electronic filing
procedures; provide for wage
information to be provided to
trustee prior to creditors meeting
Amend to require entry of order
on motion; allow trustee objection for avoidance actions or
727 action
Amend: 5 years for debtors with
income more than 150% of
median or who pursue Chapter
13 after a 707 (b) motion
Omit
Omit
Retain

Omit references to affiliates and
committees; keep present
definition in § 101 (51 C)

Retain

Retain

Retain
Retain most provisions; delete
"append;" do not make income
tax return part of public record;
delete "extraordinary and
compelling circumstances"
standard

.....

437

Plan filing and confirmation
deadlines

Small business debtor has 180-day
period of exclusivity; debtor must
file a plan not later than 300 days
after the order for relief; deadlines
may not be extended unless debtor
can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it
is more likely than not that the
court will confirm a plan within a
reasonable period of time

438

Plan confirmation deadline

439

UST duties

440

Scheduling conference

441

Serial filer provisions

442

Expanded grounds for
dismissal or conversion

443

Small business study

603

Audits

707

Superdischarge

Court shall confirm a plan not
later than 45 days after it is filed
Expands duties ofUST in small
business cases, including verifying
filing of tax returns
Court shall hold such status
conferences as are necessary to
further the expeditious and
economical resolution of the case
Automatic stay does not apply
with respect to certain serial filing
small business debtors
Court "shall" convert or dismiss
"absent unusual circumstances"
upon showing of cause; cause is
defined
Small Business Administration to
study causes of small business
filings and to determine best way
for small business debtors to
reorganize
Audits must be conducted of a
random minimum 0.4% of all
consumer filings and of all
schedules "reflecting greater than
average variance" from district
norms, under GAAS by
independent certified or licensed
public accountants or under
regulations of the Attorney
General (adopted within 2 years of
enactment of the legislation); 18
month delay in effect
523(a)(1)(B) (unfilled or late filed
taxes) and (C) (fraudulently filed
taxes) made nondischargeable in
Ch13

- -_ _--1.-.3.6

Amend to provide 120-day
exclusivity period,
extendable for cause; small
business debtor must file
plan within 90 days of order
for relief, but time may be
extended for cause; court
may not extend time
beyond 300 days unless the
debtor makes specified
showing
Omit
Retain

Retain, except change
caption to "Status
Conferences"
Retain, except require order
terminating the stay on
motion
Modify to give court more
discretion as to whether to
convert or dismiss
Retain

Amend: audits charged only
to those in "enhanced
scrutiny" class; all audits
should be conducted
pursuant to EOUST
regulations, by employees
or contractors of EOUST;
regulations within 18
months; effective 6 months
thereafter

Amend: remove only
§ 523(a)(1)(C) tax debts
from the superdischarge of
§ 1328(a)
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